



**SANCUS – ADVANCING THE PROTECTION  
AND PROMOTION OF DEMOCRATIC  
ACCOUNTABILITY WORLDWIDE  
PROJECT HANDBOOK 2021–2023**

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Authors: Matt Jenkins, Caitlin Maslen, Alice Gracy, Kate Hanlon, Isabelle Büchner and Jorum Duri.

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# INTRODUCTION

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The project – Strengthening Accountability Networks among Civil Society (SANCUS) – aims to contribute to greater democratic accountability of public institutions globally, specifically by empowering civil society organisations (CSOs) to demand systemic change to address accountability and anti-corruption deficits in 26 countries over 36 months.

The SANCUS partners include eight national CSOs from sub-Saharan Africa (Cameroon, Rwanda, the Gambia, Madagascar, Nigeria, Kenya, Zambia and Zimbabwe), eight from Latin America and the Caribbean (Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Guatemala, Jamaica, Honduras, Panama, and Peru), four from the Middle East and North Africa (Morocco, Lebanon, Jordan and Palestine), four from Asia Pacific (Cambodia, Sri Lanka, Indonesia and Maldives) and two from Eastern Europe and Central Asia (Armenia and Bosnia and Herzegovina).

## PROBLEM STATEMENT

SANCUS countries exhibit certain common accountability and anti-corruption deficits, though the precise constellation naturally varies according to context. On the supply side of accountability, these deficiencies typically include a lack of integrity in state institutions as well as weaknesses of oversight institutions. This is often accompanied by a frail rule of law, which hinders the enforcement of formal rules.<sup>1</sup> On the demand side, CSO led accountability initiatives are increasingly challenging due to shrinking civic space and the exclusion of affected communities from policy and budgetary processes that affect them.

**(i) Lack of integrity in public institutions.** There is typically a lack of transparency, accountability and adherence to the values of public service in state institutions in the target countries. This deficit mainly stems from the distinction between the public and private spheres being “blurred by patronage, lack of the rule of law, and politicised administrations”.<sup>2</sup> In these settings, formal institutions are “susceptible to manipulation, corruption and bias” and unable to enforce integrity rules or disburse public goods in an unpartisan fashion.<sup>3</sup> SANCUS countries face challenges such as embedded patronage networks, opaque political party financing, unresolved conflicts of interest, undue influence and the abuse of state resources.<sup>4</sup>

**(ii) Weak rule of law.** Assessments of anti-corruption interventions in weak rule of law contexts posit that top-down approaches to strengthen formal enforcement mechanisms are

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<sup>1</sup> Mungiu-Pippidi, A. 2015. *The Quest for Good Governance: How Societies Develop Control of Corruption*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

<sup>2</sup> Johnson, J. 2016. *Anti-Corruption Strategies in Fragile States*, Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham. p. xv

<sup>3</sup> Kaplan, S. 2015. [Modelling Fragility: A Social and Institutional Approach](#), OECD Institutions and Stability Blog.

<sup>4</sup> Duri, J. 2020. [Overview of Corruption and Anti-Corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa](#). Anti-Corruption Helpdesk Answer; Transparency International. 2020. [CPI 2019: Eastern Europe and Central Asia](#)

unlikely to be successful as they typically collide with powerful vested interests.<sup>5</sup> Rather, in countries characterised by abusive, rent-seeking elites, strong centralised authority is itself a conduit for the diversion of resources and abuse of power.<sup>6</sup> In these settings, powerful individuals are able to divert public funds and misappropriated state assets for their own self-interest and enrichment at the expense of citizens.<sup>7</sup>

**(iii) Weak checks and balances.** A primary source of accountability deficits and a structural political economy feature<sup>8</sup> is the absence of political will to tackle corruption from within the state. In such “strong but unwilling” states, weak oversight institutions may be “as much a product of political calculus as of a lack of human, financial and technical resources”.<sup>9</sup> Where political leaders deliberately constrain independent oversight institutions, loot the treasury, and distribute resources in a particularistic and partisan manner, redressing the balance requires strengthening actors able to act as a counterweight to the executive branch, as well as animating checks and balances – be these formal or otherwise.<sup>10</sup> In other types of hybrid political orders where the state presence is weak, gaps in authority and services may be filled by a range of non-state actors, many of whom may depend on corruption to maintain their power and influence.<sup>11</sup>

**(iv) Shrinking civic space.** The notion that supply-side measures to strengthen state institutions alone will resolve accountability deficits is increasingly recognised as overly simplistic.<sup>12</sup> Yet in recent years, the enabling environment conducive to demand-side accountability initiatives has deteriorated. Both the Economist Intelligence Unit’s [Democracy Index](#) and Freedom House’s [Freedom in the World](#) indices register substantial net declines in the health of democracies, while the CIVICUS Monitor also records a consistent downward trend in the number of countries with “open” civic space.<sup>13</sup> The past years have also seen an overall weakening of democratic institutions, rights and shrinking civil society space in numerous parts of the world.<sup>14</sup>

**(v) Lack of public participation in decision-making.** Enhanced public participation is widely believed to improve government outcomes and reduce corruption.<sup>15</sup> However, citizens are often excluded from decision-making processes by office bearers, despite the fact they are

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<sup>5</sup> Khan, M. et al. 2016. [Anti-Corruption in Adverse Contexts: A Strategic Approach](#). SOAS Working Paper

<sup>6</sup> OECD. 2018. *States of Fragility 2018*, OECD Publishing, Paris. p24

<sup>7</sup> Transparency International. 2019. [Middle East and North Africa: Corruption Continues As Institutions and Political Rights Weaken](#)

<sup>8</sup> Zaum, D. 2013. [Political Economies of Corruption in Fragile and Conflict-Affected States: Nuancing the Picture](#), U4 Brief

<sup>9</sup> OECD. 2018. *States of Fragility 2018*, OECD Publishing, Paris. p43

<sup>10</sup> OECD. 2018. *States of Fragility 2018*, OECD Publishing, Paris. p43

<sup>11</sup> United Nations; World Bank. 2018. *Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict*. World Bank Group, Washington, DC. p142

<sup>12</sup> Kaplan, S. 2008. *Fixing Fragile States: A New Paradigm for Development*, Praeger Security International, London

<sup>13</sup> Transparency International. 2019. [Tackling the Crisis of Democracy, Promoting Rule of Law and Fighting Corruption](#); CIVICUS. 2020. [Civic Space in Numbers](#)

<sup>14</sup> Smidt, H. 2018. [Shrinking Civic Space in Africa: When Governments Crack Down on Civil Society](#). German Institute for Global and Area Studies; Transparency International. 2018. [Digging Deeper into Corruption, Violence against Journalists and Active Civil Society](#); UN News. 2020. [Latin America and Caribbean Region Deadliest for Journalists in 2019](#); Transparency International. 2020. [Accountability in Asia Pacific](#)

<sup>15</sup> Marin, J.N. 2016. [Evidence of Citizen Engagement Impact in Promoting Good Governance and Anti-Corruption Efforts](#). U4 Helpdesk paper

deeply affected by these decisions. Public participation is also hindered by a general lack of knowledge on the part of citizens,<sup>16</sup> as well as barriers to information held by public institutions that would enable citizens to effectively participate and demand accountability.

## THEORY OF CHANGE

To address these accountability and anti-corruption deficits, the SANCUS project will empower CSOs and citizens to engage with office bearers to demand greater democratic accountability of public institutions through various tools and methods. Individuals, communities, CSOs and public institutions that are targeted and sensitised to democratic accountability deficits – as well as potential remedies – are believed to be better placed to demand greater accountability.

To achieve this, the project embeds national CSOs into global cross-country relationships they can leverage to demand greater accountability in the use of public goods. The driving idea is to support national CSOs to address their own specific needs and constraints by drawing on the knowledge, skills and resources of their peers across the SANCUS network and beyond.

Two interlinked work packages will contribute to the action's intended outcomes: (i) one package for global and regional roles; and (ii) a second for in-country roles. The Transparency International Secretariat and the four co-beneficiaries (Chile, Kenya, Palestine and Sri Lanka) have primary implementing responsibilities for global management and regional coordination and facilitation. The national CSOs will implement in-country work packages with the support of the networks created by SANCUS.

The action adopts a two-lever approach to enhance democratic accountability:

- *vertical accountability*: the means by which the state is held to account by citizens and their associations
- *horizontal accountability*: the means by which one state actor has the formal authority to demand explanations or impose penalties on another body as part of intra-governmental checks and balances<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> Marzuki, A. 2015. [Challenges in the Public Participation and the Decision Making Process](#). Institute for Social Research in Zagreb

<sup>17</sup> Transparency and Accountability Initiative. 2017. [How Do We Define Key Terms? Transparency and Accountability Glossary](#)

Outcomes	Outputs	
(1) <b>Network building:</b> CSOs and rights holders are more effectively mobilised to demand greater accountability and integrity through increased visibility, strategic advocacy and broad networks.	(1) A <b>network of CSOs</b> undertakes sustained peer-to-peer sharing of expertise, knowledge and collective advocacy strategies.	(4 – supporting outcomes 1-3) Enhanced capacities of CSOs to utilise <b>digital tools</b> in advocacy, monitoring, legal protection and participation of marginalised citizens.
(2) <b>Vertical accountability:</b> CSOs meaningfully engage duty bearers in consultations, redress mechanisms, as well as in the monitoring and scrutiny of their responsiveness throughout the policy and budget cycles.	(2) Strengthened protections, knowledge, tools and technical capacity of <b>CSOs to demand accountability</b> from and counter corruption of duty bearers as well as strengthened relationships between public sector and civil society.	
(3) <b>Horizontal accountability:</b> CSOs more strongly advocate for enhanced parliamentary oversight, as well as stronger democratic accountability institutions and mechanisms, based on systematic monitoring and public reporting on their performance, using digital technologies.	(3) Enhanced standards, guidelines and monitoring tools/systems to regularly report on <b>parliamentary oversight</b> and oversight agencies' performance.	

Where authorities abuse their powers, there is a need for interventions by citizens, CSOs and independent media to hold the government and public officials accountable.<sup>18</sup> Such demand-side accountability is often regarded as “the antidote to weak state-centred accountability”,<sup>19</sup> and essential for democratic governance.<sup>20</sup> In an environment where institutions are weak and vulnerable to corruption, many scholars posit donor support to non-state actors to increase demand-side accountability as one of the few viable anti-corruption policy options,<sup>21</sup> not least because of the inherently political task of demanding downward accountability.<sup>22</sup> SANCUS thus places a strong emphasis on the demand side of vertical or social accountability that consciously builds on a growing willingness among citizens to demand their rights and monitor the performance of duty bearers.<sup>23</sup> The experience from Transparency International’s [Advocacy and Legal Advice Centres](#) (ALACs), for instance, demonstrates that equipping CSOs to operate

<sup>18</sup> Lührmann, A., Marquardt, K.L. and Mechkova, V. 2017. [Constraining Governments: New Indices of Vertical, Horizontal and Diagonal Accountability](#). The Varieties of Democracy Institute, Working Paper 46; Barma, N. 2008. [Matching Governance Demand and Supply](#). World Bank Blogs ; Kessy, T.A. 2020. [The Demand and Supply Sides of Accountability in Local Government Authorities in Tanzania](#). Public Integrity, pp1-20

<sup>19</sup> Brinkerhoff, D.W. and Wetterberg, A. 2015. [Gauging the Effects of Social Accountability on Services, Governance, and Citizen Empowerment](#). Public Administration Review, 76(2): 274-286

<sup>20</sup> Bovens, M. 2005. Public accountability, in Ferlie, E., Lynne, I. and Pollitt, C (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Public Management*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press

<sup>21</sup> Schouten, C. 2011. [Social Accountability in Situations of Conflict and Fragility](#), U4 Brief; Peacebuilding Initiative. 2019. [Civil Society: Key Debates & Implementation Challenges](#); Johnson, J. et al. 2012. [Mapping Evidence Gaps in Anti-Corruption](#), U4 Issue.

<sup>22</sup> Mungiu-Pippidi, A. 2006. Corruption: Diagnosis and Treatment, *Journal of Democracy*, vol.17(3). p98

<sup>23</sup> The Economist Intelligence Unit. 2019. [Democracy Index 2019](#). p8; Gorbanova, M. 2015. [Speak Up: Empowering Citizens against Corruption](#). Transparency International; Mechkova, B., Bernhard, M. And Lührmann, A. 2019. [Diagonal Accountability and Development Outcomes](#). The Varieties of Democracy Institute/ Open Government Partnership

as intermediaries between state structures and citizens can help improve the accountability of public bodies.

SANCUS will also seek to empower national CSOs to exert demand-side pressure on horizontal accountability mechanisms by engaging and cooperating with oversight institutions to scrutinise duty bearers. For instance, collaboration with oversight agencies to help them collect and publish relevant data can enable civil society to monitor public policy and budgetary processes.<sup>24</sup> There is good evidence that such civil society oversight of the budget formulation, allocation and execution processes can reduce the risks of misallocation and particularism that unduly favour special interest groups.<sup>25</sup>

As such, SANCUS will involve global and country-based activities targeting both vertical and horizontal accountability simultaneously to maximise pressure for improved democratic accountability in public institutions. Knowledge networks and citizen-led action will target government duty bearers, such as service providers (vertical lever), while also monitoring the performance of oversight institutions such as parliaments and supreme audit institutions meant to keep those duty bearers in check (horizontal lever). The global and regional level activities will focus on deepening national CSOs' thematic knowledge of key accountability topics through the establishment of dedicated cross-regional clusters, the production of research tools needed to generate evidence that can be used to push for reform and finally the development of CSOs' technical skills to undertake effective monitoring interventions. This will position national CSOs to play an active role in advocacy and policy formulation through the execution of national work plans.

SANCUS CSOs will also use digital tools to enhance their advocacy, monitoring, legal protection, and mobilisation of citizens. The main goal is to capitalise on digital tools to advance accountability where information is digitalised, and internet penetration, digital literacy and security risks allow.

## EXPECTED IMPACT

SANCUS support to CSOs will contribute to strengthening democratic accountability through a variety of civic engagement modalities, including monitoring, consultations and advocacy campaigns designed to curb corruption and rights violations. We expect to affect SANCUS target groups in the following directions:

- **CSOs** from 26 countries are both a target group and final beneficiary of the action. SANCUS will empower CSOs across three levels. At a technical level, these CSOs will attain improved techniques, tools and expertise that will outlast the life of the project. At a political and policy level, SANCUS is expected to not only protect but also expand the enabling environment in the country for CSOs and citizens to seek accountability

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<sup>24</sup> United Nations Development Programme. *Fighting Corruption in Post-Conflict and Recovery Situations: Learning from the Past*. New York: UNDP, 2010. p78

<sup>25</sup> Kukutschka, R. 2016. [Civil Society Budget Monitoring](#), Anti-Corruption Helpdesk Answer; Grimes, M. 2013. *The Contingencies of Societal Accountability: Examining the Link Between Civil Society and Good Government*, *Studies in Comparative International Development*, vol.48 (4): pp380–402

from duty bearers, thereby affording greater opportunities to realise their rights. At a deeper social and economic level, SANCUS will strengthen the agency of informal coalitions in the country to demand greater accountability from government while reducing the incentives and opportunities for corruption. Likewise, SANCUS will create incentives and effective tools or methodologies for these CSOs to more effectively mobilise **individuals and communities** for greater participation in decision-making as well as demanding greater accountability from duty bearers.

- SANCUS targets **duty-bearing public offices and officials** to increase supply-side accountability in the long term. At a policy and technical level, SANCUS expects to identify malpractice and regulatory obstacles preventing a closer engagement between officials and the groups of citizens they are meant to serve. Moreover, SANCUS shall nurture those relationships through channels allowing for feedback loops beyond the life of the project. Ideally, this will benefit from multi-stakeholder collaboration to improve duty bearers' internal integrity frameworks and protocols.
- In addition, SANCUS targeting of **oversight institutions** intends to affirm their independence from executive interference and performance to fulfil their constitutional mandates in the long term. At a more technical level, SANCUS will develop monitoring mechanisms and evidence that could assist these oversight institutions to improve their methodologies and protocols.

Ultimately, **rights holders, individuals and communities** will be the final beneficiaries of increased democratic accountability for the sectors and services targeted by each SANCUS work plan. Marginalised sections within communities face most constraints to realise their rights, such as limited access to redress mechanisms, service delivery failures, instances of corruption and other expressions of government failures.<sup>26</sup> Such under-represented groups with limited "voices", include women, rural populations, poor households and young people. SANCUS will contribute to overcoming the constraints of these groups by empowering CSOs to engage them in policy processes and anti-corruption initiatives, including network building, joint advocacy campaigns, media exposure to their demands, participatory budgeting, public expenditure tracking surveys, report cards, public hearings, citizen juries and social audits.

A specific added value of SANCUS is that it not only contributes to SDG 16.7 in the countries of implementation but also to efforts to monitor progress towards indicator SDG 16.7.2 in those countries. This indicator, classified as Tier II by the [Inter-Agency and Expert Group on SDG Indicators](#), is characterised by a dearth of corresponding data in many countries. The project will attempt to capture and baseline available data in SANCUS countries that could be used to assess progress towards the 2030 target.

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<sup>26</sup> Schouten, C. 2011. [Social Accountability in Situations of Conflict and Fragility](#), U4 Brief.

## LITERATURE REVIEW

Accountability as a concept refers to the relationship between an agent (typically public officials) and a principal (generally conceived of as the citizenry or body politic), in which agents are “entrusted with authority to act on behalf” of the principal.<sup>27</sup> Agents have their own personal interests and preferences, and they may act in accordance with these rather than with the interests of the principle. As such, accountability deficits can arise where the principal is unable to effectively monitor and restrain the behaviour of the agents.

In essence, accountability is about ensuring that those entrusted with power are made answerable for their behaviour and that there is redress when those in positions of power fail to live up to their duties or prioritise private over public interests.<sup>28</sup>

Accountability is widely acknowledged as being a fundamental, constituent element of good governance and democracy.<sup>29</sup> In the face of declining public trust in democratic institutions over the past several decades,<sup>30</sup> there is growing pressure from citizens for more transparency and greater accountability on the part of decision-makers.<sup>31</sup> In this sense, accountability is sometimes interpreted more broadly as a proxy for the quality of democracy and an indicator of the strength of the rule of law, good governance and effectiveness of public institutions.<sup>32</sup>

The most important global development framework, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, explicitly commits governments to enhancing their accountability as an essential means of securing a better and more sustainable future. Goal 16 calls for all countries to promote “peaceful and inclusive development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels”.<sup>33</sup>

While accountability is often viewed as a kind of “institutionalised relationship” between principal and agent,<sup>34</sup> it is important to recognise that this relationship can be tempestuous and even adversarial. Fox describes efforts to demand improved accountability and censure perceived failings on the part of duty bearers as taking place in an “arena of conflict over whether and how those in power are publicly responsible for their decision”.<sup>35</sup> Demanding greater accountability is not a technocratic endeavour – it is an inherently political task.

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<sup>27</sup> Stephenson, M. 2015. [Corruption is BOTH a “Principal-Agent Problem” AND a “Collective Action Problem](#). The Global Anticorruption Blog; Zúñiga, N. U4 Anti-Corruption Helpdesk. [Does More Transparency Improve Accountability?](#) p.2

<sup>28</sup> Transparency and Accountability Initiative. 2017. [“How Do We Define Key Terms? Transparency and Accountability Glossary](#)

<sup>29</sup> OECD. 2014. *Accountability and Democratic Governance: Orientations and Principles for Development*. DAC Guidelines and Reference Series, p.30

<sup>30</sup> OECD. 2013. *Trust in Government, Policy Effectiveness and the Governance Agenda*. *OECD Publishing*

<sup>31</sup> Mulgan, R. 2003. *Holding Power to Account: Accountability in Modern Democracies*. *Springer*. p.2

<sup>32</sup> Castiglione, D. 2012. [Democratic and Public Accountability](#), Britannica

<sup>33</sup> United Nations. [SDG 16](#)

<sup>34</sup> Transparency and Accountability Initiative. 2017. [How Do We Define Key Terms? Transparency and Accountability Glossary](#)

<sup>35</sup> Fox, J. 2007. *Accountability Politics: Power and Voice in Rural Mexico*

This begs several questions. First, what does accountability look like in practice and what forms can it take? Second, how can the quality of accountability relationships between rights holders and duty bearers be assessed? Third, what can be done to strengthen these relationships?

In answer to the first question, it is important to recognise that there are different dimensions of accountability. The traditional understanding of accountability in democratic societies revolved around the ability of citizens to influence political outcomes through formal channels. Most obviously, this centred on citizens' key role in the orderly transition of power through electoral processes.

Over the last 30 years, this has come to be seen as an overly restrictive view of democratic accountability, with an excessive reliance on "ex post facto" means of political control via the ballot box.<sup>36</sup> A more expansive view of accountability has progressively emerged, which also considers procedural aspects and covers a wide array of instruments intended to produce desirable behaviour on the part of agents independently of the principal's capacity to sanction a lack of integrity during elections.<sup>37</sup>

Following the pioneering work of Guillermo O'Donnell in the 1990s, scholars have increasingly come to distinguish between three different forms of accountability: vertical, diagonal and horizontal.<sup>38</sup>

## Vertical and diagonal accountability

Vertical accountability refers to the relationship between public officials (agent) and citizens (principals), and particularly the capacity of the latter to directly hold the former to account. Key measures of the strength of vertical accountability have typically included the regular occurrence of free and fair elections, the quality of political parties and incumbents' adherence to their campaign promises.<sup>39</sup> Yet elections are an imperfect accountability mechanism given their periodic nature, as well as the complex relationship between voters' political preferences for future administrations and their desire to pass judgement on the previous government.<sup>40</sup>

Therefore, it is important to consider alternative routes to vertical accountability beyond "formal institutional channel[s]" such as elections and party politics.<sup>41</sup> More informal means of exercising vertical accountability can include a range of bottom-up initiatives to improve the openness of institutions, broaden public participation, and make policy and budgetary processes more responsive to public needs.

These approaches are intended to allow citizens to make demands on the state directly, be this through "public demonstrations, protests, investigative journalism [or] public interest

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<sup>36</sup> Castiglione, D. 2012. [Democratic and Public Accountability](#), Britannica

<sup>37</sup> Castiglione, D. 2012. [Democratic and Public Accountability](#), Britannica

<sup>38</sup> See O'Donnell, G. Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies, *Journal of Democracy*, vol.9(3), (1998) pp112-126

<sup>39</sup> Mulgan, R. 2003. *Holding Power to Account: Accountability in Modern Democracies*. Palgrave Macmillan. pp.41-45

<sup>40</sup> Mulgan, R. 2003. *Holding Power to Account: Accountability in Modern Democracies*. Palgrave Macmillan. pp.41-45

<sup>41</sup> Transparency and Accountability Initiative. 2017. [How Do We Define Key Terms? Transparency and Accountability Glossary](#)

lawsuits”.<sup>42</sup> This kind of action by citizens – or their allies in community-based organisations, civil society organisations or independent media – can prove useful in “by-pass[ing] cumbersome or compromised formal accountability systems”.<sup>43</sup> As such, it is sometimes referred to as **diagonal accountability** because it seeks to “fill the accountability gap that formal institutions leave”.<sup>44</sup>

Alternative means of spurring formal institutional checks and balances into action include **social accountability** tools such as community monitoring and participatory budgeting.<sup>45</sup> While social accountability mechanisms are usually considered to be a means of strengthening vertical accountability,<sup>46</sup> it is important to note that, unlike voting, it involves citizens acting collectively rather than individually.<sup>47</sup>

There is a body of evidence that suggests that embedding social accountability methods into governmental procedures is closely related to increased government transparency, greater accountability and, consequentially, lower levels of corruption.<sup>48</sup> Lührmann et al., for instance, provide empirical support for the notion that robust diagonal accountability is associated with more capable public administrations and stronger economic development.<sup>49</sup>

## Horizontal accountability

Horizontal accountability refers to the means by which one state actor has the formal authority to demand explanations or impose penalties on another public institution as part of intra-governmental checks and balances.<sup>50</sup> Horizontal accountability mechanisms can be seen as the expression of the separation of powers in action.<sup>51</sup> In addition to the legislative and judicial branch, a key role is played by independent oversight institutions – including bodies such as the ombudsperson, anti-corruption agencies and supreme audit institutions – which provide checks and balances on power to prevent or sanction misconduct.<sup>52</sup>

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<sup>42</sup> Lührmann, A., Marquardt, K., and Mechkova, V. 2017. [Constraining Governments: New Indices of Vertical, Horizontal and Diagonal Accountability](#), V-Dem Institute Working Paper 46

<sup>43</sup> Transparency and Accountability Initiative. 2017. [How Do We Define Key Terms? Transparency and Accountability Glossary](#)

<sup>44</sup> Lührmann, A., Marquardt, K., and Mechkova, V. 2017. [Constraining Governments: New Indices of Vertical, Horizontal and Diagonal Accountability](#), V-Dem Institute Working Paper 46

<sup>45</sup> Peruzzotti E, Smulowitz C. 2006. eds. *Enforcing the Rule of Law: Social Accountability in the New Latin American Democracies*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press

<sup>46</sup> Reddy, N.K. and Ajmera, S. 2015. *Ethics, Integrity and Aptitude*. McGraw-Hill Education. p.336

<sup>47</sup> UNICEF. [“Engagement in Social Accountability: A Stock Take](#), p6

<sup>48</sup> Bernhard, M., Luhrmann A., Mechkova V. 2017. [Diagonal Accountability and Development Outcomes](#)

<sup>49</sup> Bernhard, M., Luhrmann A., Mechkova V. 2017. [Diagonal Accountability and Development Outcomes](#)

<sup>50</sup> Transparency and Accountability Initiative. 2017. [How Do We Define Key Terms? Transparency and Accountability Glossary](#)


<sup>51</sup> Rose-Ackerman, S. 1996. Democracy and ‘Grand’ Corruption. *International Social Science Journal*, vol.48, pp365-380

<sup>52</sup> O'Donnell, G. 1998. [Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies](#). *Journal of Democracy*, vol.9. pp112-126

Robust horizontal accountability mechanisms are vital to a healthy democracy.<sup>53</sup> A key consideration is not only the legal mandate of oversight bodies but also the political willpower, resourcing and capacity to effectively tackle abuses of power.<sup>54</sup>

## Accountability and democracy

While the literature identifies these three distinct channels of accountability, it is important to note that in a fully functioning democracy, all three channels should interact and mutually reinforce one another.<sup>55</sup> In their recent study of Benin, Ecuador and South Korea, Labens and Lührmann concluded that a successful interplay between vertical, horizontal and diagonal accountability mechanisms can help prevent democratic breakdown by exerting pressure on political leaders from various directions and by multiple stakeholders.<sup>56</sup>



(Source: Lührmann, Marquardt & Mechkova 2017).

This observation, should not however, lead to an indiscriminate approach to promoting accountability. Acosta, Joshi and Ramshaw caution that attempts to strengthen democratic

<sup>53</sup> Castiglione, D. 2012. [Democratic and public accountability](#), Britannica

<sup>54</sup> Lührmann, A., Marquardt, K., and Mechkova, V. 2017. [Constraining Governments: New Indices of Vertical, Horizontal and Diagonal Accountability](#), V-Dem Institute Working Paper 46

<sup>55</sup> Lührmann, A., Marquardt, K., and Mechkova, V. 2017. [Constraining Governments: New Indices of Vertical, Horizontal and Diagonal Accountability](#), V-Dem Institute Working Paper 46

<sup>56</sup> Laebens, M. and Lührmann, A. 2021. [What Halts Democratic Erosion? The Changing Role of Accountability](#). Democratization, vol.28

accountability can be weakened by an excessive focus on formal routes to accountability (such as elections) as this can crowd out collective social action. By the same token, where social accountability efforts neglect institutional or political responses, abuse of entrusted power is unlikely to result in meaningful sanctions.<sup>57</sup>

V-Dem's 2020 policy brief on political accountability argues that, based on contextual analysis, routes to meaningful accountability will rely on different prioritisation and sequencing. The policy implication that they draw from this assessment is that, especially in weak democracies, vertical accountability should be pursued first, and once certain democratic minimums have been reached then horizontal accountability strategies targeting oversight bodies can be pursued.<sup>58</sup>

## Assessing accountability

The literature points to four primary elements of accountability that are important to consider in each of the three routes to accountability discussed above.<sup>59</sup>

- **Standards setting** sets out the behaviour expected of the agent and the criteria and best practices against which they will be judged.<sup>60</sup> These should contain clearly defined duties and performance standards, and the assessment should be transparent and objective.<sup>61</sup>
- **Answerability** helps determine who is accountable to whom and is the process in which duty bearers and other officials are required to “inform, explain and justify” their actions to their principals.<sup>62</sup>
- **Responsiveness** addresses the issue of when and how government officials comply with citizens’ demands.
- **Enforceability** refers to the existence of provisions to reward or penalise actors. This may take the form of sanctioning the agent if they fail to uphold the standards set for them or, in severe cases, imprisonment for illegal actions. Enforceability relies on minimum standards with regards to the rule of law.<sup>63</sup>

The literature on accountability has substantially increased in recent decades, in parallel to an increased policy focus on transparency, accountability and participation. The research defines different but interconnected routes towards accountability – vertical, diagonal and horizontal.

Vertical and diagonal accountability mechanisms include bottom-up approaches whereby citizens individually and collectively hold public officials to account. In terms of the SANCUS

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<sup>57</sup> Mejía Acosta, A., Joshi, A., Ramshaw, G. 2013. [Democratic Accountability and Service Delivery: A Desk Review](#)

<sup>58</sup> V-Dem Institute. 2020. [Political Accountability: Vertical, Horizontal, and Diagonal Constraints on Governments](#). Policy Brief No. #22

<sup>59</sup> Mejía Acosta, A., Joshi, A., Ramshaw, G. 2013. [Democratic Accountability and Service Delivery: A Desk Review](#)

<sup>60</sup> Transparency and Accountability Initiative. 2017. [How Do We Define Key Terms? Transparency and Accountability Glossary](#)

<sup>61</sup> UN Economic and Social Council. [Accountability](#)

<sup>62</sup> Mejía Acosta, A., Joshi, A., Ramshaw, G. 2013. [Democratic Accountability and Service Delivery: A Desk Review](#)

<sup>63</sup> Mejía Acosta, A., Joshi, A., Ramshaw, G. 2013. [Democratic Accountability and Service Delivery: A Desk Review](#)

project, this route will be strengthened in targeted countries through building of knowledge networks and citizen-led actions targeting public service providers.

Through horizontal accountability mechanisms, the project will involve monitoring the performance of oversight institutions such as parliaments and supreme audit institutions.

The SANCUS interventions discussed in the next section of this handbook are intended to consciously exploit the interplay between different routes to accountability by ensuring that each work plan considers how to mobilise pressure on policy-makers from both inside and outside the apparatus of state. Ultimately, the goal is to contribute to greater democratic accountability to the benefit of individuals and communities in the 26 countries involved.

# SANCUS COUNTRIES

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In early 2020, Transparency International Secretariat held a call for expressions of interest from its network of national chapters to participate in the SANCUS project. Fifty-one expressions of interest were received. Of these, 20 were selected for participation. In addition, an organisation not affiliated with Transparency International was engaged in the Gambia.

SANCUS countries were selected according to two primary criteria:

- Practicality: the country must have a bare minimum of accountability regulatory architecture, including minimum guarantees and operating space for civil society.
  - Relevant indicators:
    - Freedom House 2019 (0 = worst, 100 = best, range: not free/partly free/free)
    - CIVICUS Monitor 2020 (range: closed/repressed/obstructed/narrowed/open)
    - EIU Democracy Index 2019 (0 = worst, 10 = best, where 0-4 = authoritarian regime, 4-6 = hybrid regime, 7-8 = flawed democracy, and 9-10 = full democracy)
    - World Bank's Voice and Accountability indicator on Worldwide Governance Indicators 2019 (-2.5 = worst, +2.5 = best)
    - World Justice Project's Rule of Law Index 2020 (0 = worst, 1 = best)
    - Reporters without Borders' Press Freedom Index 2020 (0 = best, 100 = worst, where 0 to 15 points = good, 15.01 to 25 points = satisfactory, 25.01 to 35 points = problematic, 35.01 to 55 points = difficult, 55.01 to 100 points = very serious)
    - Index of Public Integrity (0 = worst, 10 = best)
    - International IDEA's Checks on Government indicator from Global State of Democracy Indices (0 = worst, 1 = best, range: authoritarian regime/hybrid regime/low performance democracy/mid-range performance democracy/high performance democracy)
- Scale: the extent to which corruption affects the country. Preference shall be given to countries with below-average scores and/or significant decliners in the Corruption Perceptions Index;
  - Relevant indicators:
    - the Corruption Perceptions Index 2019 (0 = worst, 100 = best)

The resulting country selection represents a diverse group of states from around the world that tend to feature in the "middle third" of most governance indices, where the literature suggests that governance interventions such as SANCUS can be most influential. It is important to note that the range of countries is marked by different directions of travel. Some, like Armenia and

Colombia, have made notable progress in recent years to strengthen democratic norms and institutions, as well as improve citizens' voice. Others, including Guatemala and Lebanon, present a more concerning picture.

Generally speaking, however, these countries share a number of important characteristics. They tend to be low-to-mid range performing democracies characterised by limited political rights, obstructed civic space and some concerns for press freedom. Nonetheless, these states have the basic accountability infrastructure, freedom of expression and rule of law required to tackle the common constraints outlined in the introduction: weak checks and balances, limited separation of public and private interests, lack of enforcement and restrictions to civic space.

This makes them well placed to host SANCUS actions that involve complementary efforts to tackle both horizontal and vertical accountability. This approach is believed to be well suited to ensuring that these countries continue to improve their democratic accountability infrastructure, or alternatively buttress them against further democratic backsliding. Crucially, none of these are deemed to be "closed" to civil society groups in the indices consulted.

In 2021, five additional national CSOs were selected for participation. TI chapters in Jamaica, Panama, and Cambodia joined the project to implement horizontal accountability initiatives, while TI chapters in Peru and Madagascar placed the focus of their projects on vertical accountability.



# ARMENIA

## Democratic Accountability Overview

Armenia scores slightly above average on the Corruption Perceptions Index and has been improving somewhat in the past few years. Indeed, events in recent years make it a promising country for SANCUS to further consolidate democratic accountability. Following the Velvet Revolution in which the opposition leader took power, a snap election in December 2018 judged by the OSCE to be free and fair has been accompanied by a subsequent growth in accountability, transparency and public trust in democracy. Particularly encouraging is a rise in CSO activity without government interference. Nonetheless, the recent conflict with Azerbaijan poses a threat to the consolidation of these reform efforts domestically, and the support of SANCUS could help to buttress the progress made.

DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY INDICES	COUNTRY RESULT
<b>CORRUPTION PERCEPTION INDEX 2020</b>	Score = 49/100, Rank = 60/180
<b>FREEDOM HOUSE</b>	Score = 55, partly free
<b>CIVICUS MONITOR 2021</b>	Obstructed
<b>EIU DEMOCRACY INDEX 2020</b>	Score = 5.35, Rank = 89
<b>WGI: VOICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 2019</b>	0.05 (Percentile Rank: 47.78)
<b>RULE OF LAW INDEX 2020</b>	-
<b>PRESS FREEDOM INDEX 2021</b>	28.83
<b>INDEX OF PUBLIC INTEGRITY 2019</b>	-
<b>GLOBAL STATE OF DEMOCRACY 2020 (Checks on government)</b>	0.60 (mid-range performance democracy)

## Transparency International Anti-Corruption Centre (TI Armenia)

<http://www.transparency.am/>

## SANCUS PROJECT – EDUCATON

<b>DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNT-ABILITY PROBLEM</b>	<p><b>Core problem:</b> institutional deficits relating to accountability and transparency in the education sector.</p> <p><b>Root causes:</b> resistance of institutions and lack of political will to bring significant change.</p> <p><b>The effect:</b> among others, inadequate quality of teaching staff caused by nepotism and bribery; embezzlement of school budget funds caused by low transparency and oversight; electoral fraud caused by the use of administrative resource of school principals and teachers in the elections.</p>
<b>MAIN OBJECTIVE</b>	<b>Strengthen accountability in the education sector</b>
<b>NETWORK BUILDING</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1.1 Training sessions for 25 representatives per year of NGOs and non-formal active youth-based groups working in the field of education to enhance their skills to implement monitoring activities to enhance vertical accountability.</li> <li>1.2 Multi-stakeholder discussions, including state authorities, educational establishments, civil society and experts to promote the developed policy inputs as part of the monitoring activities.</li> </ol>
<b>VERTICAL ACCOUNT-ABILITY ACTIONS</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>2.1 Monitoring of the Ministry of Education, Science, Sports and Culture in terms of budget development and execution, responsiveness to information requests and raised problems by media as well as other issues suggested by the project stakeholders through the observation of the National Assembly's website and interviews with officials and public council members.</li> <li>2.2 Monitoring with civil society groups of specific services or issues in the field of education, selected by the stakeholders based on participatory methodologies, such as focus groups, citizen assessment scorecards and social audits. Depending on the issues identified, the civil society coalition will monitor the Ministry of Education, Science, Sports and Culture, the Ministry of Finance or the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, educational units of regional administrations, schools, universities and so on. Based on this monitoring, recommendations will be developed into a publicly available report.</li> <li>2.3 Advocacy through a series of meetings with duty bearers and the relevant parliamentary committees, along with coalition building and media to promote the recommendations developed based on the monitoring.</li> <li>2.4 Follow up, if needed, with citizen/whistleblower complaints, applying to responsible authorities and law enforcement bodies, and engaging in litigation in courts, wherever relevant, e.g. when access to information requests are rejected.</li> <li>2.5 Follow up cooperation with investigative journalists if there is a need for more thorough investigation, such as where monitoring indicates that there has been serious embezzlement of funds.</li> </ol>

**HORIZONTAL  
ACCOUNT-  
ABILITY  
ACTIONS**

- 3.1 Implement the parliamentary oversight assessment tool developed by the SANCUS project, and develop a report based on the findings.
- 3.2 Conduct advocacy on strengthening parliamentary oversight guided by the findings of the assessment.
- 3.3 Monitoring and analysis of oversight institutions such as the *chamber of control* and the ombudsman in terms of their performance and response with respect to the identified issues as well as their relevant findings reflected in institutional reports.
- 3.4 Monitoring and analysis of the performance of law enforcement institutions (including Corruption Prevention Commission, the anti-corruption committee, the prosecutor's office and anti-corruption courts) in relation to reported cases, application of the rule of law and lawfulness, and consistency of the administrative and criminal sanctions applied by those institutions in relation to the cases. Based on this monitoring and analysis, recommendations will be developed into a publicly available report.
- 3.5 Advocacy through a series of meetings and discussions with the National Assembly, the oversight and the law enforcement institutions, as relevant, and engagement of civic institutions and media to promote the legal or practice related changes.
- 3.6 Advocacy meetings to discuss monitoring reports and recommendations to strengthen the oversight of the education sector with the National Assembly and the oversight as relevant, to promote the legal or practice related changes.

## Selected Indicators

Indicator	Baseline 2020	Target 2021	Target 2022	Target 2023
% of SANCUS supported CSOs who report that SANCUS networks have "significantly" improved their capacity to pursue advocacy on democratic accountability issues	N/A	20%	20%	20%
# of duty bearer institutions monitored by SANCUS supported CSOs	0	2	2	2
# of parliaments and oversight institutions monitored by SANCUS supported CSOs	0	3	3	3
# of citizens mobilised to participate in SANCUS supported monitoring processes (disaggregated by age, sex, rural/urban, theme, form of engagement)	0	20	40	60

# BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

## Democratic Accountability Overview

Bosnia and Herzegovina has been steadily declining on the CPI in recent years, and is below both the global and regional average. The country is characterised by an almost uniquely fragmented governance context, with political stalemate and the duplication of government functions providing ample opportunities for corruption. The country nonetheless has a fair amount of civic space and relatively good budget transparency, despite some restrictions on press freedom.

DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY INDICES	COUNTRY RESULT
<b>CORRUPTION PERCEPTION INDEX 2020</b>	Score = 35/100, Rank = 111/180
<b>FREEDOM HOUSE</b>	Score = 53, partly free
<b>CIVICUS MONITOR 2021</b>	Narrowed
<b>EIU DEMOCRACY INDEX 2020</b>	Score = 4.84, Rank = 101
<b>WGI: VOICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 2019</b>	-0.20 (Percentile Rank: 38.92)
<b>RULE OF LAW INDEX 2020</b>	0.52
<b>PRESS FREEDOM INDEX 2021</b>	28.34
<b>INDEX OF PUBLIC INTEGRITY 2019</b>	6.01
<b>GLOBAL STATE OF DEMOCRACY 2020</b>	0.54 (weak/low performance democracy)

## **TI Bosnia and Herzegovina & Balkan Investigative Reporting Network (BIRN)**

<http://www.ti-bih.org/>

<https://birn.eu.com/>

## SANCUS PROJECT – JUDICIARY

<b>DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNT-ABILITY PROBLEM</b>	<p><b>Core problem:</b> lack of integrity in the judiciary and insufficient level of transparency in terms of disciplinary procedures against judges and prosecutors.</p> <p><b>Root causes:</b> proceedings are often compromised by the interference of individual interests within the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council (HJPC) and key officials within the judiciary despite the efforts of the Office of the Disciplinary Prosecutor. Moreover, there is excessive prosecutorial discretion in deciding whether to initiate investigations.</p> <p><b>The effect:</b> lack of transparency, accountability and integrity led to high level of a lack of trust in judiciary institutions, as well as enabling the politicisation of the judiciary and impunity for grand corruption.</p>
<b>MAIN OBJECTIVE</b>	<p><b>Improve transparency &amp; accountability of judiciary in BiH with special focus on the transparency and efficiency of disciplinary procedures against judges and prosecutors</b></p>
<b>NETWORK BUILDING</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1.1 Consultation processes with all relevant stakeholders and especially through established partnerships with CSOs and the international community active in the judiciary field.</li> <li>1.2 Cooperation with the Office of the Disciplinary Prosecutor (ODP) to establish a permanent channel for exchange of information with the <i>ODP</i>.</li> <li>1.3 Cooperation with other institutions covered by the monitoring and use the cooperation as advocacy for relevant bodies in charge of proposing and implementing reforms, such as HJPC, Parliamentary Assembly, Council of Ministers, etc.</li> <li>1.4 Cooperation with Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), EU Delegation and other stakeholders, who have been active in monitoring the work of the judiciary in Bosnia and Herzegovina to increase pressure on decision-makers for reforms in the judiciary in BiH.</li> </ol>
<b>VERTICAL ACCOUNT-ABILITY ACTIONS</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>2.1 Conduct an online pre-survey among citizens based on a random sample to gather citizen perceptions of important information about the work of judiciary that should be made available by prosecutors and courts. Organise focus groups with civil society groups to identify key issues related to judicial transparency and inform the development of an assessment methodology of judicial transparency.</li> <li>2.2 Transparency index assessing 79 courts and 20 prosecutorial offices at all levels of governance in Bosnia and Herzegovina based on: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• proactive transparency by analysing the official websites of the courts and prosecutor offices and assessing the accessibility of relevant information.</li> <li>• transparency and openness of the courts and prosecutor offices to CSOs and citizens seeking information via freedom of information requests.</li> </ul> </li> </ol>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• transparency of the courts and prosecutor offices to the media, measured by the responsiveness to inquiries sent by media to the courts and prosecutor offices.</li> </ul>
	2.3 Freedom of information requests, where institutions refuse to provide information, will use the ALAC to follow up with further legal actions.
	2.4 Report produced by cross-referencing and analysing findings from the index.
	2.5 Secure online channels for citizens via the interactive platform to report their own experiences/irregularities in the work of the judiciary. All received reports will be treated by the ALAC legal team, and justified cases will be reported to the ODP to ensure two-fold accountability.
	2.6 Outreach activities towards citizens and CSOs to use online channels for reporting irregularities/corruption.
	2.7 15 thematic media stories focusing on specific institutions, examples and issues arising from the research findings.
	2.8 Production of video and other promotional materials to disseminate the analysis of research results.
	2.9 Capacity-building activities for CSOs, student associations and citizens to strengthen their abilities to monitor the judiciary and encourage them to report corruption/irregularities via an interactive online platform as well as to provide them with support from the ALAC legal team in cases where institutions refuse to provide information.
<b>HORIZONTAL ACCOUNT- ABILITY ACTIONS</b>	3.1 Development of a methodology to monitor disciplinary procedures conducted by the Office of the Disciplinary Prosecutor (ODP).
	3.2 On-site monitoring of integrity, transparency and efficiency of all disciplinary procedures per year (around 30 per year based on annual ODP reports) against judges and prosecutors conducted by the ODP.
	3.3 Creation of policy proposals for improving the transparency of disciplinary procedures in cooperation with ODP to ensure the integrity of the process as well as for further improvements to the integrity mechanisms within the judiciary.
	3.4 Development of a methodology to monitor court trials for corruption and organised crime.
	3.5 On-site monitoring of the ability and efficiency of the judiciary to prosecute cases of corruption and organised crime and collect information on the individual performance of judges and prosecutors.
	3.6 Production of in-depth analyses of key issues relevant to disciplinary procedures as well as analyses of the issues pertaining to the efficiency and integrity in the prosecution of corruption and organised crime.
	3.7 Production of a mini-documentary video and case studies about disciplinary and prosecution issues to inform the wider public and create pressure on decision-makers to improve the status in this field.
<b>DIGITAL TOOLS</b>	4.1 Develop an interactive online platform for the Transparency index of courts and prosecutorial offices in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

## Selected Indicators

Indicator	Baseline 2020	Target 2021	Target 2022	Target 2023
# of legislative, procedural or policy changes to strengthen oversight institutions' efficacy, accountability and independence to which the action contributes	N/A	1	2	3
# of duty bearer institutions monitored by SANCUS supported CSOs	0	30	80	99
# of participants of technical workshops on the use of accountability tools and data analysis techniques (disaggregated by institutional affiliation, sex, location)	N/A	N/A	30	60
# of citizens mobilised to participate in SANCUS supported monitoring processes (disaggregated by age, sex, rural/urban, theme, form of engagement) <i># of page viewers,</i> <i># of reports received</i>	N/A	N/A	10,000 50	25,000 150
# of collaborations with tech organisations to produce digital accountability tools for SANCUS sub-actions	N/A	1	1	1

# BRAZIL

## Democratic Accountability Overview

Brazil scores relatively highly on a number of the indices assessing the strength of the country's democratic foundations. Nonetheless, these scores have been dropping precipitously in the last couple of years, and the impact of a wave of corruption scandals is reflected in the country's low CPI score. Political instability has led to an administration that seems to have an ambivalent attitude towards democratic modes of governance, and the country is also marked by extreme inequality and growing pressure on civic space.

DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY INDICES	COUNTRY RESULT
<b>CORRUPTION PERCEPTION INDEX 2020</b>	Score = 38/100, Rank = 94/180
<b>FREEDOM HOUSE</b>	Score = 74, free
<b>CIVICUS MONITOR 2021</b>	Obstructed
<b>EIU DEMOCRACY INDEX 2020</b>	Score = 6.92, Rank = 49
	0.34
<b>WGI: VOICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 2019</b>	(Percentile Rank: 58.62) Declining
<b>RULE OF LAW INDEX 2020</b>	0.52
<b>PRESS FREEDOM INDEX 2021</b>	36.25
<b>INDEX OF PUBLIC INTEGRITY 2019</b>	6.26
<b>GLOBAL STATE OF DEMOCRACY 2020</b> (Checks on government)	0.63 (mid-range performance democracy)

## Transparência Internacional Brasil (TI Brazil)

<https://transparenciainternacional.org.br/>

## SANCUS PROJECT – SUB-NATIONAL GOVERNMENT TRANSPARENCY

<b>DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNT- ABILITY PROBLEM</b>	<p><b>Core problem:</b> federal, state and municipal governments often have unequal levels of transparency and accountability, and are often affected by corruption, either due to the absence of specific sub-national rules or by a lack of enforcement and oversight.</p> <p><b>Root causes:</b> insufficient mechanisms to promote exchange, increase accountability and foster a positive atmosphere of mutual learning among sub-national governments.</p> <p><b>The effect:</b> Lack of transparency and accountability increase the risk of corruption in sub-national governments, and oversight bodies are unable to independently carry out their duties.</p>
<b>MAIN OBJECTIVE</b>	<p><b>Foster cooperation and competition between state governments so that they can learn from each other how to implement higher standards of transparency and democratic accountability</b></p>
<b>NETWORK BUILDING</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1.1 Mobilise public authorities at the state level (particularly comptroller generals and similar oversight bodies in the executive branch) to improve government accountability mechanisms, offer guidance and recommend national and international best practices and specific courses of action.</li> <li>1.2 Offer training and systematised data for activists and investigative journalists (through working with Abraji, an association of investigative journalism in Brazil and/or the Organised Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP)) to build pressure on sub-national governments and oversight institutions to improve.</li> <li>1.3 Offer training and support local grassroots NGOs to replicate the assessment methodology to rank and assess a larger number of medium and small municipalities throughout the country.</li> </ol>
<b>VERTICAL ACCOUNT- ABILITY ACTIONS</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>2.1 Development of a methodology to rank sub-national governments (specifically the executive branch) in relation to requirements of transparency, integrity, internal and external control mechanisms, and social oversight. The methodology will be developed through desk research, detailed study of the websites/portals of each entity, review of the relevant literature, and interviews with stakeholders and specialists.</li> <li>2.2 Hold consultations about methodology with researchers and public authorities as well as citizens and civil society organisations involved in the promotion of transparency, integrity and measures to counter corruption.</li> <li>2.3 Use the methodology to monitor and rank 27 states.</li> <li>2.4 Conduct dialogue with state governments: preliminary results will be forwarded to the authorities responsible for each state's transparency and anti-corruption policies (for instance, to representatives from the offices of the state comptroller general) to offer an opportunity to learn about the results and submit any requests for clarification or correction in relation to the conclusions, or present updates in the assessed portals.</li> </ol>

	<p>2.5 Disseminate the results and classification of each state in the ranking and make this public on a specific website. Widely distribute using traditional media outlets and on social networks.</p> <p>2.6 Maintain a continuous relationship with relevant stakeholders after the results have been published. TI Brazil will seek to continue its contact with the representatives of the offices of the state comptroller general, civil society organisations, media outlets and influential actors on social networks as a way to generate pressure for local governments to commit to advancing their efforts and to issue the best recommendations and practices to the state governments assessed.</p>
<b>HORIZONTAL ACCOUNT-ABILITY ACTIONS</b>	<p>3.1 Qualitative assessment of the impact on improving the transparency of states' databases on the work of oversight institutions, such as public procurement and government spending.</p> <p>3.2 Development of legal and institutional frameworks to advance open government efforts, in state governments, through capacity building and exchange programmes with oversight institutions at the sub-national level.</p> <p>3.3 Collaborate with offices of the comptroller general, which act as the main oversight bodies for sub-national duty bearers, by identifying positive and negative experiences in the design and implementation of transparency policies, pointing out opportunities for improvement and strengthening oversight initiatives in general.</p>
<b>DIGITAL TOOLS</b>	<p>4.1 Establish a digital platform ranking 27 states to promote better systematisation, comparison and visualisation of key anti-corruption databases (for instance, public procurement, public spending, revenues, public servants' salaries, tax incentives, and others) of each Brazilian state.</p> <p>4.2 Bonde: social pressure platform that sends citizen notifications directly to the public authority to push for availability and improvement of key anti-corruption databases. It will be made available on the ranking's website, and it will be useful to pressure the assessed governments for better results on the ranking.</p>

## Selected Indicators

Indicator	Baseline 2020	Target 2021	Target 2022	Target 2023
# of legislative, procedural or policy changes to strengthen oversight institutions' efficacy, accountability and independence to which the action contributes	0	27	27	27
# of national SANCUS multi-stakeholder dialogues to advance in-country networks	0	1	2	4
# of advocacy actions conducted by SANCUS supported CSOs to increase demand-side pressure on oversight institutions	N/A	0	4	6

# CAMEROON

## Democratic Accountability Overview

Considered an authoritarian regime by the EIU Democracy Index 2019, Cameroon has been ruled by the same president and party for almost 40 years. Paul Biya, who first became president in 1982, and his party, Cameroon People's Democratic Movement (CPDM), have remained in power through rigged elections, political patronage and the president's control of high-level appointments. Over the last four decades, CPDM has repressed opposition figures, threatened independent journalists who were critical of the government, blocked or slowed access to social media to hinder citizen mobilisation and postpone elections. Appointments to electoral management bodies appear highly partisan.

DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY INDICES	COUNTRY RESULT
<b>CORRUPTION PERCEPTION INDEX 2020</b>	Score = 25/100, Rank = 149/180
<b>FREEDOM HOUSE</b>	Score = 16, not free
<b>CIVICUS MONITOR 2021</b>	Repressed
<b>EIU DEMOCRACY INDEX 2020</b>	Score = 2.77, Rank = 142
<b>WGI: VOICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 2019</b>	-1.19 (Percentile Rank: 16.26)
<b>RULE OF LAW INDEX 2020</b>	0.36
<b>PRESS FREEDOM INDEX 2021</b>	43.78
<b>INDEX OF PUBLIC INTEGRITY 2019</b>	3.83
<b>GLOBAL STATE OF DEMOCRACY 2020 (Checks on government)</b>	0.39 (authoritarian regime)

Cameroon also presents one of the lowest scores in the CPI 2020, ranking 149 out of 180 countries, and bribery is widespread in the country. Data from Transparency International's Global Corruption Barometer 2019 shows that almost half of the Cameroonians who had used public services in the year prior to the interview paid a bribe to get the services they needed. Also noteworthy is the fact that 72 per cent of the interviewed people perceived corruption to have increased in the country over the previous year and 64 per cent regarded the government to be doing a bad job countering corruption.

Initiatives to curb corruption, such as the creation of the National Anti-corruption Commission (CONAC), have reportedly been hindered by undue political influence over public institutions. Decision-making is done mainly by presidential decree with limited public consultation and the president also has the prerogative of appointing and dismissing judges. Legislation on access to information is absent in Cameroon, and an e-government initiative launched in 2006 has had little impact.

# TI Cameroon

<https://ti-cameroun.org/>

## SANCUS PROJECT – CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN LOCAL PUBLIC FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT

<b>DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNT-ABILITY PROBLEM</b>	<p><b>Core problem:</b> poor local citizen participation in citizens' monitoring roles and involvement in local governance budget processes.</p> <p><b>Root causes:</b> poor budgetary literacy among citizens, limited access to information related to local development planning, exclusion of minorities from budgetary processes as well as the absence of a comprehensive national anti-corruption law.</p> <p><b>The effect:</b> citizens are disinterested in local development and local authorities' budget reports since they can neither criticise nor question the accuracy. This leads to low institutional accountability.</p>
<b>MAIN OBJECTIVE</b>	<p><b>Strengthen transparency and accountability in local development plan implementation &amp; public financial management through citizen participation</b></p>
<b>NETWORK BUILDING</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1.1 Project's launching ceremony including all stakeholders (parliamentarians, leaders of civil societies, local authorities, traditional authorities) who will take part in the implementation of the project. This will be an occasion for the project team to explain how the project will be implemented, including the various roles each will play.</li><li>1.2 Establish three local citizen watch and action committees (LCWAC) consisting of leaders of youth organisations, councillors, leaders of women's organisations, traditional rulers, representatives of local administration and leaders of minority groups in the areas of Bafia, Bamenda and Bafoussam.</li><li>1.3 Provide training to local multi-stakeholder LCWACs on how to interact with the population to denounce malpractice.</li><li>1.4 Provide training as well as logistical and technical support to investigative journalists on the management of local budgets with a focus on the detection of malpractices and the collection of evidence.</li></ol>
<b>VERTICAL ACCOUNT-ABILITY ACTIONS</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>2.1 Host advocacy activities to lobby local and national authorities (including public officials, traditional rulers and parliamentarians) to better include minority groups in local governance.</li><li>2.2 Training workshops for citizens to monitor municipal development plans. Citizens will be involved in the selection of the development plans to be monitored.</li><li>2.3 Monitoring of three municipal governments via a digital platform with a focus on the implementation of a communal development plan for</li></ol>

	<p>appropriate budget allocation and the inclusion of all population groups (youth, women, minorities). This will include two urban councils: one in the English speaking region (Bamenda) and one in the French speaking region (Bafoussam), and one rural council (in Bafia). Citizens will denounce the malpractices identified at the local level through the digital platform under the supervision of the ALAC.</p> <p>2.4 Make field visits where malpractice has been identified to draw up a report and refer it to the competent authorities.</p> <p>2.5 Draw up a comparative study of the implementation of decentralisation in the English and French speaking regions.</p> <p>2.6 Schedule official and informal meetings with local authorities to follow up on the local development plan.</p> <p>2.7 Organise experience sharing sessions with the three LCWACs to exert pressure on the local administration (councillors, deconcentrated officials, traditional rulers) for the inclusion of minorities and publication of a communal development plan.</p> <p>2.8 Design and production of information and awareness tools (videograms, leaflets/booklets summarising the results, cartoons/animated videos, microprogrammes, posters, banners, etc.) related to the Local development plan, how to use the app and other denunciation mechanisms.</p> <p>2.9 Provide legal clinics on citizen assistance through the chapter's ALAC.</p>
<b>HORIZONTAL ACCOUNT-ABILITY ACTIONS</b>	<p>3.1 Follow up on reports of wrongdoing submitted to competent authorities, parliamentarians (coming from the areas in which the project is implemented), the supreme state audit, the National Anti-corruption Commission (NACC) and the Ministry of Decentralisation and Local Development, to pressure them to hold duty bearers to account.</p> <p>3.2 Work with parliamentarians and other oversight bodies to pressurise local authorities to publish full and easy-to-understand information about the communal development plans.</p>
<b>DIGITAL TOOLS</b>	<p>4.1 Design and implement a mobile application for monitoring municipal plans. The application will contain the development plans (including the budgets of the relevant councils) of certain areas so citizens can check whether the projects are actually implemented as provided for in the plan and denounce any irregularities through the mobile app.</p> <p>4.2 Set up a sustainability mechanism for the mobile app and LCWAC outreach.</p>

## Selected Indicators

Indicator	Baseline 2020	Target 2021	Target 2022	Target 2023
% of SANCUS supported CSOs who report that the skills and knowledge gained had "significantly" improved their	N/A	70%	90%	100%

capacity to meaningfully participate in policy and budgetary processes (disaggregated by location, type of CSO)				
% women from SANCUS supported CSOs who report that the skills and knowledge gained had “significantly” improved their capacity to monitor oversight institutions	N/A	30%	50%	70%
% rural people (compared to urban) of SANCUS supported CSOs who report that the skills and knowledge gained had “significantly” improved their capacity to monitor oversight institutions	N/A	20%	40%	60%
# of parliaments and oversight institutions monitored by SANCUS supported CSOs	3	2	3	3

# CAMBODIA

## Democratic Accountability Overview

Cambodia remains one of the lowest scoring countries the CPI, ranking 23/100 in 2021, but with a slight increase from 2020's score of 21/100. The political system has been dominated by the Cambodian People's Party for 30 years, with elections being held in a repressive environment. Anti-corruption laws are rarely enforced, and it has been claimed that members of the Prime Minister's family have used their positions of power to keep millions of dollars of assets abroad<sup>64</sup>.

There is a growing repressive political environment which aims to maintain the status quo, with the executive having uncontrolled and unlimited executive powers. The judicial system is rife with corruption and there are no institutional safeguards to ensure transparency, with bribery often preventing accountability within the judiciary.<sup>65</sup> Since 2020, the government has also been eroding democratic accountability through digital surveillance of their citizens throughout the pandemic, and cases of government intimidation and violent attacks towards independent media have been reported.

DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY INDICES	COUNTRY RESULT
<b>CORRUPTION PERCEPTION INDEX 2021</b>	Score = 23/100, Rank = 157/180
<b>FREEDOM HOUSE</b>	Score = 43, not free
<b>CIVICUS MONITOR 2021</b>	Repressed
<b>EIU DEMOCRACY INDEX 2021</b>	Score = 2.90, Rank = 134
<b>WGI: VOICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 2021</b>	-1.44 (Percentile Rank: 10.63)
<b>RULE OF LAW INDEX 2022</b>	0.31
<b>PRESS FREEDOM INDEX 2022</b>	43.48
<b>INDEX OF PUBLIC INTEGRITY</b>	4.26
<b>GLOBAL STATE OF DEMOCRACY 2019 (Checks on government)</b>	0.32 (Authoritarian regime)

<sup>64</sup> Freedom House, 2022. <https://freedomhouse.org/country/cambodia/freedom-world/2022>

<sup>65</sup> Norad, 2015. Country Profile. <https://web.archive.org/web/20150716150637/http://www.business-anti-corruption.com/country-profiles/east-asia-the-pacific/kingdom-of-cambodia/show-all.aspx>

# TI Cambodia

<https://www.ticambodia.org/>

## SANCUS PROJECT – PARLIAMENTARY OVERSIGHT – CITIZEN ENGAGEMENT

<b>DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNT-ABILITY PROBLEM</b>	<p><b>Core problem:</b> lack of public demand for horizontal accountability, particularly for a legislature that can provide an effective check on the executive while representing the interest of the people.</p> <p><b>Root causes:</b> low level of public awareness about the need for horizontal accountability, particularly a well-functioning legislature, limited public engagement and activism around legislative affairs, and lack of effective mechanism for public participation and engagement with the legislature. Moreover, there is lack of independence of the legislative branch and political influence from the executive branch.</p> <p><b>The effect:</b> uncontrolled and unlimited executive powers; ineffective parliamentary oversight; pervasive social injustice and inequality; poor government responsiveness and effectiveness; and a vicious cycle of political apathy.</p>
<b>MAIN OBJECTIVE</b>	Strengthen parliamentary oversight and increased citizen participation, particularly youth and young women, around parliamentary oversight and accountability.
<b>NETWORK BUILDING</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1.1 Engage relevant stakeholders from civil society and independent think tanks in the assessment of parliamentary oversight</li><li>1.2 Foster good rapport with the Senate and National Assembly through meeting to brief on the assessment study and seek for their participation and action</li><li>1.3 Partner with independent media outlets to raise awareness of horizontal accountability based on the assessment findings</li></ol>
<b>HORIZONTAL ACCOUNT-ABILITY ACTIONS</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>3.1 Conduct parliamentary oversight assessment based on the tool developed by the SANCUS global team, and produce an assessment report</li><li>3.2 Produce and disseminate two position papers based on the findings of the assessment to provide basis for parliament to improve their oversight functions</li><li>3.3 Conduct digital campaigns to raise awareness among the public about the need for horizontal accountability, particularly a well-functioning parliament</li><li>3.4 Produce featured articles under a theme of horizontal accountability</li><li>3.5 Organise a youth debate on topics related to horizontal accountability, particularly parliament oversight and representation.</li></ol>

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- 3.6 Organize a youth essay contest under a theme of horizontal accountability
  - 3.7 Use the assessment findings and especially the policy papers to conduct policy dialogues on parliamentary oversight and representation with policy makers and parliamentarians to discuss how their roles can be enhanced
  - 3.8 Share the assessment findings with the Civil Society Organization's coalition and work with them to demand enhanced parliamentary oversight and accountability
- 

## Selected Indicators

Indicator	Baseline 2021	Target 2022	Target 2023
# and description of peer exchanges conducted as part of Action to develop SANCUS-supported CSOs' relevant skills/knowledge (disaggregated by remote/physical mode, location, sex of participants)	N/A	0	1
# of marginalised groups represented at multi-stakeholder dialogues (disaggregated by age, disability, location, sex)	N/A	N/A	1
# of parliaments and oversight institutions monitored by SANCUS-supported CSOs	N/A	1	1
# of advocacy actions conducted by SANCUS-supported CSOs to increase demand-side pressure on oversight institutions	N/A	0	11

# CHILE

## Democratic Accountability Overview

Chile ranks 25 in the 2020 CPI, but its score has been decreasing since 2012. The country has strong and transparent institutions that promote business and have effective mechanisms to investigate and punish corrupt practices. However, citizens have few opportunities to influence the decisions of their representatives, which has resulted in a series of unsatisfied demands. Several protests since 2019 demanding greater societal equality have been on-going and have led to violence and a restrictive state of emergency.

In this context of political-social crisis and in response to the mass demonstrations, in November 2019, political parties with parliamentary representation promoted an Agreement for Peace and the New Constitution. This agreement initiated a national plebiscite that opened the door to an overhaul of the constitution. Since then, a universal vote was held to elect 155 members of a Constituent Assembly, who have been tasked with drafting a new constitutional text. A new referendum is expected mid-2022 for the country to either approve or reject the new constitution.

DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY INDICES	COUNTRY RESULT
<b>CORRUPTION PERCEPTION INDEX 2020</b>	Score = 67/100, Rank = 25/180
<b>FREEDOM HOUSE</b>	Score = 93, free
<b>CIVICUS MONITOR 2021</b>	Obstructed
<b>EIU DEMOCRACY INDEX 2020</b>	Score = 8.28, Rank = 17
<b>WGI: VOICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 2019</b>	1.02 (Percentile Rank = 81.28)
<b>RULE OF LAW INDEX 2020</b>	0.67
<b>PRESS FREEDOM INDEX 2021</b>	27.89
<b>INDEX OF PUBLIC INTEGRITY 2019</b>	7.61
<b>GLOBAL STATE OF DEMOCRACY 2020</b> (Checks on government)	0.81 (mid-range performing democracy)

## Chile Transparente (TI Chile)

<http://www.chiletransparente.cl/>

## SANCUS PROJECT – CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT PROCESS

<b>DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNT-ABILITY PROBLEM</b>	<p><b>Core problem:</b> the process of drafting the new constitution does not yet have its own internal regulation mechanism. The limited regulatory framework and the uncertainty over what will be decided in that framework leaves regulatory gaps in the standards of transparency, accountability and citizen participation that will apply to the constitutional convention.</p> <p><b>Root causes:</b> there is no precedent in Chile for an open citizen constitutional discussion. Moreover, the constitutional convention is not subject to the control of other state bodies, such as the Council for Transparency or the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic, itself the guarantor of probity in the use of its resources and its transparency.</p> <p><b>The effect:</b> citizens’ high expectations of the work of the convention are not met, which is likely to lead to a deep social and institutional crisis in the country. There is an expectation gap between the norms and procedures to which citizens are already used to compared to a convention that cannot or does not want to guarantee a similar framework.</p>
<b>MAIN OBJECTIVE</b>	<p><b>Strengthen the constituent process covering the period from the beginning of the constitutional convention to safeguard the public interest in the process and promote active citizen involvement in the constitutional discussion and operation of the convention</b></p>
<b>NETWORK BUILDING</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1.1 Mapping of networks and organisations interested in influencing the constitutional process.</li> <li>1.2 Form networks of organisations and alliances with key actors to influence the constitutional process.</li> <li>1.3 Establish alliances with organisations experienced in working with vulnerable and excluded groups (women, migrants and Indigenous peoples).</li> <li>1.4 Host national multi-stakeholder dialogues that allow civil society, academia, public and international organisations to discuss the process and produce inputs that feed public discussion around the convention.</li> <li>1.5 Host international multi-stakeholder dialogues to learn about similar processes from other countries in the region.</li> </ul>
<b>VERTICAL ACCOUNT-ABILITY ACTIONS</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>2.1 Conduct the assessment of public participation in budgeting processes, based on the toolkit developed by the SANCUS project.</li> <li>2.2 Conduct advocacy on strengthening public participation in budgeting processes, based on the findings from the assessment</li> <li>2.3 Development of training content to guide citizens in observing the constitutional development process (through face-to-face workshops and self-education material on the web portal) to understand the information published by the convention, analyse it, request information from the convention members, make complaints and influence the convention.</li> <li>2.4 Train citizen observers, especially those in vulnerable and excluded groups as well as community leaders.</li> </ul>

	<p>2.5 Conduct a communications campaign to encourage citizen reporting.</p> <p>2.6 Citizen monitoring of the transparency and probity of the constitutional convention to allow citizens to follow the management of the convention, detect irregularities and make complaints, which will be referred to the chapter's ALAC.</p> <p>2.7 Development of an advocacy strategy for the content of the new constitution: principles of probity and transparency.</p> <p>2.8 Establish direct contacts with convention members to present and discuss regulation proposals.</p> <p>2.9 Build on direct contacts with convention members to follow up on transparency commitments and compliance with the regulations.</p>
<b>HORIZONTAL ACCOUNT-ABILITY ACTIONS</b>	<p>3.1 Advocate for the establishment of a guarantor body as an internal entity that can control the probity of the convention, ensure compliance with its regulations and provide public access to information.</p> <p>3.2 Monitor the work of this guarantor body, as well as provide training to its members.</p>
<b>DIGITAL TOOLS</b>	<p>4.1 Organise a hackathon that will invite development teams to prepare proposals for data association and visualisation.</p> <p>4.2 Set up a web platform to centralise, systematise and disseminate the information published by the convention, both about its work in drafting the new constitutional text and its internal management, present disaggregated data as well as visualisations and analysis of the data. The language will be adapted for easy understanding, and educational materials will be added to make sense of the information repository of training content for citizen observers.</p> <p>4.3 Adopt GlobaLeaks into the web platform to manage complaints about potential irregularities in the convention, which will allow citizens to send a report and ensure security of the information sent and the anonymity of the whistleblower.</p>

## Selected Indicators

Indicator	Baseline 2020	Target 2021	Target 2022	Target 2023
# of joint advocacy actions undertaken by SANCUS supported CSOs as evidence of regular networking to further the action	N/A	5	10	-
# of citizens mobilised to participate in SANCUS supported monitoring processes (disaggregated by age, sex, rural/urban, theme, form of engagement)	0	1,000	500	-
% of citizens engaged by SANCUS monitoring processes from under-represented groups (disaggregated by sex, age, disability, location and where possible income group)	0	50%	50%	-

*Note: TI Chile will conclude some aspects of their project on the finalisation of the Constitutional Convention in 2022, therefore not all indicators have a 2023 target.*

# COLOMBIA

## Democratic Accountability Overview

Colombia scores 39 on the 2020 CPI, having seen little change in its CPI score in years as corruption scandals continue to plague the country, notably in politics and the judiciary. It remains below the regional CPI average score of 43, which is mirrored by the fact that, according to the 2018 Latinobarometro, Colombian citizens view corruption as the most severe problem facing the country. Despite this, and according to the EIU's Democracy Index, Colombia has seen some improvement in recent years. More encouragingly still, the country has seen steady and continuous progress on the World Bank's Voice and Accountability indicator. Indeed, the last couple of years has witnessed growing civil society mobilisation in the aftermath of the 2016 peace deal, though violence against human rights activists and social leaders remains a concern.

DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY INDICES	COUNTRY RESULT
CORRUPTION PERCEPTION INDEX 2020	Score = 39/100, Rank = 92/180
FREEDOM HOUSE	Score = 65, partly free
CIVICUS MONITOR 2021	Repressed
EIU DEMOCRACY INDEX 2020	Score = 7.04, Rank = 46
WGI: VOICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 2019	0.23 (Percentile Rank: 55.17)
RULE OF LAW INDEX 2020	0.5
PRESS FREEDOM INDEX 2021	43.74
INDEX OF PUBLIC INTEGRITY 2019	6.5
GLOBAL STATE OF DEMOCRACY 2019 (Checks on government)	0.64 (Mid-range performance democracy)

## Corporación Transparencia por Colombia (TI Colombia)

<http://www.transparenciacolombia.org.co/>

## SANCUS PROJECT – WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION

<b>DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNT-ABILITY PROBLEM</b>	<p><b>Core problem:</b> substantial barriers and poor incentives to report corruption and other wrongdoing, as well as inefficiency in the resolution of reported cases.</p> <p><b>Root causes:</b> (i) lack of knowledge regarding the social and professional composition of whistleblowers (people who report corruption) and the political role they can play; (ii) the risks that whistleblowers face, such as the fear of being killed, fear of reprisals in the workplace, damage to their reputation, etc.; (iii) the inefficiency of competent authorities to investigate and sanction corruption; (iv) the dispersion and scarcity of the legal and regulatory framework in the institutional framework; and (v) the low visibility and protection of whistleblowers who also become victims of corruption.</p> <p><b>The effect:</b> possible discouragement of citizens to report corruption, hence lower democratic accountability that can lead to significant weakening of civic space; (ii) increased public mistrust in institutions, especially oversight bodies and the judicial system; (iii) increase in the human rights violations of citizens reporting alleged cases of corruption; and (iv) higher levels of corruption that weaken the country's democratic system and peacebuilding.</p>
<b>MAIN OBJECTIVE</b>	<p><b>Strengthen access to reporting channels and capacity of citizens to report to the ALAC, as well as monitor the response of public and judicial authorities to cases referred by the ALAC and cases investigated by journalists. Contribute to the implementation of institutional and regulatory measures on whistleblowing and whistleblower protection.</b></p>
<b>NETWORK BUILDING</b>	<p>1.1 Conduct monitoring and advocacy actions within the framework of the Anti-Corruption Support Network, which in 2021 is set to become the Citizen Anti-Corruption Movement (MCA). This will provide a space for civil society dialogue and advocacy that builds a collective voice and drives advocacy actions. Some members will participate in the studies and/or cases followed.</p> <p>1.2 Strengthen collaboration with two print media outlets engaged in investigative journalism.</p>
<b>VERTICAL ACCOUNT-ABILITY ACTIONS</b>	<p>2.1 Conduct a study on whistleblowers' profiles through interviews (respecting anonymity) and ALAC data to identify exactly who are the whistleblowers of corruption in Colombia in order to contribute to a greater recognition of this group in the country.</p> <p>2.2 Develop and disseminate a report based on this study involving the different whistleblowers identified in the promotion of the recommendations.</p> <p>2.3 Selection and legal study of four relevant cases by the ALAC team of lawyers with proper strategic advocacy follow-up on an individual basis.</p> <p>2.4 Organisation of working groups with competent authorities to foster dialogue between authorities and whistleblowers (ALAC clients and</p>

	<p>others, such as journalists) and a more speedy investigation of cases submitted to them.</p> <p>2.5 Organisation of working groups with media partners to carry out investigative journalism on corruption. Production of two stories on corruption events that have occurred and been judged, providing an analytical view of how corruption takes place to raise public awareness of the case studies.</p> <p>2.6 Contribute to the implementation of institutional and regulatory measures on whistleblowing and whistleblower protection through the joint drafting of recommendations as well as roundtables with political parties and the national electoral council.</p>
<b>HORIZONTAL ACCOUNTABILITY ACTIONS</b>	<p>3.1 Conduct parliamentary oversight assessment based on the tool developed by the SANCUS global team,</p> <p>3.2 Establish separate channels of dialogue and coordination around specific cases of corruption with judicial authorities and other entities of the judicial and executive branches</p> <p>3.3 Promote spaces for inter-institutional dialogue based on internal analysis documents (whistleblower profile, whistleblowing action) and recommendations.</p> <p>3.4 Promote spaces for inter-institutional dialogue for petitioning and accountability based on the relevant and representative cases studied.</p> <p>3.5 Follow up with public authorities to ensure that they adopt the policy recommendations via a methodology for monitoring and legislative advocacy as well as the cases handled by the competent authorities. This includes the attorney general's office (competence in disciplinary investigation), the comptroller general's office (competence in fiscal investigation) and parliament, which has a fundamental role in promoting legislative and regulatory measures on whistleblowing and whistleblower protection.</p>
<b>DIGITAL TOOLS</b>	<p>4.1 Design and implement a digital tool to raise awareness of the two cases investigated and analysed by investigative journalists.</p> <p>4.2 Construction and progressive updating of the MCA website.</p> <p>4.3 Use of protected mobile phones to respond to citizen reports received by ALAC.</p>

## Selected Indicators

Indicator	Baseline 2020	Target 2021	Target 2022	Target 2023
# of citizens mobilised to participate in SANCUS supported monitoring processes (disaggregated by age, sex, rural/urban, theme, form of engagement)	45 active citizens  0 citizens reached by our outreach and communication	55 active citizens	70 active citizens  1,000 citizens reached by our dissemination and	70 active citizens  1,000 citizens reached by our dissemination and

			communicati on	communicati on
# of duty bearer institutions monitored by SANCUS supported CSOs	0	0	3	3

# THE GAMBIA

## Democratic Accountability Overview

After a violent coup d'état in 1994, the Gambia had been under the authoritarian leadership of Yahya Jammeh. This changed in 2016 when the opposition leader, Adama Barrow, won the elections and ended the country's 22-year dictatorship. The peaceful transition of power only materialised due to the involvement of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Civil liberties and political rights are seen to have largely improved in the West African country after Barrow took office, with the attempt to approve a new constitution as one of the most notable efforts in this direction. The drafting of this new constitution involved extensive public consultation and resulted in a bill with a series of human rights advances, the inclusion of marginalised groups and the limitation of executive power (e.g., presidential term limit). Regrettably, the final draft submitted in September 2020 to the national assembly did not receive the necessary votes to become Gambians' new fundamental law.

DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY INDICES	COUNTRY RESULT
CORRUPTION PERCEPTION INDEX 2020	Score = 37/100, Rank = 102/180
FREEDOM HOUSE	Score = 46, partly free
CIVICUS MONITOR 2021	Obstructed
EIU DEMOCRACY INDEX 2020	Score = 4.49, Rank = 103
WGI: VOICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 2019	-0.22 (Percentile Rank: 38.42)
RULE OF LAW INDEX 2020	0.50
PRESS FREEDOM INDEX 2021	30.76
INDEX OF PUBLIC INTEGRITY 2019	-
GLOBAL STATE OF DEMOCRACY 2020 (Checks on government)	0.64 (weak/low performance democracy)

Although progress has been made on many fronts, there is a lot yet to be achieved in the country. The Barrow administration conducted an official inquiry into Jammeh's misuse of state funds for private gain. The publication in September 2019 revealed the former president's theft of millions in foreign aid, his collaboration with terrorist financiers to undervalue state assets and launder millions, among many other criminal acts. Despite this major achievement in unveiling illicit activities from the highest ranked political figure in the Gambia, there are concerns about selective justice in the country. An anti-corruption agency has also been promised by the current administration, but Gambians are still waiting for it.

## Gambia Participates

## SANCUS PROJECT – PUBLIC FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT

<b>DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNT-ABILITY PROBLEM</b>	<p><b>Core problem:</b> the budget formulation process in the Gambia is top-down and non-participatory and, as a result, citizens only receive the end product with little chance to provide input on the budget or track and monitor the implementation of the budget (limited citizen oversight on the budget). While the Gambia has registered significant progress on budget transparency, however, the country has not achieved the “minimum requirement” of fiscal transparency and accountability.</p> <p><b>Root causes:</b> oversight institutions like the national assembly and the absence of independent fiscal institutions to effectively monitor budget expenditures and hold government accountable for the budget continues to affect budget oversight and compliance. The national audit office’s findings and recommendations are largely ignored, and the implementation of the budget is characterised by poor service delivery and misprioritisation of public interest due to the non-participatory nature of the budget.</p> <p><b>The effect:</b> government initiatives that are meant to improve the lives and livelihoods of citizens are largely ineffective and inefficient.</p>
<b>MAIN OBJECTIVE</b>	<p><b>Strengthen citizen participation in budget formulation and improve the oversight of public financial management processes</b></p>
<b>NETWORK BUILDING</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1.1 Collaborate with local civil society organisations to organise multi-stakeholder dialogues on government accountability with members of CSOs, media, the national assembly and government institutions like the Ministry of Finance and national audit office.</li> <li>1.2 Continue working with the International Budget Partnership in advancing budget transparency, public participation and oversight in the Gambia through the Open Budget Survey and support the government to implement these recommendations.</li> <li>1.3 Engage international investigative journalists in the OCCRP or Transparency International to provide technical guidance and oversight of local findings and bring an international perspective to the situation.</li> </ol>
<b>VERTICAL ACCOUNT-ABILITY ACTION</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>2.1 Assess public participation in budgeting processes in targeted municipalities, based on the toolkit developed by the SANCUS global team.</li> <li>2.2 Conduct advocacy for strengthening of public participation based on the findings</li> <li>2.3 Facilitate budget discussions in all seven regions of the Gambia between government officials from the Ministry of Finance, local elected representatives, village development committee representatives. Local</li> </ol>

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- councillors and, most importantly, the national assembly members will engage directly with their constituents on citizen's priorities in the budget.
- 2.4 Roll out the "Budget on The Street" initiative where key budget information will be posted on street billboards in strategic locations.
  - 2.5 Monitor the budget process to track whether citizens' budget priorities are captured and as well monitor and report on parliamentary oversight of the budget process while partnering with other civil society organisations and pressure groups to ensure probity.
  - 2.6 Mobilise civil society groups in a multi-stakeholder dialogue on the anti-corruption bill that is still before the parliament for legislation.
  - 2.7 Organise a series of community engagements (targeting marginalised communities) and inform them about the anti-corruption bill.
  - 2.8 Mobilise citizens via community engagements in rural Gambia and online, targeting those within the Greater Banjul Area to demand more open governance and transparency in the use of public wealth by their local governments through to the central government. Encourage citizens to demand annual financial statement from local government authorities.
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**HORIZONTAL  
ACCOUNT-  
ABILITY  
ACTIONS**

- 3.1 Implement the parliamentary oversight assessment tool developed by the SANCUS team.
  - 3.2 Conduct advocacy for strengthening of parliamentary oversight guided by the findings of the assessment.
  - 3.3 Monitor national assembly sittings on the development of the appropriation bill during each fiscal year by a parliamentary affairs officer who will report on the sessions and their outcome on the Gambia Participates (GP) website to be accessed by citizens, media and CSOs for parliamentary accountability.
  - 3.4 Use the information gathered by the parliamentary affairs officer (independent observer) from monitoring parliamentary proceedings to assess and report on parliament's performance in the execution of its oversight functions, which will later be published on GP's website and publicised widely across all social media platforms.
  - 3.5 Advocacy meetings where GP will lobby parliamentarians through the finance and public accounts committee, putting pressure on them to establish a credible anti-corruption commission.
  - 3.6 Continue working with the national audit office and other oversight institutions to make public data available on their websites or other online platforms, including the publication of laws and proceedings from the national assembly.
  - 3.7 Advocate for the national assembly to consider the auditor general's report on time and implement the recommendations in the audit report through a constitutional petition.
  - 3.8 Where applicable, pursue litigation where interference in the operations of oversight bodies is detected.
  - 3.9 Adopt both direct advocacy with parliamentarians and organise CSO protests to prioritise the anti-corruption bill.
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**DIGITAL  
TOOLS**

- 4.1 Collaboration with Transparency International and GlobalLeaks to develop GamLeaks so whistleblowers in the public sector can anonymously report corrupt acts of public financial management and other topics. To popularise the platform, social media campaign ads will be mounted to attract potential whistleblowers to use the platform.
- 4.2 Development and monitoring of the GamLeaks platform (website, iOS and Android app).
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## Selected Indicators

Indicator	Baseline 2020	Target 2021	Target 2022	Target 2023
# of legislative, procedural or policy changes to strengthen duty bearers' vertical accountability processes and integrity mechanisms to which the action contributes	1	1	2	3
# of duty bearer institutions monitored by SANCUS supported CSOs (national assembly and the Ministry of Finance)	2	2	2	2
# of advocacy actions conducted by SANCUS supported CSOs to increase demand-side pressure on oversight institutions	N/A	2	3	3

# GUATEMALA

## Democratic Accountability Overview

Guatemala has progressively declined on the CPI in recent years, sinking to 25 in 2020, down from 32 in 2014, well below the regional average. The UN-backed anti-corruption body, the Comisión Internacional contra la Impunidad en Guatemala (CICIG) was forced to prematurely suspend its operations in 2019, and recent presidential elections have seen several candidates banned on dubious grounds. Consequently, the country's score in the EIU's Democracy Index has declined in the past couple of years, citing concerns about the fairness of electoral processes, the separation of powers and the accountability of elected officials. Interest groups and clandestine criminal structures are entrenched in the public administration, and civic space is under some pressure.

DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY INDICES	COUNTRY RESULT
CORRUPTION PERCEPTION INDEX 2020	Score = 25/100, Rank = 149/180
FREEDOM HOUSE	Score = 52, partly free
CIVICUS MONITOR 2021	Obstructed
EIU DEMOCRACY INDEX 2020	Score = 4.97, Rank = 97
WGI: VOICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 2019	-0.31 (Percentile Rank: 35.47)
RULE OF LAW INDEX 2020	0.45
PRESS FREEDOM INDEX 2021	38.45
INDEX OF PUBLIC INTEGRITY 2019	6.44
GLOBAL STATE OF DEMOCRACY 2020 (Checks on government)	0.61 (weak/low performance democracy)

## Acción Ciudadana (TI Guatemala)

<http://www.accionciudadana.org.gt/>

## SANCUS PROJECT – CITIZEN ENGAGEMENT

### DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNT-ABILITY PROBLEM

**Core problem:** lack of citizen awareness of and participation in budgetary and the legislative matters, insufficient access to public information, and ineffective design of mechanisms for citizen participation, especially with regard to the system of urban and rural development councils.

**Root causes:** asymmetry of power between the citizenry and Guatemalan politicians, corporations and criminal groups. The population has little capacity to contribute to measures to counter corruption, given the levels of poverty, lack of formal education and systemic racism that affects the Indigenous population.

**The effect:** as corruption grows, citizens lose their capacity to react, thus broad swathes of the population lose interest and expectations in the system so that the perpetrators of corruption can act with impunity, leading to a further increase in poverty, social conflict and poor governance.

### MAIN OBJECTIVE

**Strengthen the knowledge of citizens around the functions of local-municipal governments, particularly with regards to the obligations of district deputies in terms of oversight and representing citizen interests. In parallel, enhance mechanisms for citizen participation and political advocacy.**

### NETWORK BUILDING

- 1.1 Facilitate and foster the exchange of experiences, accumulated knowledge and good practices among the eight regional commissions that form the National Network of Transparency and Probity commissions, which is made up of organisations, collectives and individual citizens.
- 1.2 Establish links and collaboration opportunities between anti-corruption and local CSOs that work on gender issues, as well as with youth and Indigenous people.
- 1.3 Organise training for local journalists on the use of state transparency portals, the analysis of public information and the use of digital tools for investigative journalism, by partnering with national networks of local journalists such as Prensa Comuntaria and FGER.

### VERTICAL ACCOUNT-ABILITY ACTION

- 2.1 Social audit school for 160 participants per year primarily aimed at aimed at women, youth and Indigenous people's organisations (but also open to journalists, students, community leaders and citizens interested in transparency and countering corruption) based on a curriculum designed in association with the School of Political Science of the Universidad de San Carlos de Guatemala, which will certify the social auditors. The participants will then join the departmental transparency commissions to perform social audit exercises.
- 2.2 Social audit actions: Acción Ciudadana along with the National Network of Transparency and Probity will design, implement and follow up on the social audit exercises in eight municipalities per year on the themes of water and sanitation, as well as social and humanitarian programmes.
- 2.3 Advocacy actions, including:

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• submit proposals to the municipal councils on social and humanitarian programmes and water and sanitation to be included in the municipal budgetary process.</li> <li>• submit proposals on reforms to the municipal purchasing and contracting procedures in the areas of water and sanitation and social and humanitarian programmes.</li> <li>• cover the activities carried out by the national network of commissions in the regions/municipalities where they operate.</li> </ul> <p>2.4 ALAC assistance will be provided along with all actions. In particular, instances in which potential cases of corruption are revealed, or in situations of human, civil or political rights violations against the citizens who are performing the social audits, violations such as denial of access to public information, discrimination or even intimidation or violence. In these situations, the ALAC will provide free legal assistance. The ALAC will further provide legal guidance and considerations to the proposals to be submitted to the municipalities. The ALAC will make sure that all proposals are legally pertinent and sustainable.</p>
<p><b>HORIZONTAL ACCOUNT- ABILITY ACTIONS</b></p>	<p>3.1 Implement the parliamentary oversight assessment tool developed by the SANCUS team, and advocate for strengthening of parliamentary oversight based on the findings.</p> <p>3.2 Educational and awareness campaigns for the public on the importance of demanding a more active role from their district congressmen and congresswomen in the control over the municipalities and development councils of their regions.</p> <p>3.3 Advocacy actions in Congress to demand legal and policy reforms focused on municipalities and development councils through the introduction of the report before Congress's commissions of municipal matters and decentralisation and development, by representatives of the national network of commissions (including women, youth and Indigenous people).</p> <p>3.4 Based on the findings of the social audits, file cases where possible acts of corruption are identified to the general comptroller's office.</p> <p>3.5 In case of violation of the access to public information rights during any of the actions, file a denouncement at the ombudsman's office, as established by Guatemalan legislation.</p>
<p><b>DIGITAL TOOLS</b></p>	<p>4.1 Develop a geoportal through which results, impact and findings of the social audit exercises, as well as reports and research conducted by Acción Ciudadana, will be disseminated. It will also contain ALAC case management system (Salesforce), news, investigation reports from national and international media addressing corruption issues related to the regions/municipalities reached through the project and links to state transparency portals by municipality.</p>

## Selected Indicators

Indicator	Baseline 2020	Target 2021	Target 2022	Target 2023
% of SANCUS supported CSOs who report that skills and knowledge gained “significantly” improved their capacity to monitor oversight institutions (disaggregated by sex, location)	N/A	25%	50%	75%
% women of SANCUS supported CSOs who report that skills and knowledge gained “significantly” improved their capacity to monitor oversight institutions	N/A	25%	50%	75%
% rural people (compared to urban) of SANCUS supported CSOs who report that skills and knowledge gained “significantly” improved their capacity to monitor oversight institutions	N/A	25%	50%	75%
# of citizens mobilised to participate in SANCUS supported monitoring processes (disaggregated by age, sex, rural/urban, theme, form of engagement)	0	160	160	160
# of duty bearer institutions monitored by SANCUS supported CSOs	monitored 222 municipal governments during 2020 as part of a study conducted on public contracting during the COVID-19 pandemic	8	16	24

# HONDURAS

## Democratic Accountability Overview

Honduras dropped five points in the CPI, from 29 in 2018 to 24 in 2020. It simultaneously declined in the EIU's Democracy Index, as a result of insufficient checks and balances on government authority and growing opacity in state affairs. There are concerns about the impartiality of the judiciary, systemic clientelism and the misuse of public funds. A window of opportunity is presented by recent amendments to the constitution and new electoral legislation to restructure the old bipartisan power-sharing agreements between the National Party (Partido Nacional – PN) and the Liberal Party (Partido Liberal – PL). As these electoral reforms move towards the implementation phase, the country is entering a crucial stage in its democratic trajectory.

DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY INDICES	COUNTRY RESULT
CORRUPTION PERCEPTION INDEX 2020	Score = 24/100, Rank = 157/180
FREEDOM HOUSE	Score = 44, partly free
CIVICUS MONITOR 2021	Repressed
EIU DEMOCRACY INDEX 2020	Score = 5.36, Rank = 88
WGI: VOICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 2019	-0.55 (Percentile Rank: 31.03)
RULE OF LAW INDEX 2020	0.4
PRESS FREEDOM INDEX 2021	49.35
INDEX OF PUBLIC INTEGRITY 2019	5.65
GLOBAL STATE OF DEMOCRACY 2020 (Checks on government)	0.48 (hybrid regime)

## Asociación para una Sociedad más Justa (ASJ) (TI Honduras)

<https://asjhonduras.com/webhnl/en/home/>

## SANCUS PROJECT – EDUCATION

<b>DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNT- ABILITY PROBLEM</b>	<p><b>Core problem:</b> almost no follow-up of citizen complaints and no clear progress on implementing changes in the education sector.</p> <p><b>Root causes:</b> a lack of legitimacy and fragile government institutions extend to all sectors of the country, including public schools. There are also inadequate complaints mechanisms and reporting channels.</p> <p><b>The effect:</b> a lack of trust by citizens in government institutions, especially in the education sector.</p>
<b>MAIN OBJECTIVE</b>	<p><b>Improve the citizen complaint mechanism and whistleblowing channels in the education sector as a means of exerting pressure on duty bearers to improve accountability and strengthen the rule of law</b></p>
<b>NETWORK BUILDING</b>	<p>1.1 Continue developing a strong alliance between at least 10 CSOs working to improve the national complaint mechanism in the education sector.</p> <p>1.2 Multi-stakeholder dialogues with participating CSOs, local and national authorities, journalists and the academia, focusing on a thematic approach to transparency, complaint mechanisms and the urgent need for quality of education.</p> <p>1.3 Provide relevant information to international, regional and inter-governmental bodies.</p>
<b>VERTICAL ACCOUNT- ABILITY ACTION</b>	<p>2.1 Assess public participation in budgeting processes, based on the toolkit developed by the project.</p> <p>2.2 Analyse the existing complaint mechanism in the education sector, identify best practices and opportunities for improvement. This activity considers the complete chain of the complaint mechanism: i) a report on decentralised institutions at the departmental level; ii) roles, responsibilities, follow-up and actions taken when required at the central level (the ministry/institution responsible); and iii) the roles and responsibilities of oversight agencies and the correct implementation of sanctions according to law.</p> <p>2.3 Three workshops with public officials and other relevant actors at a decentralised level to propose and build improvements in manuals and protocols for the complaints mechanism.</p> <p>2.4 Internal validation of the tools, manuals and improvements made to the complaints mechanism. During this stage, the project will focus on guaranteeing that participating public officials at decentralised and centralised levels understand and correctly use the tools and resources developed.</p> <p>2.5 Community external validation of the tools, manuals and improvements made to the complaints mechanism. During this stage, the project will focus on testing the process with teachers, community leaders and other CSOs, with particular emphasis on vulnerable and marginalised groups. This will include round tables, user surveys and the development of material related to whistleblower protection.</p>

	2.6 Monitoring, evaluation and final adjustments to the complaints mechanism. During this stage of the process, ALAC will give technical advice to public officers and participating CSOs, including providing recommendations and accompanying public officers during final adjustments.
<b>HORIZONTAL ACCOUNT-ABILITY ACTIONS</b>	<p>3.1 Collaborate with at least two oversight institutions by providing recommendations (two public proposals) to improve the Ministry of Education's complaint mechanism. The proposals will include recommendations and opportunities for the improvement of their role and follow-up of the complaint mechanism.</p> <p>3.2 Organise at least one public forum and six public press conferences throughout the project lifetime, informing the key stakeholders, relevant actors, and the general population about the progress in the complaints mechanism and the important role of oversight agencies.</p>
<b>DIGITAL TOOLS</b>	4.1 Increase the ALAC team's productivity and responsiveness to complaints through the implementation and roll out of GlobalLeaks.

## Selected Indicators

Indicator	Baseline 2020	Target 2021	Target 2022	Target 2023
% of SANCUS supported CSOs who state that the action has "significantly" improved opportunities for civil society participation in policy and budgetary processes (disaggregated by location, type of CSO)	N/A	0%	10%	20%
# of joint advocacy actions undertaken by SANCUS supported CSOs as evidence of regular networking to further the action	0	3	6	10
% of SANCUS supported CSOs who report that SANCUS networks have "significantly" improved their capacity to pursue advocacy on democratic accountability issues	0	10%	15%	20%
% of citizens engaged in SANCUS monitoring processes from under-represented groups (disaggregated by sex, age, disability, location and where possible income group)	0%	0%	40%	60%

# INDONESIA

## Democratic Accountability Overview

After the end of the Suharto regime in 1998, democracy in Indonesia has flourished. However, the dictatorship that lasted for 38 years left a visible legacy of corruption, reflected in the country's mediocre CPI score. Systemic corruption plagues various branches of state activity: civil service, judiciary, local and national legislatures, and the police. For instance, data from Transparency International's Global Corruption Barometer 2020 shows that, out of 17 countries in Asia, Indonesia is the third-highest in terms of reported bribery, and 30 per cent of the survey respondents paid a bribe to access public services in the 12 months prior to the interview. As for Indonesia's anti-corruption legal framework, legislation on whistleblower protection and conflicts of interest are insufficient and inadequate, and the country lacks a unified public procurement law.

Anti-corruption advances in the past decades include the establishment of the country's anti-corruption commission – Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi (KPK) – a specialised anti-corruption court – the Pengadilan Tindak Pidana Korupsi (TIPIKOR) – in 2002, and the subsequent investigation and imprisonment of numerous public officials and parliamentarians. Unfortunately, the KPK suffered a setback in September 2019 when the parliament passed legislation that reduced the commission's ability to wiretap suspects and established that the KPK could only employ investigators from the national police.

DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY INDICES	COUNTRY RESULT
CORRUPTION PERCEPTION INDEX 2020	Score = 37/100, Rank = 102/180
FREEDOM HOUSE	Score = 59, partly free
CIVICUS MONITOR 2021	Obstructed
EIU DEMOCRACY INDEX 2020	Score = 6.30, Rank = 64
WGI: VOICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 2019	0.16 (Percentile Rank: 52.71)
RULE OF LAW INDEX 2020	0.53
PRESS FREEDOM INDEX 2021	37.40
INDEX OF PUBLIC INTEGRITY 2019	6.29
GLOBAL STATE OF DEMOCRACY 2020 (Checks on government)	0.61 (weak democracy)

## TI Indonesia

<http://www.ti.or.id/>

## SANCUS PROJECT – JUDICIARY

<b>DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNT-ABILITY PROBLEM</b>	<p><b>Core problem:</b> Inadequate horizontal and vertical accountability to oversee Supreme Court, notably a weak internal supervisory body.</p> <p><b>Root causes:</b> Lack of political will to reform the judiciary.</p> <p><b>The effect:</b> Judicial corruption, political interference and weakened rule of law.</p>
<b>MAIN OBJECTIVE</b>	<p><b>Strengthen the anticorruption agenda within Supreme Court and other related agencies, with a specific focus on strengthening public participation in judicial and non-judicial services</b></p>
<b>NETWORK BUILDING</b>	<p>1.1 Enhancing civil society participation to monitor courts through strengthening CSO Coalition on Judicial Monitor;</p> <p>1.2 CSOs actively engage in judicial reform through monitoring activities at the Supreme Court, both judicial and non-judicial service practices;</p> <p>1.3 Organize training and capacity building for 15 selected journalists to understand judicial reform better and publish relevant stories;</p>
<b>VERTICAL ACCOUNT-ABILITY ACTION</b>	<p>2.1 Conduct a Judicial Integrity Survey based on the perceptions of experts and civil society figures who have been active in overseeing the course of judicial reform, especially those related to the judicial and non-judicial performance of the Supreme Court;</p> <p>2.2 Training of civil society groups and journalist networks to monitor the integrity and performance of the Supreme Court.</p> <p>2.3 Evaluation study of the Supreme Court’s guidelines on the criminalization of corruption and corporate criminal liability.</p> <p>2.4 Hold consultations with relevant stakeholders i. e: Supreme Court itself, Judicial Commission, Corruption Eradication Commission and CSOs/NGOs and develop recommendation papers to strengthen the integrity of the Supreme Court together with the Judicial Commission and the Corruption Eradication Commission that will be disseminated via a public campaign.</p> <p>2.5 Development of an online tracker as part of the info portal to assess whether recommendations have been adopted and build pressure for reform.</p> <p>2.6 Conduct public oversight to trace the current track records of prospective Supreme Court judges.</p> <p>2.7 Review the implementation of the whistleblower system policy in the Supreme Court, Witness and Victim Protection Agency, the Judicial Commission and the Corruption Eradication Commission.</p> <p>2.8 Conduct advocacy and dissemination of the results of the whistleblower system policy review to CSOs, journalists and the general public</p>
<b>HORIZONTAL ACCOUNT-</b>	<p>3.1 Advocacy and dissemination of evaluation study results on the Supreme Court’s guidelines on the criminalization of corruption and corporate criminal liability to the Supreme Court itself, KPK - (Corruption Eradication</p>

<b>ABILITY ACTIONS</b>	<p>Commission), the Anti Corruption Agency, Judicial Commission and to the public.</p> <p>3.2 Organizational performance assessment of Supreme Court and Anti-Corruption Agency in regards to Article No 11 and Article 6 and 36 UNCAC.</p> <p>3.3 Advocacy and disseminate the results of the ACA assessment to the public.</p> <p>3.4 Policy research on the regulation of protection mechanisms for Supreme Court judges, particularly in cases of corruption.</p> <p>3.5 Dialogue between CSOs and the House of Representatives to develop a discourse on making special regulations related to judge protection, particularly to protect judges from undue influence by the executive and other state institutions.</p> <p>3.6 Collaborate with the Judicial Commission and the Corruption Eradication Commission to refine the competency guidelines for selection of supreme justices.</p> <p>3.7 Policy dialogue to identify and refine internal oversight mechanisms at the Supreme Court. The advocacy will seek to strengthen the role of Supervisory Body within the Supreme Court through the Supreme Court's circular letter of internal supervision.</p> <p>3.8 Policy dialogue between state institutions, namely the Parliamentary, Judicial Commission, Anti-Corruption Agency (KPK), DPR, Ombudsman, PPATK and the Supreme Court to formulate joint policies through a series of multistakeholder forums to strengthen judicial integrity</p>
<b>DIGITAL TOOLS</b>	<p>4.1 Strengthening the quality of the Supreme Court Oversight Information System (whistleblowing systems), including the possibilities to adopt GlobalLeaks, from the perspective of court service users</p> <p>4.2 Improve the e-Court system that has been developed by the Supreme Court.</p> <p>4.3 Develop an integrated information portal that will include research products and policy papers, news produced by journalists, information regarding all activities and meetings, channels of complaints and public aspirations and relevant Supreme Court policies</p>

## Selected Indicators

Indicator	Baseline 2020	Target 2021	Target 2022	Target 2023
# of legislative, procedural or policy changes to strengthen oversight institutions' efficacy, accountability and independence to which the action contributes	1	2	2	2

# of citizens mobilised to participate in SANCUS supported monitoring processes (disaggregated by age, sex, rural/urban, theme, form of engagement)	0	50	100	200
% of citizens engaged by SANCUS monitoring processes from under-represented groups (disaggregated by sex, age, disability, location and where possible income group)	0	20%	30%	45%
# of duty bearer institutions monitored by SANCUS supported CSOs	0	2	3	4

# JAMAICA

## Democratic Accountability Overview

Jamaica's score on the CPI has remained stable at 44/100, only increasing slightly over the past decade. It has made some progress with the establishment of the Major Organised Crime, Ant-Corruption Agency, and Integrity Commission Act of 2017, but there has also been major resistance to reforms from many politicians. Its political system is one of representative parliamentary and competitive elections regularly occur.

Corruption is an issue in Jamaica with frequent links between public officials and organised crime. The elected national legislatures determine the policies of the government, but criminal groups have been known to affect democratic policymaking<sup>66</sup>. The government has been reluctant to pursue many of these cases, and government whistleblowers are often not protected<sup>67</sup>.

DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY INDICES	COUNTRY RESULT
CORRUPTION PERCEPTION INDEX 2021	Score = 44/100, Rank = 70/180
FREEDOM HOUSE	-
CIVICUS MONITOR 2021	Narrowed
EIU DEMOCRACY INDEX 2021	Score = 7.13, Rank = 42
WGI: VOICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 2021	0.63 (Percentile Rank: 65.700)
RULE OF LAW INDEX 2022	0.58
PRESS FREEDOM INDEX 2022	83.35
INDEX OF PUBLIC INTEGRITY	-
GLOBAL STATE OF DEMOCRACY 2021 (Checks on government)	0.75 (Weak/low performance democracy)

### NIA Jamaica

<https://niajamaica.org/>

<sup>66</sup> Freedom House, 2022. <https://freedomhouse.org/country/jamaica/freedom-world/2022>

<sup>67</sup> Freedom House, 2022. <https://freedomhouse.org/country/jamaica/freedom-world/2022>

## SANCUS PROJECT

<b>DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY PROBLEM</b>	<p><b>Core problem:</b> A core problem diminishing horizontal accountability by the parliament is the extent of executive dominance built into the parliamentary/executive relationship and excessive acquiescence in that dominance.</p> <p><b>Root causes:</b> The underlying cause of this core problem relates to a leader-centred political culture and the relative subordination of state institutions - including the legislature- to the executive. As an illustration, the Jamaican Constitution bestows on the Prime Minister unfettered powers to effect a dissolution of parliament in the event of a threatened motion of no-confidence.</p> <p><b>The effect:</b> ineffectiveness of parliamentary use of its oversight powers and capacity; decline in public trust and confidence; erosion of support for democracy, with a concomitant increase in popular support for military takeover to deal with high crime and corruption.</p>
<b>MAIN OBJECTIVE</b>	<p>Improve parliamentary oversight by strengthening the mandate, performance and efficacy of various actors (categories of members) within the Parliament.</p>
<b>NETWORK BUILDING</b>	<p>1.1 Engage like-minded civil society organisations (potentially Jamaicans for Justice, the Jamaica Accountability Meter Portal and the Jamaica Environment Trust) to monitor parliamentarians’ activities related to oversight; for example, attendance at sessional committees.</p> <p>1.2 Engage journalists and media practitioners, particularly those engaged in the coverage of parliament to deepen their understanding of horizontal accountability and engender their support for the advocacy actions of the project. Traditional media will also be crucial in wider public awareness/education building. NIA’s existing relationships with investigative journalists derives from having co-sponsored – along with the Press Association of Jamaica and the Media Institute of the Caribbean – training seminars in investigative Journalism</p>
<b>HORIZONTAL ACCOUNTABILITY ACTIONS</b>	<p>2.1 Implement the parliamentary oversight assessment tool developed by the SANCUS team, and guided by the findings of the assessment to advocate for strengthening of oversight, such as the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Lobbying parliamentary leaders to facilitate more timely debate of private members’ motions and more prompt answers to parliamentary questions.</li> <li>b. Advocating for more oversight opportunities for opposition MPs.</li> <li>c. Advocating for a specific timeframe for both sessional committees and the parliament (as appropriate) to discuss and act on reports from the Auditor General’s Department and from parliamentary commissions.</li> <li>d. Undertaking any other advocacy objectives highlighted by the findings from the assessment.</li> </ul> <p><i>In each of the areas, we would seek to ensure that the changes are (permanently) codified through amendments to the standing orders of parliament.</i></p> <p>2.2 Provide support for the parliamentary internship programme to strengthen the research base for private members motions as well as questions to</p>

- 
- Ministers.
- 2.3 Advance the development/adoption of a code of conduct for parliamentarians, which would highlight the priority of parliament's internal oversight functions
- 2.4 Conduct fulsome desk review/research to guide monitoring of the parliament and its processes that provide oversight and ensure accountability.
- 

## Selected Indicators

Indicator	Baseline 2021	Target 2022	Target 2023
# of legislative, procedural or policy changes to strengthen oversight institutions' efficacy, accountability and independence to which the Action contributes	0	1	1
# and description of joint advocacy actions undertaken by SANCUS-supported CSOs as evidence of regular networking to further the Action	0	2	4

# JORDAN

## Democratic Accountability Overview

Jordan is a constitutional monarchy, with King Abdullah II bin Hussein holding powers including appointment of the prime minister and cabinet members. The legislature consists of the Assembly of Senators, also appointed by the King, as well as the elected House of Representatives. The last parliamentary elections were held in November 2020, which recorded the lowest voter turnout in a decade of just 29.88%. Jordan's CPI score has stayed quite steady at around 48 in the last 10 years. In recent years, the country has continued to consolidate, maintaining stability and integrity, although both remain fragile. One of its notable change in the advancement of women's rights was the abolishment of Article 308 of the Penal Code that previously enabled those convicted of sexual assault to avoid punishment if they married their victim.

DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY INDICES	COUNTRY RESULT
CORRUPTION PERCEPTION INDEX 2020	Score = 49/100, Rank = 60/180
FREEDOM HOUSE	Score = 34, not free
CIVICUS MONITOR 2021	Obstructed
EIU DEMOCRACY INDEX 2020	Score = 3.62, Rank = 118
WGI: VOICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 2019	-0.67 (Percentile Rank = 28.57)
RULE OF LAW INDEX 2020	0.57
PRESS FREEDOM INDEX 2021	42.89
INDEX OF PUBLIC INTEGRITY 2019	6.91665868
GLOBAL STATE OF DEMOCRACY 2020 (Checks on government)	0.55 (hybrid regime)

## Rasheed for Integrity and Transparency (TI Jordan)

<http://www.rasheedti.org>

## SANCUS PROJECT – RIGHT TO INFORMATION/ PUBLIC FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT

<b>DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNT-ABILITY PROBLEM</b>	<p><b>Core problem:</b> Citizens are unable to access information and understand their rights in monitoring the promises made by the government in order to hold officials accountable.</p> <p><b>Root causes:</b> Insufficient basic background information about corruption and inability of public to distinguish between different types of corruption and its degree. Moreover, corruption is embedded in the social culture, which leads to the lack of conducive environment for citizens to be open and willing to talk about the issue.</p> <p><b>The effect:</b> Limited citizen understanding of the reasoning behind fighting corruption, due to the lack of understanding of their rights. Low citizen participation in anti-corruption initiatives due to lack of a place where they can access and understand how to eradicate corruption.</p>
<b>MAIN OBJECTIVE</b>	<p><b>Improve democratic accountability of Jordanian public institutions by ensuring Access to Information and empowering civil society actors to demand quality changes to address accountability.</b></p>
<b>NETWORK BUILDING</b>	<p>1.1 Building-up and expanding the national network of experts consisting of civil society and non-profit organisations, unions, coalitions as well as journalists, researches, academia, and other professional individuals.</p> <p>1.2 Further inclusion of individual and organisational experts across the MENA region, who could sufficiently contribute with their expertise to the network.</p>
<b>VERTICAL ACCOUNT-ABILITY ACTION</b>	<p>2.1 Submit access to information requests to the authorities (public entities that are required by the Access to Information law to disclose information and answer those requests), and evaluate the implementation of the law, in addition to the time spent for receiving responses.</p> <p>2.2 Generate recommendations to improve policies and legal frameworks that support expert network's ability to advocate for increased vertical accountability.</p>
<b>HORIZONTAL ACCOUNT-ABILITY ACTIONS</b>	<p>3.1 Analyse the yearly report published by the Audit Bureau</p>

## Selected Indicators

Indicator	Baseline 2020	Target 2021	Target 2022	Target 2023
# of legislative, procedural or policy changes to strengthen oversight institutions' efficacy, accountability and independence to which the action contributes	2	0	0	1
# of marginalised groups represented at multi-stakeholder dialogues (disaggregated by age, disability, location, sex)	0	0	0	3
% of duty bearer institutions monitored by SANCUS-supported CSOs	1	0	0	5
# of advocacy actions conducted by SANCUS supported CSOs to increase demand-side pressure on oversight institutions	N/A	0	0	2

# KENYA

## Democratic Accountability Overview

Corruption penetrates every sector of Kenya's economy. The judicial system is rather weak, public officials frequently demand bribes, and tax evasion and public procurement fraud is reportedly widespread. The Constitution of Kenya (2010) heralded a new system of governance centred on national values and principles of governance aimed at ensuring ethical leadership, transparency, participation and accountable use of public resources. Kenya's system of governance is also centred on the devolution of power and resources to the 47 counties. The Office of the Auditor General and the Controller of Budget are the only two independent offices established under the constitution. The separation of powers between the executive, legislature and the judiciary is also embedded in the constitutional framework. Parliament is charged with overseeing the executive through measures such as approval of policies and budgets, while the judiciary is in principle insulated from undue interference by the fact that appointments are made by the independent Judicial Service Commission.

These constitutional safeguards notwithstanding, Kenya has continued to record very low progress in its measures to counter corruption and other governance indicators. In the Corruption Perception Index 2020, Kenya obtained a score of 31 out of 100, having scored 28 points in 2019. Kenya's score falls slightly below the sub-Saharan Africa average of 32 and global average of 43, signifying serious levels of public sector corruption.

DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY INDICES	COUNTRY RESULT
<b>CORRUPTION PERCEPTION INDEX 2020</b>	Score = 31/100, Rank = 124/180
<b>FREEDOM HOUSE</b>	Score = 48, partly free
<b>CIVICUS MONITOR 2021</b>	Obstructed
<b>EIU DEMOCRACY INDEX 2020</b>	Score = 5.05, Rank = 95
<b>WGI: VOICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 2019</b>	-0.29 (Percentile Rank = 36.45)
<b>RULE OF LAW INDEX 2020</b>	0.45
<b>PRESS FREEDOM INDEX 2021</b>	33.65
<b>INDEX OF PUBLIC INTEGRITY 2019</b>	5.82
<b>GLOBAL STATE OF DEMOCRACY 2020 (Checks on government)</b>	0.69 (mid-range performing democracy)

**TI Kenya**

<https://tikenya.org/>

## SANCUS PROJECT – PUBLIC FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT (PFM)

### DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNT-ABILITY PROBLEM

**Core problem:** weak parliamentary oversight and inadequate public participation in public audit processes.

**Root causes:** low capacity and poor coordination and cooperation between oversight institutions and a lack of citizen awareness and involvement in audit processes.

**The effect:** poor implementation of PFM laws and limited parliamentary oversight results in corruption being the greatest obstacle to development.

### MAIN OBJECTIVE

**Enhanced parliamentary oversight and citizen participation in the formal public audit process in Kenya and the region**

### NETWORK BUILDING

- 1.1 At the annual Parliamentary Oversight Peer Review Conference, TI Kenya will leverage on the good relationship with African Parliamentarian's Network Against Corruption (APNAC) having an existing collaboration memorandum of understanding (MoU) and the Civil Society Parliamentary Engagement Network (CSPEN) membership to organise peer review meetings between parliamentary oversight committees, governance sector CSOs and oversight institutions, such as Controller of Budget (COB), Office of the Auditor General (OAG), Public Procurement Regulatory Authority, Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission, Commission on Administrative Justice, Kenya National Commission on Human Rights.
- 1.2 National and regional peer learning and sharing forums, with national chapters under the SANCUS project and local and international CSOs engaged in fiscal transparency and open budget initiatives.
- 1.3 Regional and international reporting mechanisms, through support from SANCUS, TI Kenya will continue contributing to the voluntary national reviews as a member of the SDGs Kenya Forum.

### VERTICAL ACCOUNT- ABILITY ACTION

- 2.1 Support implementation of the citizen audit accountability framework to enhance citizens' understanding and participation in the formal audit process, TI Kenya will seek to partner with the Office of the Auditor General through an existing MoU to support the implementation of the citizen audit accountability framework, where TI Kenya was a part of the technical committee in developing the framework. This engagement will include: convening local CSOs for collaboration in the implementation of the framework; simplification of the auditor general reports, citizen friendly public budgets for easier understanding and publication of these reports on the open data platform on public accountability: public audit portal <http://publicaudit.tikenya.org/>

**HORIZONTAL  
ACCOUNT-ABILITY  
ACTIONS**

- 
- 2.2 Data collection, analysis and dissemination on the public audit portal. The public audit portal currently only has analysed reports for county governments. SANCUS will support the analysis and publication of national government reports for the Education and Health Sectors as among the most prominent service delivery sectors. The portal will be used to empower citizens with information relating to the PFM processes as well as serve as a basis for influencing adoption of ICT platforms in implementing the Citizen Audit Accountability Framework.
- 2.3 Training for journalists: TI Kenya will also support media engagement in the implementation of the citizen audit accountability framework. This will be achieved through SANCUS support for capacity building for journalists on parliamentary oversight and investigative reporting using auditor general and controller of budget reports. Training of journalists will include the development of online course materials to be publicised for journalists to access on the Media Tech Hub platform. This will allow a wider reach of materials for journalists to acquire knowledge and skills on reporting on corruption.
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- 3.1 Implement the parliamentary oversight assessment tool developed by the SANCUS team, and guided by the findings of the assessment to advocate for strengthening of oversight
- 3.2 Annual compliance and performance assessments of National Assembly and Senate, and OAG and COB reports follow-ups. To further build on the empirical data needed for the implementation of the citizen audit accountability framework, TI Kenya will conduct assessments on the status of follow-ups on the reports for previously audited financial years and actions taken for the education and health sector auditor general reports, including citizen petitions to parliament.
- 3.3 Support engagements under the CSPEN, a network of 35 civil society organisations with an interest in parliamentary strengthening programmes. CSPEN aims to be a coordinated platform for CSOs to support parliament, its committees and members in the areas of oversight, legislation and representation, as well as designing tools to help parliament systematically monitor and track the implementation the laws that it has made.
- 3.4 Outreach and awareness programmes: TI Kenya will engage in multi-media engagements to increase awareness of parliamentary oversight of PFM to influence the uptake of key recommendations from the assessments.
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	3.5 Social accountability: Public participation through petitioning parliament will be done through petitions and strategic advocacy meetings with the relevant legislative committees.
<b>DIGITAL TOOLS</b>	4.1 Public audit accountability platform: simplification of the auditor general reports and production of citizen friendly public budgets. These materials will be published on <a href="http://publicaudit.tkenya.org/">http://publicaudit.tkenya.org/</a> .
	4.2 Customise the ALAC case management system (Salesforce) to the social accountability measures adopted for addressing reports from the public aligned to budget advocacy work.

## Selected Indicators

Indicator	Baseline 2020	Target 2021	Target 2022	Target 2023
# of national SANCUS multi-stakeholder dialogues to advance in-country networks	0	1	4	4
# of participants of technical workshops on the use of accountability tools and data analysis techniques (disaggregated by institutional affiliation, sex, location)	0	35	50	50
# of citizens mobilised to participate in SANCUS supported monitoring processes (disaggregated by age, sex, rural/urban, theme, form of engagement)	0	35	100	100

# LEBANON

## Democratic Accountability Overview

Lebanon's CPI score remained stubbornly stuck on 28 for a number of years, before dropping to 25 in 2020, well below the regional average (39). The country has also declined according to the EIU's Democracy Index as a result of an intransigent political system dominated by vested interests that dictate the allocation of resources. Widespread protests in recent years have been driven by economic malaise that was compounded in August 2020 by a devastating explosion at Beirut's port. Despite concerns about civic space and press freedom, the generally non-sectarian and peaceful nature of recent electoral campaigns and political protests offers some hope for the future.

DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY INDICES	COUNTRY RESULT
CORRUPTION PERCEPTION INDEX 2020	Score = 25/100, Rank = 149/180
FREEDOM HOUSE	Score = 43, partly free
CIVICUS MONITOR 2021	Obstructed
EIU DEMOCRACY INDEX 2020	Score = 4.16, Rank = 108
WGI: VOICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 2019	-0.49 (Percentile Rank: 32.51)
RULE OF LAW INDEX 2020	0.45
PRESS FREEDOM INDEX 2021	34.93
INDEX OF PUBLIC INTEGRITY 2019	5.49
GLOBAL STATE OF DEMOCRACY 2020 (Checks on government)	0.55 (weak/low performance democracy)

## The Lebanese Transparency Association (LTA) (TI Lebanon)

<http://www.transparency-lebanon.org/>

## SANCUS PROJECT – PUBLIC FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT

<b>DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNT-ABILITY PROBLEM</b>	<p><b>Core problem:</b> Opacity and lack of accountability in budget formulation, execution and oversight.</p> <p><b>Root causes:</b> Absence of robust national budgeting process coupled with weak oversight of public funds and lack of transparency, enhancing risks of embezzlement, bribery and personal profit.</p> <p><b>The effect:</b> Growing citizen mistrust in the Lebanese state. Some of the sectors most affected by poor budgeting and corruption are energy and social affairs.</p>
<b>MAIN OBJECTIVE</b>	<p><b>Improve the responsiveness of duty bearers by pushing for reform in the energy and social sectors, as well as encouraging greater participation in budgetary processes.</b></p>
<b>NETWORK BUILDING</b>	<p>1.1 Establish national CSO-taskforce to coordinate advocacy efforts on public financial management</p> <p>1.2 Train CSOs and investigative journalists on Public Participation in Budget Processes and the importance of Budget Reform</p>
<b>VERTICAL ACCOUNT-ABILITY ACTION</b>	<p>2.1 Conduct assessment of public participation in budget processes in the power and social affairs sectors</p> <p>2.2 Advocate for public participation in budget processes based on assessment findings</p> <p>2.3 Develop CSO budget monitoring tool to assess the use of funds in the energy and social affairs sectors</p> <p>2.4 Train CSOs and investigative journalists on public expenditure monitoring</p> <p>2.5 Monitor anti-corruption budget reforms in the energy and social affairs sectors</p> <p>2.6 Advocate for the strengthening of governmental budgetary processes in the energy and social affairs sectors</p>
<b>HORIZONTAL ACCOUNT-ABILITY ACTIONS</b>	<p>3.1 Train CSOs with INTOSAI's Resource Guide for Civil Society Organizations</p> <p>3.2 Develop a CSO monitoring tool of Oversight Institutions' commitment to curbing corruption</p> <p>3.3 Conduct monitoring of Oversight Institutions in their processing of corruption cases</p> <p>3.4 Build consensus and momentum among decision makers and oversight institutions on recommendations for improved policies and procedures.</p> <p>3.5 Advocate for the enhancement of accountability through strengthening the role of Oversight Institutions</p>

## Selected Indicators

Indicator	Baseline 2020	Target 2021	Target 2022	Target 2023
# of participants of technical workshops on the use of accountability tools and data analysis techniques (disaggregated by institutional affiliation, sex, location)	N/A	0	50	50
# of citizens mobilised to participate in SANCUS supported monitoring processes (disaggregated by age, sex, rural/urban, theme, form of engagement)	0	0	60	60
# of parliaments and oversight institutions monitored by SANCUS supported CSOs	2	0	2	2

# MADAGASCAR

## Democratic Accountability Overview

Madagascar's score on the CPI has dropped slightly in the past decade, from 32/100 in 2012 to 26/100 in 2021. Its political system is of a semi-presidential representative democratic republic, established after protests in 1991. Political instability, including coups and violent unrest have still been prevalent in recent years and inefficient governance, poverty, and economic instability fuel corruption<sup>68</sup>. Investigations and prosecutions of corruption by the Independent Anti-Corruption Bureau are infrequent and lawmakers have been known to accept bribes, while the government has been known to target and harass independent media outlets that are critical of them<sup>69</sup>.

DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY INDICES	COUNTRY RESULT
CORRUPTION PERCEPTION INDEX 2021	Score = 26/100, Rank = 147/180
FREEDOM HOUSE	-
CIVICUS MONITOR 2021	Repressed
EIU DEMOCRACY INDEX 2021	Score = 5.70, Rank = 83
WGI: VOICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 2021	-0.27 (Percentile Rank: 36.71)
RULE OF LAW INDEX 2022	0.44
PRESS FREEDOM INDEX 2022	58.02
INDEX OF PUBLIC INTEGRITY	-
GLOBAL STATE OF DEMOCRACY 2019 (Checks on government)	0.47 (Weak/low performance democracy)

## TI Madagascar

<http://www.transparency.mg/>

<sup>68</sup> Rahman, 2019. <https://knowledgehub.transparency.org/helpdesk/overview-of-corruption-and-anti-corruption-in-madagascar-1>

<sup>69</sup> Freedom House, 2022. <https://freedomhouse.org/country/madagascar/freedom-world/2022>

## SANCUS PROJECT – DIANA REGIONS

<b>DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNT-ABILITY PROBLEM</b>	<p><b>Core problem:</b> Decentralization is not yet effective in Madagascar and municipal budgets lack transparency and accountability as, most of the time, citizens are not involved in their elaboration/execution/follow-up</p> <p><b>Root causes:</b> Due to a lack of democratic culture in the country, citizens do not have the habit to hold public officials to account or participate into public life. Moreover, duty bearers want to hold citizens and CSOs level of awareness and engagement into public affairs low; so that they can continue to abuse public resources in a total impunity</p> <p><b>The effect:</b> Given this situation, public resource, and specifically municipal budgets are most of the time embezzled or used in private ways for unintended purposes by corrupt and ill-intentioned politicians and public officials. Communities, especially vulnerable people (women, youth, disabled, etc.) do not really benefit from the execution of such biased budgets.</p>
<b>MAIN OBJECTIVE</b>	<b>Empowering CSOs and citizens' participation in and monitoring of municipal budgets in order to create a better public accountability and reduced corruption in Madagascar's 6 selected municipalities</b>
<b>NETWORK BUILDING</b>	<p>1.1 Organization of a 3-day regional cross-municipalities exchange program gathering representatives from the 10 municipalities in a venue/location</p> <p>1.2 Building a coalition/network of CSOs striving for vertical accountability</p>
<b>VERTICAL ACCOUNT-ABILITY ACTION</b>	<p>2.1 Assessing public participation in budgeting processes in targeted municipalities, based on the assessment toolkit developed by SANCUS</p> <p>2.2 Conducting advocacy on strengthening public participation in budgeting processes, based on the findings from the assessment</p> <p>2.3 Journalistic Investigation related to accountability</p> <p>2.4 Training the target stakeholders to vertical accountability</p> <p>2.5 Massive learning and sensitization campaign for citizens, based on the SANCUS assessment findings</p>

### Selected Indicators

Indicator	Baseline 2021	Target 2022	Target 2023
# of legislative, procedural or policy changes to strengthen duty bearers' vertical accountability processes and integrity mechanisms to which the Action contributes	0	1	1
% of SANCUS recommendations adopted by public institutions targeted by sub-actions (disaggregated by country, type of institution)	0		50%
# and description of joint advocacy actions undertaken by SANCUS-supported CSOs as evidence of regular networking to further the Action	0	0	6
# ALAC cases in progress in SANCUS countries			30

IOc3.i3: # SANCUS sub-actions that employ digital tools to monitor oversight institutions	0	0	2
# of citizens mobilised to participate in SANCUS-supported monitoring and scrutiny processes (disaggregated by age, sex, rural/urban, theme, form of engagement)		600	1200
% of citizens engaged by SANCUS monitoring processes from underrepresented groups (disaggregated by sex, age, disability, location and where possible income group)		50%	50%
# of duty bearer institutions monitored by SANCUS-supported CSOs		6	6

# MALDIVES

## Democratic Accountability Overview

In the 2019 CPI, the Maldives was accorded a score of 29, which reflects a significantly poorer performance than the regional average (44). Yet 2020 witnessed a dramatic improvement, with the country receiving a CPI score of 43. The Maldives does not feature on many of the governance indices, likely a function of its size. Yet despite the country's small size, it punches above its weight in terms of corruption scandals. A 2016 whistleblowing case revealed a massive corruption scheme in which the government was selling islands for resort development below market rates and funnelling tens of millions of dollars into the private accounts of wealthy businessmen and politicians. According to the latest Global Corruption Barometer data published in November 2020, a staggering 90 per cent of Maldivian citizens consider government corruption a major problem.

DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY INDICES	COUNTRY RESULT
CORRUPTION PERCEPTION INDEX 2020	Score = 43/100, Rank = 75/180
FREEDOM HOUSE	Score = 40, partly free
CIVICUS MONITOR 2021	Obstructed
EIU DEMOCRACY INDEX 2020	-
WGI: VOICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 2019	-0.44 (Percentile Rank: 33.99)
RULE OF LAW INDEX 2020	-
PRESS FREEDOM INDEX 2021	29.13
INDEX OF PUBLIC INTEGRITY 2019	-
GLOBAL STATE OF DEMOCRACY 2020 (Checks on government)	-

## Transparency Maldives (TI Maldives)

<https://transparency.mv/v16/>

## SANCUS PROJECT – STATE OWNED ENTERPRISES

<b>DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNT- ABILITY PROBLEM</b>	<p><b>Core problem:</b> SOEs operate as vessels for corruption. Successive governments have failed to strengthen compliance programs aimed to prevent and detect misconduct, irresponsible management and bad governance of SOEs. Oversight agencies are not performing their role in holding SOEs to account.</p> <p><b>Root causes:</b> SOEs are powerful actors in the economy of the country and exert a lot of influence on the state apparatus. SOEs receive a great deal of state funding but are not held accountable by public officials and there is a general absence of political will to hold SOEs to account.</p> <p><b>The effect:</b> Widespread corrupt practices by SOEs, as well as incomplete or low-quality works that lead to wastage of public resources.</p>
<b>MAIN OBJECTIVE</b>	<p><b>Strengthen the legal and regulatory framework for the operation and functionality of SOEs, as well as improve the governance, functions and operations of SOEs themselves.</b></p>
<b>NETWORK BUILDING</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1.1 Organise an Anti-Corruption Conference, in partnership with ACC, on the theme of SOE integrity, which brings together all major stakeholders including SOEs, President's Office, Ministry of Finance, oversight institutions (Parliament Standing Committee, PCB, Auditor General's Office ), the private sector, NGOs and the media.</li> <li>1.2 Organise bi-annual multi-stakeholder dialogues to continue the conversation and follow up on any commitments proposed at the Conference.</li> <li>1.3 Work with journalists to develop stories on corruption and governance aspects of SOEs.</li> </ol>
<b>VERTICAL ACCOUNT- ABILITY ACTION</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>2.1 Monitor the outcomes of the Good Governance sector of the government Strategic Action Plan that relate to SOE governance.</li> <li>2.2 Develop a social audit style methodology to collect information on government projects awarded to SOEs.</li> <li>2.3 Conduct training on social audit and RTI for civil society and youth groups to seek information to monitor the government projects awarded to SOEs.</li> <li>2.4 Mobilise community monitors from civil society and youth groups to track all stages of government projects awarded to SOEs, especially large infrastructure projects, projects that are supported by a sovereign guarantee or loan, or those projects that are awarded to deliver a critical public service such as healthcare and public housing.</li> <li>2.5 Analyse the data collected through the community monitors internally to identify instances of alleged corruption or abuse of power and publish the results.</li> <li>2.6 Publish the results quarterly as quarterly bulletins on the chapter's website and social media platforms. Publish a final report and submit it to the relevant accountability institutions (including Parliament, Anti Corruption Commission and/or Auditor General's Office).</li> </ol>

	<p>2.7 Conduct awareness-raising activities and training on RTI and whistleblowing to promote a speak-up culture and support whistleblowers in SOEs.</p> <p>2.8 Work with SOEs by developing a self-assessment toolkit based on TI guides for SOEs to assist SOEs to appraise and improve their anti-corruption policies and procedures including whistle blower protection systems.</p> <p>2.9 Publish bulletins on the activities of the Project, information related to SOEs, oversight and regulatory agencies, and results of social audit.</p> <p>2.10 Implement and pilot the toolkit on public participation in budget processes, and conduct advocacy for strengthening of public participation based on the findings.</p>
<b>HORIZONTAL ACCOUNT-ABILITY ACTIONS</b>	<p>3.1 Observe the work of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on SOEs by observing Parliamentary Standing Committee meetings and analysing Committee reports on SOEs.</p> <p>3.2 Distribute/publish observations of the Committee' work and highlight areas to strengthen its oversight function.</p> <p>3.3 Engage with the Auditor General's Office, Anti-Corruption Commission and Ministry of Finance to assess the follow up actions in those areas identified in audit reports as gross misappropriation or mismanagement of funds by SOEs.</p> <p>3.4 Engage directly with President's Office, Ministry of Finance and PCB to implement the relevant outputs proposed in the Strategic Action Plan, building on existing collaborations with the President's Office.</p>
<b>DIGITAL TOOLS</b>	<p>4.1 Adopt the ALAC digital tool of GlobaLeaks and the Salesforce case management system to encourage the public to submit complaints related to SOEs.</p> <p>4.2 Engage with SOEs to encourage them to adopt GlobaLeaks to facilitate their employees to report wrongdoing.</p>

## Selected Indicators

Indicator	Baseline 2020	Target 2021	Target 2022	Target 2023
# of citizens mobilised to participate in SANCUS supported monitoring processes (disaggregated by age, sex, rural/urban, theme, form of engagement)	N/A	0	0	50
% of citizens engaged by SANCUS monitoring processes from under-represented groups (disaggregated by sex, age, disability, location and where possible income group)	N/A	0	0	40%

# MOROCCO

## Democratic Accountability Overview

Morocco's CPI score has remained steady in recent years, generally fluctuating slightly around 40. Reforms undertaken in the wake of the Arab Spring in 2011 have little to fundamentally alter the distribution of power in Morocco. Provisions relating to the issues of judicial independence and auditing have not yet led to any actual changes in practice. Several months of stalled negotiations following the 2016 parliamentary elections led to the forced resignation of Prime Minister Abdelilah Benkirane (of the Party of Justice and Development, PJD), and King Mohammed VI appointed Saadeddine el Othmani (also from PJD) as head of government in March 2017. This has reinforced the perception that the monarchy keeps a tight grip on power in the country and led some observers to question the PJD's reformist credentials. Levels of political disaffection remain high among the general population, as demonstrated by high electoral abstention rates and the low levels of trust in parliament and political parties. The Hirak Rif movement's protests and on-going consumer boycotts are signs that a large share of the population is tired of poor governance and corruption.

DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY INDICES	COUNTRY RESULT
<b>CORRUPTION PERCEPTION INDEX 2020</b>	Score = 40/100, Rank = 86/180
<b>FREEDOM HOUSE</b>	Score = 37, partly free
<b>CIVICUS MONITOR 2021</b>	Obstructed
<b>EIU DEMOCRACY INDEX 2020</b>	Score = 5.04, Rank = 96
<b>WGI: VOICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 2019</b>	-0.63 (Percentile Rank: 29.56)
<b>RULE OF LAW INDEX 2020</b>	0.5
<b>PRESS FREEDOM INDEX 2021</b>	43.94
<b>INDEX OF PUBLIC INTEGRITY 2019</b>	6.642254909
<b>GLOBAL STATE OF DEMOCRACY 2020 (Checks on government)</b>	0.56 (hybrid regime)

## Transparency Maroc (TI Morocco)

<http://www.transparencymaroc.ma/index.php>

## SANCUS PROJECT – PUBLIC FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT (PFM)

<b>DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNT-ABILITY PROBLEM</b>	<p><b>Core problem:</b> lack of reliable, relevant budget information accessible and visible to citizens and civil society organisations.</p> <p><b>Root causes:</b> ineffectiveness of anti-corruption legal framework, as well as a lack of anti-corruption bodies with the necessary independence and legal authority.</p> <p><b>The effect:</b> corruption, embezzlement and impunity of the corrupt have eroded public trust and fuelled disengagement among citizens and even civil society.</p>
<b>MAIN OBJECTIVE</b>	<p><b>Strengthen transparency and accountability in public financial management and tackle impunity around the misuse of public funds</b></p>
<b>NETWORK BUILDING</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1.1 Build a coalition of CSOs, anti-corruption bodies, researchers and investigative journalists to push for greater transparency throughout the budget process.</li> <li>1.2 Establish partnerships with national parliamentary committees to share recommendations based on identified citizen needs and influence spending priorities.</li> <li>1.3 Organise a virtual event with the African Network for Transparency to gain a regional perspective on corruption issues in budget processes.</li> <li>1.4 Training courses for young lawyers to support the ALAC in performing legal reviews in the sectors most affected by corruption as identified by the ALAC.</li> <li>1.5 Training for journalists to strengthen their capacities to investigate corruption cases in areas identified by the ALAC, including penal measures, administrative regulations, inspection and control bodies.</li> <li>1.6 Multi-stakeholder meetings with the presidency of the public ministry, the ombudsman, human rights associations and those working to protect public funds, associations working to promote women's rights, young people and associations of peripheral areas to improve mechanisms for handling corruption complaints and ensure the follow-up of ALAC cases.</li> </ol>
<b>VERTICAL ACCOUNT-ABILITY ACTION</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>2.1 Implement the toolkit on public participation in budget processes, and conduct advocacy for strengthening of public participation based on the findings.</li> <li>2.2 Training sessions for the CSO coalition on social accountability, advocacy techniques, the use of social networks, gender-sensitive budgeting and public finance.</li> <li>2.3 Advocate for the publication of budget documents, including by submitting RTI requests to authorities in line with the new law (31-13).</li> <li>2.4 Collect and analyse budgetary data from institutions (including pre-budget, year-end and audit reports) and add this data to E-Tachawor.</li> <li>2.5 Train the coalition in the use of social audits and E-Tachawor to monitor the execution of planned budgets by sector to ensure the traceability of expenditure, with a focus on health and education.</li> <li>2.6 Produce a report of the findings of the social audits collected by citizens.</li> </ol>

	<p>2.7 Disseminate the report of the findings of the social audits to citizens via communication campaigns (press conferences, social media, radio spots, etc.) to stimulate their participation in the budget process.</p> <p>2.8 Strengthen ALAC capacity to process complaints from victims of corruption and disseminate legal information, with a focus on ALAC outreach in the most remote regions using clinics, social networks and community radio.</p> <p>2.9 Awareness campaign via social media, interviews, radio spots to pressure public authorities (for example, public finances, in particular the finance ministry, the ministry of the modernisation of the administrations, the court of accounts) to improve their responsiveness to corruption complaints and accountability initiatives.</p> <p>2.10 Follow up on complaints and appeals with the entities concerned.</p> <p>2.11 Conduct an advocacy campaign calling for the effective implementation of laws protecting victims and whistleblowers.</p>
<p><b>HORIZONTAL ACCOUNT- ABILITY ACTIONS</b></p>	<p>3.1 Monitor debates in parliamentary committees on issues of parliamentary budget control through parliamentary questions, the register of parliamentarians' votes on sector budgets, and public hearings with stakeholders. Digitalise the evidence gathered and add it to E-Tachawor.</p> <p>3.2 Organise meetings and capacity-building workshops with parliamentary committees (Commission for the Control of Public Finances, Commission for Finance and Economic Development, Commission for Social Sectors, Commission for the Interior, Local Authorities, Housing and City Policy) to issue recommendations and suggestions on the finance bill and specifically on budgets dedicated to the health, education and employment sector, as well as promote greater participation of CSOs and citizens in the preparation of the draft budget law.</p> <p>3.3 Have regular planning meetings with the court of accounts and the general inspectorate of finance to support parliamentarians in their budgetary control function, and advocate for greater independence and legal authority of oversight bodies.</p> <p>3.4 Tackle impunity and support corruption prosecutions by becoming a civil party in major cases of corruption and the misuse of public funds. TI Morocco is an association acting for the benefit of the general interest by virtue of Decree n° 2.09.391 of 11 June 2009 and has the right to become a civil party in corruption cases before the courts, as was the case previously.</p>
<p><b>DIGITAL TOOLS</b></p>	<p>4.1 Create E-Tachawor as a digital platform in the form of a dashboard of information on budgetary information and parliamentary activities. The platform provides engagement opportunities for citizens, such as voting on the most popular budgetary recommendations.</p> <p>4.2 Develop an interactive ALAC tool that uses intelligent live chat software to respond to requests from victims of corruption.</p>

## Selected Indicators

Indicator	Baseline 2020	Target 2021	Target 2022	Target 2023
# of legislative, procedural or policy changes to strengthen oversight institutions' efficacy, accountability and independence to which the action contributes	N/A	1	3	3
# ALAC cases in progress in SANCUS countries	N/A	10	80	120
% of SANCUS supported CSOs who report that skills and knowledge gained "significantly" improved their capacity to monitor oversight institutions (disaggregated by sex, location)	N/A	10%	30%	50%
% women of SANCUS supported CSOs who report that skills and knowledge gained "significantly" improved their capacity to monitor oversight institutions	N/A	30%	40%	40%
% rural people (compared to urban) of SANCUS supported CSOs who report that skills and knowledge gained "significantly" improved their capacity to monitor oversight institutions	N/A	10%	20%	20%

# NIGERIA

## Democratic Accountability Overview

Nigeria's CPI score in 2020 was 25, and the score has remained relatively steady in recent years. It is below the regional average of 32. The country also registered a small decline in the EIU Democracy Index, attributed to political instability, insecurity and rampant corruption. While the country scores comparatively highly in terms of checks on government, there are some concerns with regards to civic space.

DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY INDICES	COUNTRY RESULT
CORRUPTION PERCEPTION INDEX 2020	Score = 25/100, Rank = 149/180
FREEDOM HOUSE	Score = 45, partly free
CIVICUS MONITOR 2021	Repressed
EIU DEMOCRACY INDEX 2020	Score = 4.10, Rank = 110
WGI: VOICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 2019	-0.41 (Percentile Rank: 34.98)
RULE OF LAW INDEX 2020	0.43
PRESS FREEDOM INDEX 2021	39.69
INDEX OF PUBLIC INTEGRITY 2019	4.73
GLOBAL STATE OF DEMOCRACY 2020 (Checks on government)	0.62 (weak/low performance democracy)

## Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Centre (CISLAC) (TI Nigeria)

<https://www.cislac.org/>

## SANCUS PROJECT – POLITICAL INTEGRITY AND TRANSPARENT POLITICAL PARTY FINANCING

<b>DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNT- ABILITY PROBLEM</b>	<p><b>Core problem:</b> abundance of “dirty money” in Nigerian politics, which perpetuates a lack of accountability culture and corruption for power preservation and self-enrichment.</p> <p><b>Root causes:</b> i) the inability of anti-corruption agencies and the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) to diagnose and enforce existing money laundering legal provisions and policies; ii) lack of operational independence of the supreme audit institutions; iii) lack of experience and political will of national assembly representatives to perform their oversight functions; iv) low capacity of media and civil society to investigate dirty money in Nigerian political processes; v) absence of citizens’ demand for accountability in the funding of political processes.</p> <p><b>The effect:</b> large amounts of money are laundered illicitly into Nigerian political processes at the national and state level, which erodes citizen trust in elected officials and generates apathy towards political processes.</p>
<b>MAIN OBJECTIVE</b>	<p><b>Strengthen guidelines and legal frameworks around political integrity with regards to anti-money laundering in political party financing</b></p>
<b>NETWORK BUILDING</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1.1 Create a SANCUS working group comprised of CSOs and state actors in Nigeria to meet bi-annually for project coordination.</li> <li>1.2 Meet with CSO forum to have a more robust advocacy towards the strengthening of political party financing in Nigeria.</li> <li>1.3 SDG 16 shadow reports to measure Nigeria’s progress in anti-money laundering, political integrity and other selected anti-corruption related targets.</li> <li>1.4 Media outreach on the efficient investigation of issues of political integrity and political party financing in Nigeria ahead of the 2023 general election.</li> <li>1.5 Advocacy visits to political parties on the need for political integrity and transparent financing of political parties.</li> </ol>
<b>VERTICAL ACCOUNT- ABILITY ACTIONS</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>2.1 Hold an inception meeting on the expectations of the SANCUS project with representatives of anti-corruption agencies, law enforcement agencies, representatives from the media, CSOs, INEC, development partners and citizens working in the field of political accountability.</li> <li>2.2 Desk-based research on “digital political accountability” to explore the nexus between digital payment and remittance methods and their contribution to political integrity.</li> <li>2.3 Qualitative research on financing of political parties and the level of adherence to political party financing laws in Nigeria.</li> <li>2.4 Publish research reports and disseminate to ACAs, regulatory agencies, INEC, foreign missions, development partners, CSOs, the media and citizens for policy uptake as well as to be used as an advocacy tool.</li> <li>2.5 Organise a retreat for ACAs, regulatory agencies, INEC, the media, CSOs and citizens to validate research outcomes and discuss implementation of recommendations.</li> </ol>

	<p>2.6 Training courses for CSOs and the media on the effective use of the freedom of information act to create public demand for change in corrupt political financing.</p> <p>2.7 Radio programme and social media campaign on how to demand political integrity from elected officials.</p> <p>2.8 Organise six stakeholder meetings with citizens and also six town hall meetings on the need for transparency in the political process, need to enforce the laws guiding political party financing and the problems of vote selling and vote buying by organising three stakeholder meetings and three town hall meetings across the geopolitical zones.</p> <p>2.9 Training for investigative journalists to effectively report challenges and issues within the scope of political financing.</p>
<b>HORIZONTAL ACCOUNT-ABILITY ACTIONS</b>	<p>3.1 Advocacy visits to relevant national assembly committees on anti-corruption within the scope of the illicit political financing.</p> <p>3.2 Coordination meeting between ACAs, law enforcement agents and INEC, as the only institutional body to monitor political party finance, on how to deal with violations of political party financing rules.</p> <p>3.3 Roundtable between citizens, CSOs and parliamentarians on improved legislative oversight of anti-corruption agencies, regulators and other stakeholders with regards to political integrity and political party financing issues.</p>
<b>DIGITAL TOOLS</b>	<p>4.1 Use of available ALAC digital platform (CISLAC website and social media channels) to receive complaints from citizens and to have a platform for citizens to talk about political integrity.</p>

## Selected Indicators

Indicator	Baseline 2020	Target 2021	Target 2022	Target 2023
# of national SANCUS multi-stakeholder dialogues to advance in-country networks. <i>Stakeholders will be drawn from CSOs, representatives of the media and citizens.</i>	0	5	5	10
# of parliaments and oversight institutions monitored by SANCUS supported CSOs. <i>Oversight institutions are ACAs, INEC, law enforcement agencies.</i>	0	3	3	3
# of advocacy actions conducted by SANCUS supported CSOs to increase demand-side pressure on oversight institutions. <i>Advocacy actions include advocacy visits to the media, press releases, press conferences, radio shows and opinion pieces.</i>	0	5	10	10

# PALESTINE

## Democratic Accountability Overview

There is a widespread lack of citizen trust in Palestinian institutions, partly attributable to the failure of the internal reconciliation process, stalled negotiations with Israeli authorities, the continued Israeli occupation and growth in the number of settlements.

One of the chief governance challenges in Palestine is political corruption. The most prominent manifestations of absence of political integrity are the emergence of political systems that allow a segment of influential elites, including the military, senior businessmen and other well-connected individuals, to dominate decision-making processes in the state institutions. This has led to a weakening of the separation of powers, in particular the legislative body, as well as official oversight bodies and law enforcement agencies.

DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY INDICES	COUNTRY RESULT
CORRUPTION PERCEPTION INDEX 2020	-
FREEDOM HOUSE	-
CIVICUS MONITOR 2021	Repressed
EIU DEMOCRACY INDEX 2020	Score = 3.83, Rank = 113
WGI: VOICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 2019	-
RULE OF LAW INDEX 2020	-
PRESS FREEDOM INDEX 2021	43.18
INDEX OF PUBLIC INTEGRITY 2019	-
GLOBAL STATE OF DEMOCRACY 2020 (Checks on government)	0.31 (authoritarian)

## The Coalition for Accountability and Integrity – AMAN (TI Palestine)

<https://www.aman-palestine.org/>

## SANCUS PROJECT – ELECTIONS & SUB-NATIONAL PUBLIC FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT

<b>DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNT-ABILITY PROBLEM</b>	<p><b>Core problem:</b> i) lack of horizontal accountability due to absence of the Palestinian Legislative Council; ii) weak integrity, transparency and accountability in the work of local governance units (LGUs).</p> <p><b>Root causes:</b> i) continuing political division, as well as the division of the judiciary and the official media in both the West Bank and Gaza Strip; ii) weak capacity of oversight institutions, limited social accountability, lack of comprehensive national legal and institutional analysis on LGUs integrity, low engagement from media outlets; iii) opacity of LGU work and inaccessibility of public information and records, particularly with regard to procurement and budgeting.</p> <p><b>The effect:</b> i) fertile environment for misuse of the official media in electoral campaigning; ii) division of the judiciary provides opportunities for abuse, particularly regarding appeals against the nomination of candidates; iii) heightened risk of corruption in providing basic services to citizens, especially during conflicts and crises such as the current COVID-19 pandemic.</p>
<b>MAIN OBJECTIVE</b>	<p><b>Increase transparency and accountability in the management of public money and affairs</b></p>
<b>NETWORK BUILDING</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1.1 Leverage the Civil Team for Enhancing Public Budget Transparency, a network formed by AMAN that monitors the performance of the government in managing the public budget, to provide the Ministry of Finance with recommendations based on findings of budget monitoring.</li> <li>1.2 Engage with the World Bank's planned evaluation of government performance in reforming the management of public funds.</li> <li>1.3 Form alliances with other local CSOs to form a coalition for monitoring the performance of LGUs and launch dialogue with the Ministry of LGUs and other official oversight institutions.</li> <li>1.4 Form local committees that will include representatives of marginalised groups such as youth and women, to provide them an opportunity to engage in multi-stakeholder dialogue and advocate for their own needs.</li> <li>1.5 Run capacity building programs for investigative journalists related to the management of public funds, LGUs performance, budget management.</li> </ol>
<b>VERTICAL ACCOUNT-ABILITY ACTIONS</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>2.1 Implement and pilot the toolkit on public participation in budget processes, and conduct advocacy for strengthening of public participation based on the findings.</li> <li>2.2 Diagnosing the immunity of the integrity system in the work of LGUs and its responsiveness to social accountability</li> <li>2.3 Hold workshops based on findings of the report to open up a dialogue with decision-makers about the policies and laws that must be amended to respond to the integrity system in the work of LGUs.</li> <li>2.4 Train a coalition of CSOs, particularly grassroots, youth and feminist community-based organisations on social accountability tools such as community score cards, citizens report cards, participatory budget to hold</li> </ol>

	<p>municipalities and decision-makers accountable for the progress in implementing the national report's recommendations.</p> <p>2.5 Conduct awareness raising campaigns to engage citizens to hold their LGUs to account by reporting corrupt practices to AMAN's ALAC and via newly developed digital tools.</p> <p>2.6 Monitor the LGUs elections and track electoral campaign financing and spending. Produce a monitoring report and disseminate the findings.</p>
<b>HORIZONTAL ACCOUNT-ABILITY ACTIONS</b>	<p>3.1 Use the national CSO network and local committees to implement social accountability initiatives monitoring the performance of oversight bodies including the State Audit and Administrative Bureau (national level) and council members in holding mayors accountable (local level).</p> <p>3.2 Advocate for more transparency and efficiency in public budget preparation and spending by the official oversight institutions via press releases and press conferences.</p> <p>3.3 Provide capacity-building training to new parliamentarians on holding state institutions to account with a focus on managing the public budget based on existing guidelines and tools.</p>
<b>DIGITAL TOOLS</b>	<p>4.1 Refine an existing mobile app where citizens can report corrupt acts, request legal advice and learn about anti-corruption initiatives.</p> <p>4.2 Create AMAN monitor, which is a digital tool to monitor corruption cases, local councils and public budget.</p>

## Selected Indicators

Indicator	Baseline 2020	Target 2021	Target 2022	Target 2023
# of marginalised groups represented at multi-stakeholder dialogues (disaggregated by age, disability, location, sex)	0	6	12	12
# of citizens mobilised to participate in SANCUS supported monitoring processes (disaggregated by age, sex, rural/urban, theme, form of engagement)	0	350	450	450
# of duty bearer monitored by SANCUS supported CSOs	0	5	6	6
# of parliaments and oversight institutions monitored by SANCUS supported CSOs	0	3	4	4
# of advocacy actions conducted by SANCUS supported CSOs to increase demand-side pressure on oversight institutions	N/A	1	4	7

# PANAMA

## Democratic Accountability Overview

Panama has a CPI score of 36/100 as of 2021, and 56% of citizens surveyed in the 2019 Global Corruption Barometer thought that corruption had increased in the previous 12 months. It is a democracy with competitive elections, but corruption is still a common issue. Safeguards against corruption are relatively weak due to irregular application of the laws and a lack of resources for the judicial system<sup>70</sup>.

Panama was at the centre of the 2016 Panama Papers scandal, as corporate service providers there such as Mossack Fonseca set up offshore companies for customers, obscuring the beneficial owners through loopholes in Panamanian law. In January 2020, the government of Panama approved Law 129 which established a regulatory framework to create a beneficial ownership, but this framework still has many with gaps.

DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY INDICES	COUNTRY RESULT
CORRUPTION PERCEPTION INDEX 2021	Score = 36/100, Rank = 105/180
FREEDOM HOUSE	-
CIVICUS MONITOR 2021	Narrowed
EIU DEMOCRACY INDEX 2021	Score = 6.85, Rank = 48
WGI: VOICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 2021	0.55 (Percentile Rank: 62.319)
RULE OF LAW INDEX 2022	0.52
PRESS FREEDOM INDEX 2022	62.78
INDEX OF PUBLIC INTEGRITY	-
GLOBAL STATE OF DEMOCRACY 2019 (Checks on government)	0.59 (Mid-range performance democracy)

[INSERT INTRO TEXT HERE]

### TI Panama

<http://www.libertadciudadana.org/>

<sup>70</sup> Freedom House, 2021. <https://freedomhouse.org/country/panama/freedom-world/2021>

## SANCUS PROJECT – PARLIAMENTARY OVERSIGHT AND PUBLIC FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT

<b>DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNT-ABILITY PROBLEM</b>	<p><b>Core problem:</b> Opacity and lack of accountability in parliamentary oversight processes, including on budget formulation, approval, execution and oversight, as well as accountability role of other branches of government.</p> <p><b>Root causes:</b> Lack of transparency and accountability of the parliament in its role as an oversight institution, including in relation with other oversight institutions such as the General Comptroller; weak legal framework for institutional counterweights, accountability and transparency; high risks of corruption and issues of impunity in abuse of public resources, embezzlement, bribery and other corrupt acts by political elites.</p> <p><b>The effect:</b> Weak oversight by the parliament, leading to gross misuse of public funds and executive powers being unchecked. Growing citizen disenchantment with democracy and lack of trust in the Panamanian public institutions and public officials. Vulnerable populations (based on poverty, gender and ethnicity) are most affected by mismanagement of resources and lack of accountability resulting in inadequate provision of public health, education, clean water and affordable energy, among other services.</p>
<b>MAIN OBJECTIVE</b>	<p>Advocate for strengthening of the mandate, performance and impact of parliamentary oversight, as well as public financial management in Panama.</p>
<b>NETWORK BUILDING</b>	<p>1.1 Train local CSOs on the legislative branch and role, budget cycle and budget framework process and implementation, and the roles of the Ministry of Finance, the National Assembly and the General Comptroller's Office, to articulate a network of CSOs capable of audits and oversight. Also include training on the SANCUS parliamentary oversight assessment tool, to get support and buy in from local CSOs and other stakeholders.</p> <p>1.2 Engage international investigative journalists to provide technical guidance, training and oversight of local journalists to analyse and report on the project's findings from a local, regional and global perspective.</p> <p>1.3 Create and maintain a strong partnership with at least 8 CSOs working to improve the national budget process, implementation, oversight and accountability.</p> <p>1.4 TI-Panama project personnel will travel and attend regional meetings, training sessions, peer-to-peer learning activities, and any other expertise developing activities considered necessary by the TI SANCUS global team.</p>
<b>HORIZONTAL ACCOUNT-ABILITY ACTIONS</b>	<p>3.1 To apply the parliamentary oversight assessment tool (developed by the SANCUS team), and generate knowledge and evidence for CSOs to advocate for strengthening of parliamentary oversight and push for needed reforms.</p> <p>3.2 Production of a report based on the assessment, followed up by engagement actions with parliament and other relevant stakeholders based on the results aimed at strengthening parliamentary oversight in Panama.</p>

3.3. Develop recommendations (one public proposal) aimed at improving the effectiveness of the oversight institutions in preventing and stopping misuse of public funds, and engage the institutions based on the proposal. The proposal will include recommendations and areas of opportunity to improve their role and follow up, improved transparency and performance, effective budget allocation and enhanced investigation of government spending to ensure good public financial management, as well as more inclusive participation by various stakeholders in public governance issues.

**DIGITAL TOOLS**

4.1 Organise communication campaigns and educational video content to publicise all the Actions developed in the Project's process, objective, campaigns.

### Selected Indicators

Indicator	Baseline 2021	Target 2022	Target 2023
# of legislative, procedural or policy changes to strengthen oversight institutions' efficacy, accountability and independence to which the Action contributes	N/A	0	1
% of SANCUS recommendations adopted by public institutions targeted by sub-actions (disaggregated by country, type of institution)	N/A	20%	40%
# and description of joint advocacy actions undertaken by SANCUS-supported CSOs as evidence of regular networking to further the Action	N/A	0	1
IOc3.i2: # SANCUS sub-actions that employ digital tools to monitor oversight institutions	N/A	0	1
# of marginalised groups represented at multi-stakeholder dialogues (disaggregated by age, disability, location, sex)	N/A	6	6
# of citizens mobilised to participate in SANCUS-supported monitoring and scrutiny processes (disaggregated by age, sex, rural/urban, theme, form of engagement)	N/A	25	25
% of citizens engaged by SANCUS monitoring processes from underrepresented groups (disaggregated by sex, age, disability, location and where possible income group)	N/A		20%
# of parliaments and oversight institutions monitored by SANCUS-supported CSOs	N/A	1	1

# of advocacy actions conducted by SANCUS-supported CSOs to increase demand-side pressure on oversight institutions	N/A		1
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# PERU

## Democratic Accountability Overview

Peru scored 36/100 in the 2021 CPI and the Global Corruption Barometer data showed that 65% of citizens thought in 2019 that corruption had increased in the previous 12 months. Peru is an established democracy and has undergone multiple peaceful transfers of power, yet high-profile corruption scandals continue to erode public trust in government<sup>71</sup>.

These scandals have recently included the Peruvian vaccination scandal have increased public distrust, when 487 public officials were secretly vaccinated before healthcare workers against covid-19. Businesses and special interest groups often influence officials through bribes, and since 2021 President Castillo has been the subject of multiple corruption allegations<sup>72</sup>. Additionally, the judiciary is perceived as one of the most corruption institutions in the country.

DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY INDICES	COUNTRY RESULT
CORRUPTION PERCEPTION INDEX 2021	Score = 36/100, Rank = 105/180
FREEDOM HOUSE	-
CIVICUS MONITOR 2021	Obstructed
EIU DEMOCRACY INDEX 2021	Score = 6.09, Rank = 71
WGI: VOICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 2021	0.18 (Percentile Rank: 53.623)
RULE OF LAW INDEX 2022	0.49
PRESS FREEDOM INDEX 2022	61.75
INDEX OF PUBLIC INTEGRITY	6.71
GLOBAL STATE OF DEMOCRACY 2021 (Checks on government)	0.74 (Mid-range performance democracy)

## TI Peru

<https://www.proetica.org.pe/>

<sup>71</sup> Freedom House, 2022. <https://freedomhouse.org/country/peru/freedom-world/2022>

<sup>72</sup> Freedom House, 2022. <https://freedomhouse.org/country/peru/freedom-world/2022>

## SANCUS PROJECT

### DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNT- ABILITY PROBLEM

**Core problem:** Lack of citizen engagement in participatory budget processes at subnational level, which allows a rising risk of capture and abuse of those by political authorities.

**Root causes:** Lack of interest among citizens in decision taking processes at subnational level, increased by the effects of the restrictions due to the pandemic and the ralentization of participatory processes through less accessible virtual channels, specially for more vulnerable population. There is also a pre existing limited knowledge and awareness among the public regarding the public budget.

**The effect:** As a result, there is a deficit of vertical accountability, thus increasing the risk of corruption in the decisions surrounding decisions on budget allocation to public investment.

Then, as perception of corruption grows, two broad types of scenarios emerge: 1) an absence of reaction on the side of citizens making it easier for corrupts to get away with it or 2) under certain circumstances, the reaction of the people can occur out of the institutional channels including the use of violence.

### MAIN OBJECTIVE

**To improve the skills of civil society and enabling conditions regarding transparency and accountability around the participatory budget processes at subnational level in two regions of Peru.**

### NETWORK BUILDING

- 1.3 To monitor the callings to the participatory budget processes of two subnational governments and to promote the inclusion as active agents of representatives from the diversity of the population, including vulnerable people.
- 1.4 To strenghten skills of participatory agents representing civil society to the participatory budget processes regarding the subnational governments selected.
- 1.5 To impulse collaboration processes among government and civil society to ellaborate a subnational regulation to strenghten the participatory budget under an open government approach.
- 1.6 Dialogue with authorities and public officials of the subnational governments to overcome identified weaknesses from previous processes and/or replicate good practices.
- 1.7 To exchange experiences to strenghten the strategy and advocay activities.

### VERTICAL ACCOUNT- ABILITY ACTIONS

- 2.1 Implementation of the SANCUS evaluation tool and dissemination of the results through graphic pieces in social media.
- 2.1 Monitor of participatory budget processes of 2022-2023 on their compliance with transparency standards and respect to the prioritized agreements on public infraestructure projects and annual execution plan.
- 2.2 Dissemination of public warnings in case of breach of agreements or risks of corruption.
- 2.3 Design and production of information and rising awareness tools (videos, flyers, infographies, etc.).
- 2.4 Elaboration of a document with recommendations to each subnational government in order to improve their transparency of information standards

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regarding the participatory budget section in the Official Transparency Website.

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## Selected Indicators

Indicator	Baseline 2021	Target 2022	Target 2023
# of legislative, procedural or policy changes to strengthen oversight institutions' efficacy, accountability and independence to which the Action contributes	0	0	2
% of SANCUS recommendations adopted by public institutions targeted by sub-actions (disaggregated by country, type of institution)	0	0	2
% of SANCUS recommendations adopted by public institutions targeted by sub-actions (disaggregated by country, type of institution)	GR Caj.: 0 GR La Lib.: 0	GR Caj.: 10% GR La Lib.: 10%	GR Caj.: 50% GR La Lib.: 50%
# and description of joint advocacy actions undertaken by SANCUS-supported CSOs as evidence of regular networking to further the Action	0	2	6
IOc3.i2: # SANCUS sub-actions that employ digital tools to monitor oversight institutions	0	0	4
# of citizens mobilised to participate in SANCUS-supported monitoring and scrutiny processes (disaggregated by age, sex, rural/urban, theme, form of engagement)	0	25	80
% of citizens engaged by SANCUS monitoring processes from underrepresented groups (disaggregated by sex, age, disability, location and where possible income group)	0	0	20%
# of duty bearer institutions monitored by SANCUS-supported CSOs	0	2	2

# RWANDA

## Democratic Accountability Overview

Rwanda's CPI score dropped from 56 in 2018 to 54 in 2020. The country recorded a decline in the EIU's Democracy Index in the same period, with the EIU citing a decline in political pluralism. While there is comparatively high control of corruption in the country, parliament is reportedly rather weak, making the role of civil society in mobilising citizens to hold those in power to account even more crucial.

DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY INDICES	COUNTRY RESULT
CORRUPTION PERCEPTION INDEX 2020	Score = 54/100, Rank = 49/180
FREEDOM HOUSE	Score = 21, not free
CIVICUS MONITOR 2021	Repressed
EIU DEMOCRACY INDEX 2020	Score = 3.10, Rank = 130
WGI: VOICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 2019	-1.08 (Percentile Rank: 18.72)
RULE OF LAW INDEX 2020	0.62
PRESS FREEDOM INDEX 2021	50.66
INDEX OF PUBLIC INTEGRITY 2019	5.08
GLOBAL STATE OF DEMOCRACY 2020 (Checks on government)	0.32 (authoritarian regime)

## TI Rwanda

<https://tirwanda.org/>

## SANCUS PROJECT – CITIZEN ENGAGEMENT

### DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY PROBLEM

**Core problem:** i) a lack of timely responses of service providers to service seekers coupled with limited bottom-up accountability. Services which include access to justice, basic services (land services, trees harvesting and veterinary services) and procurement in infrastructure projects in decentralised entities emerge as perceived to be prone to corruption, with a lack of accountability and transparency; ii) opacity in public procurement in the infrastructure sector; iii) persisting issue of corruption and injustice in the justice sector

**Root causes:** limited citizen participation in budgetary processes and engagement in monitoring service delivery. Persisting issue of corruption in the justice sector.

**The effect:** poor quality service delivery, barriers to economic growth arising from delayed and inadequate infrastructure, impediments to good governance and basic freedoms such as freedom of speech or citizens' right to hold their officials to account.

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**Promote democratic accountability in Rwanda through active engagement with citizens and strong partnership between the public, private sector and CSOs in curbing corruption**

### MAIN OBJECTIVE

**Specific objectives:**

1. Strengthen the public, private and CSO partnership to curb corruption and injustice and promote democratic accountability.
2. Increase citizen participation and engagement in promoting transparency and accountability in the governance sector as well as fostering the culture of reporting and denouncing corruption.
3. Promote transparency and accountability in the public financial management through effective use of social accountability mechanisms.

### NETWORK BUILDING

- 1.1 Identify development partners and CSO partners in the public financial management domain (office of the auditor general, Rwanda public procurement, the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, office of the ombudsman, parliaments [public account committee, African Parliamentarians Network Against Corruption APNAC], local government).
- 1.2 Establish new partnerships with duty bearers in the justice sector at national and district levels.
- 1.3 Mobilise media practitioners via workshops on corruption, the legal framework, reporting mechanisms, joint approaches for advocacy together with the Rwandan Media Network for Social Accountability.

### VERTICAL ACCOUNTABILITY ACTIONS

- 2.1 Assessing public participation in budgeting processes in targeted district councils, based on the toolkit developed by the SANCUS global team.
  - 2.2 Conduct advocacy on strengthening public participation in budgeting processes, based on the findings from the assessment
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**HORIZONTAL  
ACCOUNT-  
ABILITY  
ACTIONS**

- 2.3 Organise training courses for citizens concerned committees (CCCs) and farmers to use social audit tools – such as integrity pacts – to monitor two public infrastructure projects in each of the five districts involved in SANCUS, and monitor selected infrastructure projects.
- 2.4 Provide legal aid, advocacy and mediation in the justice sector to citizens through ALACs, with a focus on vulnerable groups. Conduct training courses for CCCs on how to access these legal aid services, sensitise fellow citizens on reporting corruption and injustice cases and existing mechanisms/channels to facilitate corruption reporting.
- 2.5 Conduct awareness-raising activities including radio and TV and the production of visibility materials to mobilise citizens to participate in the planning and budget process and in monitoring service delivery as well as sensitising them to the whistleblower protection law and channels they can use to share their views and priorities.
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- 3.1 Organise a national dialogue to discuss key findings from the monitoring of public procurement of infrastructure projects, involving affected citizens and participants who can push oversight institutions to effectively fulfil their oversight mission.
- 3.2 Establish a joint task force committee (with the involvement of oversight bodies) to ensure effective follow-up of any commitments made during the infrastructure dialogue. Use a recommendation/commitments checklist as a monitoring tool to track any progress towards addressing issues of citizens by the oversight bodies.
- 3.3 Organise a national dialogue on the justice sector to discuss key corruption trends and recommendations emanating from the ALACs, involving key stakeholders such as public institutions, CSOs, citizen testimonies, development partners and the media.
- 3.4 Establish a joint committee including oversight institutions to ensure effective follow-up of any commitments made during the justice dialogue (involve Ministry of Justice, office of the ombudsman, supreme court). Use a recommendation/commitments checklist as a monitoring tool to track any progress.
- 3.5 Strengthen partnership with oversight bodies, including via case referral from ALACs and advocacy to ensure effective follow-up on referred cases.
- 3.6 Organise interface meeting with parliamentary oversight agency (PAC and APNAC) to share evidence generated under SANCUS on the justice and infrastructure sectors. Campaign for parliamentarians to act on this evidence to ensure redress and improvement, using a recommendation/commitments checklist as a monitoring tool.
- 3.7 Assess the impact of the sobanuzainkiko tool, a digital tool used in the justice sector to promote service delivery in courts and tribunals. It has been developed by TI Rwanda to be used by the supreme court to enable citizens to express their concerns and seek redress. Promote findings to justice sector stakeholders and supervisory bodies such as the Ministry of Justice and supreme court to hold lower courts to account.
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3.8 Assessing the strength of parliamentary oversight, based on the toolkit developed by the SANCUS global team. Conduct advocacy based on the findings

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## Selected Indicators

Indicator	Baseline 2020	Target 2021	Target 2022	Target 2023
# ALAC cases in progress	5,479	5,500	5,500	6,000
# of marginalised groups represented at multi-stakeholder dialogues (disaggregated by age, disability, location, sex)	0	12	12	12
# of citizens mobilised to participate in SANCUS supported monitoring processes (disaggregated by age, sex, rural/urban, theme, form of engagement)	0	204	204	204
% of citizens engaged by SANCUS monitoring processes from under-represented groups (disaggregated by sex, age, disability, location and where possible income group)		10%	20%	30%
# of duty bearer institutions monitored by SANCUS supported CSOs	0	5	5	5

# SRI LANKA

## Democratic Accountability Overview

Sri Lanka's CPI score (38) has remained unchanged since 2016, and the country ranks 94 in the 2020 edition of the index. There is a moderately high risk of corruption, and the most common forms include facilitation payments paid to avoid bureaucratic red tape, bribe solicitation by government officials, nepotism, cronyism and high-level corruption in the public procurement sector. Sri Lanka operates within a democratic framework where, in the recent past, peaceful elections have been conducted, and where there has been uncontested transfer of power. It has a decentralised and devolved governance system that operates across the country, at three levels of central, provincial and local government.

In the past few years, the quest for better and sound governance has been on the policy agenda of governments in Sri Lanka, but the indicators continue to show poor performance, even though various reforms, institutional changes and policies have been initiated to improve governance processes. Many issues are still left unchecked, including corruption, inefficiency and poor service delivery, poor quality of public institutions and political interference in policy implementation processes by public officials.

At the same time there have been significant strides, notably in the right to information, which is used widely by people, allowing them to participate in governance and contribute to the democratic system.

DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY INDICES	COUNTRY RESULT
CORRUPTION PERCEPTION INDEX 2020	Score = 38/100, Rank = 94/180
FREEDOM HOUSE	Score = 56, partly free
CIVICUS MONITOR 2021	Obstructed
EIU DEMOCRACY INDEX 2020	Score = 6.14, Rank = 68
WGI: VOICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 2019	-0.04 (Percentile Rank = 43.48)
RULE OF LAW INDEX 2020	0.52
PRESS FREEDOM INDEX 2021	42.20
INDEX OF PUBLIC INTEGRITY 2019	6.10
GLOBAL STATE OF DEMOCRACY 2020 (Checks on government)	0.49 (mid-range performing democracy)

## TI Sri Lanka

<https://www.tisirilanka.org/>

## SANCUS PROJECT – PUBLIC FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT & LOCAL GOVERNMENT INTEGRITY

<b>DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNT- ABILITY PROBLEM</b>	<p><b>Core problem:</b> Lack of participation and consultation in budget formulation and execution.</p> <p><b>Root causes:</b> Excessive concentration of power in the hands of Local Government Authority (LGA) chairpersons when it comes to budgeting. Lack of participation and oversight over national budget implementation. Public officials’ unfamiliarity with the need for participatory processes and limited trust in civil society partners. Lack of proactive and timely access to public information.</p> <p><b>The effect:</b> Low transparency and accountability in budget processes results in abuse of power and misuse of public resources, lack of citizen confidence in public authorities, as well as low quality goods, services and works to the particular detriment of marginalised groups.</p>
<b>MAIN OBJECTIVE</b>	<p><b>Strengthen citizen participation and consultation in budget and oversight processes.</b></p>
<b>NETWORK BUILDING</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1.1 Organise bi-annual multi-stakeholder dialogues on participatory governance at the local level, including four selected LGAs, civil society and community-based organisations, and SMEs. These dialogues will address citizen participation in budgeting and proactive engagement.</li> <li>1.2 Run a journalism fellowship, training local amateur journalists on anti-corruption, investigative tools, and budget transparency. Match the fellow with respected journalists as mentors and nurture a network of young journalists reporting on corruption and budget transparency.</li> <li>1.3 Utilise the information this journalist network generates to monitor officials and ensure that information about budgetary processes is being provided to the public.</li> </ol>

**VERTICAL  
ACCOUNT-  
ABILITY  
ACTION**

- 2.1 Increase the capacity of TI Sri Lanka to monitor budgets via trainings with experts.
- 2.2 Assess at least one institution through implementing the assessment tool on public participation in budget processes.
- 2.3 Conduct public awareness raising sessions with the journalism fellows and a network of 25 District Coordinators on the importance of participatory budgeting, asset declarations, conflict of interest etc.
- 2.4 Refine existing RTI compliant websites that TI Sri Lanka has already developed for 4 Local Government Authorities, and use regular meetings to push these bodies to proactively disclose information on procurement via these platforms. Create new websites for two new LGAs.
- 2.5 Develop a checklist together with LGAs to ensure that their budgetary and policy processes are conducive to public participation.
- 2.6 Facilitate participatory budgeting with selected LGAs involving representatives of various groups in the budget formulation process (community workshops).
- 2.7 Extend legal advice and support services to an additional district by opening a fourth ALAC. TI SL conduct advocacy activities based on interactions at ALAC -eg. public interest litigation and coordinating with the Legal Aid Commission to get victims support.

**HORIZONTAL  
ACCOUNT-  
ABILITY  
ACTIONS**

- 3.1 Analyse the reports of the Committee on Public Enterprise (COPE) and Committee on Public Accounts (COPA), the two parliamentary committees responsible for examining public expenditure. We will maintain a database/excel sheet to track the progress initially, and thereafter, attempt developing it as a traffic light system.
- 3.2 Organise trainings for selected 6 LGAs on participatory budgeting, governances, Beneficial Ownership, Conflict of Interest and Asset Declarations to enhance compliance accountability mechanisms.

**DIGITAL  
TOOLS**

- 4.1 Create infrastructure for 2 new LGA websites to support proactive disclosure requirements and to include procurement data.
- 4.2 Upkeep of Politically Exposed Persons database.
- 4.3 Use Salesforce (ALAC case management system to analyse trends in corruption reporting, and carry out social media campaign utilising such findings.

## Selected Indicators

Indicator	Baseline 2020	Target 2021	Target 2022	Target 2023
# of legislative, procedural or policy changes to strengthen duty bearers' vertical accountability processes and integrity mechanisms to which the action contributes	N/A	1	3	5

# of citizens mobilised to participate in SANCUS supported monitoring processes (disaggregated by age, sex, rural/urban, theme, form of engagement)	0	25	50	75
% of citizens engaged by SANCUS monitoring processes from under-represented groups (disaggregated by sex, age, disability, location and where possible income group)	0	15%	20%	25%
# of duty bearer institutions monitored by SANCUS supported CSOs	0	0	1	1
# of parliaments and oversight institutions monitored by SANCUS supported CSOs	0	2	3	3

# ZAMBIA

## Democratic Accountability Overview

Zambia's CPI score has been steadily declining, from 38 in 2016 to 33 in 2020. The country also recorded a decline in the EIU's Democracy Index in the same period, with the EIU citing democratic backsliding in terms of legal and practical hurdles faced by opposition parties. There are concerns about judicial integrity as well as nepotism and clientelism in the country's politics. Law enforcement and public procurement are seen as being especially vulnerable to corruption. More encouragingly, the Office of the Public Protector has emerged in recent years, a type of ombudsman authority that is supported by Transparency International's chapter in the country (TI Zambia) to raise awareness of its work and clamp down on maladministration in public institutions.

DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY INDICES	COUNTRY RESULT
CORRUPTION PERCEPTION INDEX 2020	Score = 33/100, Rank = 117/180
FREEDOM HOUSE	Score = 52, partly free
CIVICUS MONITOR 2021	Obstructed
EIU DEMOCRACY INDEX 2020	Score = 4.86, Rank = 99
WGI: VOICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 2019	-0.29 (Percentile Rank: 36.95)
RULE OF LAW INDEX 2020	0.45
PRESS FREEDOM INDEX 2021	38.21
INDEX OF PUBLIC INTEGRITY 2019	4.56
GLOBAL STATE OF DEMOCRACY 2020 (Checks on government)	0.59 (hybrid regime)

## TI Zambia

<https://tizambia.org.zm/>

## SANCUS PROJECT – PUBLIC FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT

<b>DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNT-ABILITY PROBLEM</b>	<p><b>Core problem:</b> limited public participation and consultation in the financial management policy and budget cycle, as well as inadequate parliamentary and other institutions’ oversight in the budget cycle.</p> <p><b>Root causes:</b> limited space for public participation and lack of consultation with marginalised groups and civil society. Limited access to information, poor coordination and inadequate budget implementation dialogue platforms. CSOs and the general public have not effectively participated in tracking governmental responsiveness on public financial management. Restricted independence of oversight institutions.</p> <p><b>The effect:</b> mismanagement of resources and lack of transparency, accountability and integrity in budget formulation and execution.</p>
<b>MAIN OBJECTIVE</b>	<p><b>Strengthen public participation and consultation as well as oversight in the policy and budget cycle</b></p>
<b>NETWORK BUILDING</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1.1 Conduct a stakeholder mapping to identify operational areas and districts.</li> <li>1.2 Organise training course for local non-state actor stakeholders (CSOs, journalists, local traditional and religious leadership, marginalised groups – youth, women and disabled) on issues of citizen participation in planning, budget cycle, budget monitoring and expenditure tracking processes to strengthen existing district level dialogue platforms.</li> <li>1.3 Create a network for community engagement and dialogue to inform citizens about PFM processes and encourage them to participate in the monitoring of budget execution.</li> <li>1.4 Build on existing CSO national level dialogue platforms and national development planning through the 7<sup>th</sup> national development plan (7NDP) national and thematic cluster committees. This will reinforce interventions at district levels since national development processes at district level are built within the 7NDP dialogue spaces.</li> <li>1.5 Train journalists on PFM to enhance their investigation capacity and generate evidence that can contribute to PFM accountability campaigns. Foster collaboration opportunities between national journalists in Zambia and international investigative journalists.</li> <li>1.6 Establish a regional platform to share best practices in advocating for strengthening of PFM and develop regional issue/policy briefs that will highlight common weaknesses and challenges in PFM in Southern Africa.</li> <li>1.7 Engage regional parliamentary platforms (Pan-African Parliament and African Parliamentarians Network Against Corruption) to mount pressure and advocate for strengthened PFM regionally.</li> </ol>
<b>VERTICAL ACCOUNT-ABILITY ACTION</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>2.1 Undertake a desk review of the current legislative, regulatory and institutional framework to identify gaps in the oversight, internal controls and accountability mechanisms in budgeting and execution processes. Develop issues/policy briefs based on the gap analysis.</li> <li>2.2 Engage with ministries, departments and agencies to advocate for the effective implementation of the PFM Act and the Planning and Budgeting</li> </ol>

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Act, and campaign for reform to the legal, policy and institutional frameworks that govern planning and budget execution.

- 2.3 Revise existing PFM and social accountability material.
  - 2.4 Train local level structures (transparency action groups) as well as national level CSOs on the community engagement toolkit and PFM material to enhance their capacity to monitor planning and budget execution.
  - 2.5 Through community awareness raising on PFM, promote the use of social accountability tools including integrity and development pacts, community scorecards and public hearings as tools for securing and monitoring commitments from duty bearers. Maladministration and suspected corrupt activities will be channelled through ALAC to law enforcement agencies (LEAs) to deal with. Based on the follow-up on referred cases to LEAs, conduct awareness-raising meetings targeting communities to provide updates on the progress of referred cases.
  - 2.6 Hold interface meetings between citizens and duty bearers on PFM issues, where duty bearers will respond to concerns by stakeholders on budget execution.
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**HORIZONTAL  
ACCOUNT-  
ABILITY  
ACTIONS**

- 3.1 Implement the parliamentary oversight assessment tool developed by the SANCUS team, and guided by the findings of the assessment to advocate for strengthening of oversight
  - 3.2 Analyse national budgets and auditor general reports as a basis for budget execution monitoring and identify oversight gaps respectively.
  - 3.3 Develop issues/policy briefs addressing implementation and policy gaps.
  - 3.4 Hold engagement meetings with oversight institutions (Office of the Auditor General and Parliamentary Accounts Committee) to seek buy-in on the need to create spaces for non-state actors to monitor PFM budget execution, and agree on collaboration processes and procedures.
  - 3.5 Engage the Zambia Law Development Commission and Ministry of Justice to advocate for measures to strengthen the OAG's independence, such as making it a permanent member of the PAC.
  - 3.6 Conduct public and media campaigns to mount pressure on and demand accountability in budget execution by controlling officers and from duty bearers cited in the OAG's report.
  - 3.7 Support parliamentary champions (MPs) and parliamentary committee liaison officers to ensure follow up on the recommended reforms to budget implementation and audit processes.
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**DIGITAL  
TOOLS**

- 4.1 Design a web based PFM monitoring application to monitor public participation and duty bearers' responsiveness to the demands of the community. The tool will use scorecards to track community engagement and participation in national planning processes as well as budget execution. This data will be entered into the digital tool to be analysed and disseminated to key stakeholders including policy-makers, CSOs and the general public.
  - 4.2 Migrate from the current whistleblowing platform to Transparency International Secretariat's ALAC Salesforce system. Complaints from citizens will be analysed and referred to law enforcement agencies for
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action. Mindful of the confidentiality aspects, referred cases will be shared with oversight institutions and parliamentary champions as information for them to put pressure on government to take action against the relevant duty bearers.

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## Selected Indicators

Indicator	Baseline 2020	Target 2021	Target 2022	Target 2023
# of legislative, procedural or policy changes to strengthen oversight institutions' efficacy, accountability and independence to which the action contributes	1	2	2	3
# of marginalised groups represented at multi-stakeholder dialogues (disaggregated by age, disability, location, sex)	0	96	135	188
# of participants of technical workshops on the use of accountability tools and data analysis techniques (disaggregated by institutional affiliation, sex, location)	N/A	84	120	200
# of citizens mobilised to participate in SANCUS supported monitoring processes (disaggregated by age, sex, rural/urban, theme, form of engagement)	0	240	336	470
# of duty bearer institutions monitored by SANCUS supported CSOs	0	12	12	12

# ZIMBABWE

## Democratic Accountability Overview

Zimbabwe's CPI score has increased slightly from 20 in 2012, though it remains very low. A key event in 2017 was the resignation of President Robert Mugabe following a military coup. ZANU-PF then designated Emmerson Mnangagwa as Mugabe's successor, and he was inaugurated as Zimbabwe's second executive president in November 2017. During his inauguration, Mnangagwa promised to revive the economy, ensure that the 2018 elections would proceed as scheduled and restore Zimbabwe's credibility with the West. Mnangagwa also appointed key military personnel to government positions, while Mugabe's allies were arrested over allegations of corruption.

Elections were conducted as scheduled in July 2018, with the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) announcing that 5.6 million people had registered to vote. In a significant thawing of relations between the European Union and Zimbabwe, the EU election observer mission was allowed access to the country for the first time in 15 years. Mnangagwa narrowly won the presidential election over Nelson Chamisa of the MDC Alliance, which had to be confirmed by the constitutional court after a challenge over alleged irregularities by the MDC Alliance.

The post-2018 election environment has been characterised by socio-economic and political uncertainties, as well as the continued suppression of fundamental freedoms.

DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY INDICES	COUNTRY RESULT
<b>CORRUPTION PERCEPTION INDEX 2020</b>	Score = 24/100, Rank = 157/180
<b>FREEDOM HOUSE</b>	Score = 28, not free
<b>CIVICUS MONITOR 2021</b>	Repressed
<b>EIU DEMOCRACY INDEX 2020</b>	Score = 3.16, Rank = 127
<b>WGI: VOICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 2019</b>	-1.14 (Percentile Rank = 16.75)
<b>RULE OF LAW INDEX 2020</b>	0.39
<b>PRESS FREEDOM INDEX 2021</b>	40.95
<b>INDEX OF PUBLIC INTEGRITY 2019</b>	4.520773292
<b>GLOBAL STATE OF DEMOCRACY 2020 (Checks on government)</b>	0.51 (authoritarian regime)

**TI Zimbabwe**

<https://www.tizim.org/>

## SANCUS PROJECT – PUBLIC FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT

<b>DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNT- ABILITY PROBLEM</b>	<p><b>Core problem:</b> limited participation and consultation of citizens and vulnerable groups in budget processes.</p> <p><b>Root causes:</b> absence of political will to address accountability deficits and mismanagement of public resources, impunity of political elites and weak oversight institutions. There is also a lack of robust access to information systems or whistleblower protection.</p> <p><b>The effect:</b> the executive acts as the sole decision maker in determining revenue and expenditure priorities; leaks of public funds through public procurement and victimisation of citizens who report corruption.</p>
<b>MAIN OBJECTIVE</b>	<p><b>Promote the engagement of citizens, in particular of under-represented groups, in policy and budget processes and improve access to information so citizens are better placed to demand accountability</b></p>
<b>NETWORK BUILDING</b>	<p>1.1 Provide inputs into governance monitoring processes at the regional and international levels via the UNCAC Coalition, the Southern African Anti-Corruption Network, Publish What You Pay Zimbabwe and the Economic Governance Initiative cluster in Zimbabwe.</p> <p>1.2 Organise in-country multi-stakeholder dialogues with partners to promote participatory and inclusive budgeting and anti-corruption initiatives with a specific focus on public procurement.</p> <p>1.3 Peer exchange with other SANCUS partners.</p>
<b>VERTICAL ACCOUNT- ABILITY ACTION</b>	<p>2.1 Build on existing relationships with journalists to offer small grants to investigative journalists working on strategic cases of corruption in public procurement and budget execution. The investigative reports will form the basis of TI Zimbabwe's advocacy work</p> <p>2.2 Establish noticeboards and complaints boxes at two local authorities to increase responsiveness and citizen input in governance processes.</p> <p>2.3 Produce and disseminate pamphlets and fliers to increase the understanding corruption as a human rights issue, awareness of reporting channels and knowledge of the roles and responsibilities of duty bearers and oversight institutions.</p> <p>2.4 Organise community outreach meetings with a focus on marginalised groups (women, youth and people with disabilities) to promote greater participation in budgetary processes, as well as gather their views on local and national priorities for the respective budgets.</p> <p>2.5 Organise women empowerment circles to establish safe spaces for women to participate in governance processes at local and national levels.</p> <p>2.6 Organise community interface meetings between citizens and duty bearers to stimulate dialogue on corruption in public services such as land, water and sanitation, and health.</p> <p>2.7 Train citizens in the use of social accountability tools to conduct social audits on selected public service delivery projects and monitor the</p>

	implementation of agreed priorities in local authorities' annual budgets.
	2.8 Based on the information gathered from the ALAC database, develop position papers for advocacy and awareness raising.
	2.9 Broadcast community radio programmes in local languages interviewing representatives from the local authorities and ordinary citizens to discuss the budget processes and public service delivery at the local level.
	2.10 Organise citizen-led community newsletters to provide community journalists with platforms to publish articles on (anti-)corruption.
	2.11 Provide mobile legal aid clinics to support victims and witnesses of corruption.
<b>HORIZONTAL ACCOUNTABILITY ACTIONS</b>	3.1 Implement the parliamentary oversight assessment tool developed by the SANCUS team, and guided by the findings of the assessment to advocate for strengthening of oversight.
	3.2 Work with members of the African Parliamentarians Network against Corruption to promote accountability and advocate for anti-corruption reforms and whistleblower protection.
	3.3 Train the parliament secretariat to strengthen the capacities of the committee clerks and researchers to work on gender responsive budgeting and analyse the auditor general's report.
	3.4 Train councillors from local authorities to strengthen their capacity on anti-corruption with a focus on public procurement to ensure that they hold local authorities to account for public service delivery.
	3.5 Hold closed door meetings with oversight institutions based on existing MoUs with the anti-corruption commission and the procurement regulatory authority to strengthen their internal integrity management systems and response mechanisms.
	3.6 Organise good governance symposiums involving oversight institutions, civil society and representatives from underprivileged groups to develop anti-corruption action plans and agreement commitments at central government level.
<b>DIGITAL TOOLS</b>	4.1 Facilitate civic engagement and grassroots advocacy, particularly through social media channels

## Selected Indicators


Indicator	Baseline 2020	Target 2021	Target 2022	Target 2023
# ALAC cases in progress	500	700	1,200	1,500
# of participants of technical workshops on the use of accountability tools and data analysis techniques (disaggregated by institutional affiliation, sex, location)	0	120	180	180

# of citizens mobilised to participate in SANCUS supported monitoring processes (disaggregated by age, sex, rural/urban, theme, form of engagement)	0	1,200	1,000	800
% of citizens engaged by SANCUS monitoring processes from under-represented groups (disaggregated by sex, age, disability, location and where possible income group)	0	50%	60%	80%

# PEER LEARNING

## THEMATIC CLUSTERS

Based on an initial mapping exercise, cross-regional thematic clusters of national CSOs working on similar issues have been identified. These clusters will engage in thematic based peer-to-peer learning within and outside the project network for sustained knowledge exchange.



## LEARNING ACTIVITIES

SANCUS will involve a wide range of peer learning and exchange activities, including:

**Mastermind sessions:** tapping into the collective intelligence of the SANCUS group, these sessions will provide an opportunity to explore an idea or challenge in greater depth. National CSOs will discuss an issue and collectively brainstorm, share experiences and build solutions. As an output of these discussions, the project will develop short “think pieces” articulating the further research planned, solutions that will be piloted and additional ideas generated for dissemination across SANCUS networks and beyond. This is the mental “gym” where ideas are worked on, approaches improved and problems solved. Some potential topics include:

- how to reach and engage marginalised groups
- how to engage reluctant duty bearers
- how to develop a common approach to monitoring oversight institutions
- how to mobilise citizens where there are COVID restrictions

**Spotlight sessions:** drawing on the in-project experience of national CSOs, these sessions will discuss particularly successful outcomes, outputs and activities. These sessions will stimulate the dissemination of good practices among the SANCUS network of chapters and, over time, a broader overview of critical components in building democratic accountability.

**Webinars:** these mini-training courses zoom-in on a specific project topic or capacity need to build the immediate information base. Often involving external expertise, they provide an opportunity to explore whether a longer training or special consultancy would be of value to one or multiple national CSOs. The content is recorded for reference and continued use. Potential topics include:

- find, engage and safeguard investigative journalists
- use digital tools to improve advocacy and legal advice centres
- approaches to working with vulnerable groups
- improve data analysis skills

**Exchange visits:** a peer mentorship initiative, these exchanges will embed representatives from national CSOs with their peers for extended visits to build the technical and thematic capacity in an area of expertise of another national CSO. This knowledge exchange across the Transparency International movement mobilises and multiples expertise. The output of these visits will vary, including research, refined project implementation and joint advocacy initiatives.

# REGIONAL CLUSTERS

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## REGIONAL PLANS

In addition to the thematic clusters, SANCUS national CSOs are collaborating at a regional level to build relationships, develop common research tools/products and unify their advocacy to intensify their demands for democratic accountability with both national and regional impact.

The global and regional level activities conducted will focus on deepening national CSOs' thematic knowledge of key accountability topics through the establishment of dedicated cross-regional clusters, the production of research tools needed to generate evidence that can be used to push for reform, and finally the development of CSOs' technical skills to undertake effective monitoring interventions. This will position national CSOs to play an active role in advocacy and policy formulation through the execution of the national sub-actions.

### Americas

In Latin America, our SANCUS national CSOs have identified common themes to engage citizens at the local level in the delivery of basic services. Collaborating with other CSOs regionally, they will develop practical guidance and seminars for citizens to better identify and report cases of corruption. Additionally, national CSOs will jointly promote whistleblowing, prosecution and reporting of cases in collaboration with regional networks of journalists.

### Asia Pacific

In the Asia Pacific region, SANCUS national CSOs have initially identified strengthening victims and witnesses protection authorities (WPAs) as an area to collaborate for joint activity and advocacy. They will work in collaboration at the regional level with VWPAs to support and protect whistleblowers. Additionally, they will explore collaboration with regional journalism networks and enhance the use of investigative tools, such as right to information requests.

### Eastern Europe and Central Asia

In Eastern Europe and Central Asia, SANCUS will explore synergies provided by the European Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern Partnership. The recent joint communication for the post-2020 strategy in the Eastern Partnership countries is promising in this regard, given its prioritisation of civil society dialogue, anti-corruption measures and rule of law issues, as well

as its call for redoubled efforts to promote “integrity and accountability in all levels of public administration”.<sup>73</sup>

## Middle East and North Africa

In the MENA region, national CSOs have identified opportunities to collaborate regionally around advocating for the implementation of SDG Goal 16 (targets 6, 7 and 10). Capitalising on Transparency International’s existing methodology for shadow reports, they will prepare a regional assessment for the involved countries. This will form the basis to develop a regional advocacy paper and conduct the identified advocacy interventions through regional forums.

## Sub-Saharan Africa

In sub-Saharan Africa, there is a large and diverse group of national CSOs who will combine their project interests. Using this to their advantage, one of the areas for common action initially identified by national CSOs is a joint comparative review on the implementation of regional commitments under the African Union Convention on Combating Corruption (AUCPCC). This will be complemented with a joint position paper on AUCPCC implementation and promotion activities around African Anti-Corruption Day.

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<sup>73</sup> European Commission. 2020. [Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Eastern Partnership Policy Beyond 2020](#)