

# INDEPENDENT REDD+ GOVERNANCE MONITORING

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**A guidance document for civil society organisations**



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
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# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

**Good governance, in terms of participation, transparency and accountability, will be paramount for achieving effective, efficient and equitable REDD+ outcomes. A key part of improving governance for REDD+ will be the development of comprehensive monitoring and information sharing systems to demonstrate how countries have complied with social, environmental and governance safeguards<sup>1,2</sup> – a prerequisite for results-based payments under REDD+ mechanisms.<sup>3,4</sup>**

Under REDD+, countries are increasingly focusing on full implementation of policies and measures to reduce deforestation and forest degradation. They are also concentrating on the safeguards, benefit-sharing mechanisms and related information monitoring systems that will be required for REDD+.<sup>5</sup>

It is increasingly understood that the participation of civil society organisations<sup>6</sup> or non-governmental actors in monitoring REDD+ governance processes and implementation can greatly complement REDD+ information systems. The participation of non-state actors can provide a means of holding governments to account on REDD+, and can also help to increase transparency in decision-making processes and institutions – which will be important for building confidence in their effectiveness and honesty.

## PURPOSE OF THIS GUIDANCE DOCUMENT


This guidance document has been produced in recognition of the key role of civil society organisations in increasing accountability and transparency in REDD+ implementation, and in response to the need to build greater capacity and engagement of citizens in holding their governments to account.

The document aims to provide civil society organisations and practitioners involved in tackling REDD+ corruption and governance issues with an overview of key steps and considerations for the design and implementation of effective independent governance monitoring systems.

The guidance document draws on a growing body of experiences and case studies undertaken by civil society organisations within and outside the Transparency International movement, and across different tropical forest countries.<sup>7</sup> It provides an overview of good practices, methodologies and practical tools for monitoring REDD+ governance. The document also discusses key enabling conditions and lessons learnt for scaling-up and replicating existing initiatives.

It focuses on the range of issues and considerations that need to be taken into account in designing and implementing a system for monitoring REDD+ by civil society organisations (see Figure 1 for an overview). Over the longer term, however, civil society should consider how best it can integrate these models into final national monitoring frameworks, without losing credibility and independence. Such integration will be critical to establishing accountable results as REDD+ implementation moves towards its final phase.

FIGURE 1. INDEPENDENT REDD+ MONITORING: KEY STEPS AND CONSIDERATIONS





## 4. IMPLEMENT MONITORING ACTIVITIES

PAGES 20-23

- Carry out **skills & needs assessments** to develop tailored capacity- building programmes with actors
- Consider **local rights**, risk and safeguards in monitoring activities
- **Establish partnerships** based on strengths and weakness, and complimentary goals to maximise impact



## 5. REPORT & VERIFY RESULTS

PAGES 24-25

- Prior design of multi-stakeholder committees and **protocols** to legitimise monitoring results
- Consider differentiated reporting formats to target audiences and **networks**



## 6. FOLLOW-UP & ADVOCATE

PAGES 26-27

- Arrange regular feedback sessions and support (e.g. legal) to generate **advocacy** strategies and accountability
- Identify key **champions** across institutions
- Consider networks and **partnerships** for the mandated inclusion of **independent** civil society in REDD+ governance monitoring

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# INTRODUCTION: REDD+ GOVERNANCE MONITORING – WHY AND WHO

**REDD+<sup>8</sup> is a mechanism for mitigating climate change, strengthening forest governance, promoting sustainable land use planning, enhancing biodiversity and improving rural livelihoods.<sup>9</sup> However, the high levels of corruption, weak law enforcement capacity and poor institutional coordination that characterise many tropical forest countries<sup>10,11</sup> provide a high-risk context for REDD+'s implementation.<sup>12</sup> In these conditions there is a high level of risk that there will be an increase in corruption, illegal and unplanned forest conversion and use, conflicts over land and forest ownership and access rights, and inequitable benefit sharing.<sup>13</sup>**

As such, addressing and safeguarding against governance risks and shortcomings in the implementation of REDD+<sup>14</sup> has been a central part of readiness efforts under national REDD+ programmes in tropical forest countries, and is firmly recognised in the Cancún agreements, which make reference to “transparent and effective forest governance systems”<sup>15</sup> as one of the key safeguards that countries are required to have in place.

Robust and effective monitoring systems (which include national forest monitoring and safeguard information systems) are fundamental requirements of the REDD+ architecture. Such systems can provide information to track and verify REDD+ policy outcomes, in terms of emissions reductions, socio-environmental impacts and implementation of safeguards.<sup>16</sup> This will ultimately underpin results-based payments.<sup>17,18</sup> Other stakeholders can be engaged in the monitoring system, through the implementation and provision of information on REDD+ activities and safeguards.<sup>19</sup>

It is increasingly understood that civil society organisations<sup>20</sup> can greatly complement REDD+ governance, providing valuable complementary information for evaluating and verifying performance on governance of REDD+ activities. They can do this by monitoring the degree to which safeguards are implemented, monitoring law enforcement, identifying and publicly denouncing corruption and illegal practices, and reporting on issues related to REDD+ readiness and implementation activities.<sup>21</sup>

Such third-party, independent information sources will be needed to verify results and ensure that REDD+ safeguards are being addressed and respected.<sup>22</sup> They can also inform both national and international stakeholders and decision-makers on progress towards achieving national REDD+ policy objectives, and they can pinpoint ways to improve national REDD+ programmes.

In recognition of the key role of civil society organisations in increasing accountability and transparency in REDD+ implementation, the next sections look at the practical aspects of, and considerations when, establishing robust and effective civil society monitoring systems for REDD+ governance.



# 1. DESIGNING A REDD+ GOVERNANCE MONITORING SYSTEM

This section begins by framing governance for REDD+, and presents relevant approaches and considerations for choosing indicators and methodologies for assessing REDD+ governance. The section also draws on different case studies and best-practices to discuss important steps and enabling conditions for designing effective monitoring systems.

## DEFINING GOVERNANCE AND WHAT TO MONITOR

As a first step, we must consider what governance entails. In the context of REDD+, governance often refers to REDD+ safeguards and encompasses existing institutions, policies and processes in place or created to implement REDD+.<sup>23</sup> According to the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization,<sup>24</sup> achieving good REDD+ governance requires that the key interrelated and mutually reinforcing principles that generally characterise good governance (accountability, effectiveness, efficiency, equity, participation and transparency) are appropriately and consistently applied throughout the three main pillars of governance (see Figure 2). These three pillars are:

1. policy, legal, institutional and regulatory frameworks (coherence of policy and institutional systems)
2. planning and decision-making processes (the level of transparency and accountability in different processes)
3. implementation, enforcement and compliance (level of effective, equitable and efficient implementation of policy, legal, institutional and regulatory frameworks)<sup>25</sup>

FIGURE 2. REDD+ GOVERNANCE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK



Source: FAO, 2011

This conceptualisation of REDD+ governance must be considered in the development of monitoring systems given that it will define what information will be monitored.

Countries pursuing REDD+ are currently undertaking policy-making and planning processes, and developing national strategies, as part of readiness phases, while others are now implementing REDD+ policies, action plans – including demonstration activities – and capacity building.<sup>26</sup> Thus, differences in the stages of REDD+ in the focus country<sup>27</sup> will dictate whether monitoring is undertaken for both the design and implementation phases of REDD+, or just for one of these phases.

The next section considers these different stages in the selection of indicators used for monitoring governance.

## CHOOSING PRIORITY GOVERNANCE INDICATORS

The choice of indicators is a fundamental step in the monitoring of REDD+ governance. Many indicators will be linked to the REDD+ safeguards; some of them will be process indicators (for example, to illustrate whether or not an output has been achieved); and some of them will be impact indicators (for example, linked to actual social or environmental impacts).<sup>28</sup>

Furthermore, indicators can be quantitative, yielding a number (often with associated units), or qualitative, for example multiple-choice, narrative, numerical (on a scale of one to five), yes or no.<sup>29</sup> The choice of indicators should be specific and clear, measurable, realistic in terms of feasibility, and time bound.

As mentioned above, the decision regarding which indicators to use to monitor governance will depend on the stage REDD+ is at in the focus country, and must also consider other contextual factors (for example, access to information). In Table 1 below, a distinction is made, in terms of information and indicator requirements, between focusing on the design of policy frameworks for REDD+ and the implementation of REDD+ policy.<sup>30</sup>

TABLE 1. INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS AND PROCESSES FOR THE STAGE OF REDD+ BEING MONITORED

STAGE	MONITORING REQUIREMENTS AND CHARACTERISTICS
<b>Policy design</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Indicators will centre on assessing the existence and, in some instances, quality of rules/policies (see Table 2 on page 18 of this guide).</li> <li>Will rely on desk-based methods to assess the clarity and quality of policy / legal frameworks.</li> </ul>
<b>Policy implementation</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Involves indicators and verifiers which specifically focus on the level and quality of implementation and enforcement activities, compliance and impacts related to participation/decision-making, transparency and access to information, law enforcement and accountability and benefit-sharing.</li> <li>Measuring governance through de facto 'outcomes' or impacts will require collecting data on the level and nature of implementation and enforcement; field-based monitoring will be central to understanding levels and impacts of policy implementation and enforcement.</li> </ul>



While capturing both policy development and design processes, as well as policy enforcement and implementation impacts of REDD+, can provide a more comprehensive governance assessment,<sup>31</sup> whether such a thorough and ongoing assessment can be undertaken will depend on capacity and circumstances. For example, monitoring the design of REDD+ policy frameworks can involve relatively low data collection costs and the use of straightforward indicators (for example, the existence of a law or institution), which will suit monitoring initiatives that have limited capacity, while monitoring policy implementation and law enforcement can require more substantial resources and elaborated monitoring methodologies to capture the effect or impact of REDD+ policies.<sup>32</sup> Such choices will need to be made in the initial design of monitoring frameworks. See **Case Study 10** on Proética's work in Peru.

Toolbox 1 below offers important guidance on choosing indicators to address the different dimensions of governance discussed under section 1.2 above. Toolbox 2 offers guidance on assessing forest governance processes.

### Toolbox 1. What information to gather on key REDD+ governance dimensions (Programme on Forests – PROFOR)



In an effort to identify the necessary indicators for monitoring REDD+ governance, PROFOR has produced a detailed framework of 130 indicators that address the key dimensions of governance that are important for successful REDD+ implementation, including REDD+ safeguards.

PROFOR has also developed a diagnostic tool\* that provides protocols for scoring the indicators based on multiple-choice questions. The tool is flexible, relatively inexpensive to use, and adaptable to many contexts. It has been tested in Uganda, Burkina Faso, Kenya and Russia.

**Annex 1** provides more information on what information to provide on REDD+ governance.

\* [www.profor.info/sites/profor.info/files/AssessingMonitoringForestGovernance-guide.pdf](http://www.profor.info/sites/profor.info/files/AssessingMonitoringForestGovernance-guide.pdf)

### Toolbox 2. Applicable REDD+ governance indicators and worksheets (World Resources Institute – WRI)



The Forest Governance Indicator Framework developed by WRI provides a comprehensive menu of indicators and worksheets to guide the data collection and recording process that can be used and adapted to diagnose strengths and weaknesses in forest governance processes.

**Annex 2** provides more information on applicable REDD+ governance process indicators.

As part of identifying indicators to monitor, it is important to take into account priority governance issues and risks, as well as information gaps found in focus countries that need to be filled in order to enable governance improvements.

Ranking such risks (using methodologies presented in Toolbox 3) can help in the prioritisation and design of monitoring indicators to ensure relevance and effectiveness. In this process, having a joint understanding of where the main risks lie can help to focus the selection of indicators to monitor. Guaranteeing multi-stakeholder participation/input in the identification and design of indicators will also ensure access, ownership and relevance.

### Toolbox 3. Ranking corruption risks to prioritise governance indicators (Transparency International)



As part of Transparency International's Climate Integrity Programme, Transparency International produced a five-step approach for identifying, prioritising, analysing and addressing corruption risk in forest carbon projects and REDD+. The module provides relevant methods for identifying potential and existing corruptions risks, and subsequently ranking and prioritising these risks based on stakeholder assessment of the likelihood and impact of these risks occurring. The module provides a toolkit to guide this process.

This approach involves drawing on participatory workshops, small group meetings and expert group discussions with numerous stakeholders. Assessments of the impact of corruption can be influenced by personal experiences or organisational bias, so basing this assessment on a range of views can ensure that rankings are accepted as legitimate – and can provide a learning opportunity for different stakeholders to understand the impacts of corruption on each other. Having a joint understanding of where the main risks lie can also help to focus the selection of indicators to monitor.

For more details, see Module 4 Step 2, Exercises A3 and A4 in *Keeping REDD+ clean: a step-by-step guide to preventing corruption*.

[www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/keeping\\_redd\\_clean](http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/keeping_redd_clean)



**Having a joint understanding of where the main risks lie can help to focus the selection of indicators to monitor. Guaranteeing multi-stakeholder participation/ input in the identification and design of indicators will also ensure access, ownership and relevance.**

Lastly, it is important to note that once indicators are developed and selected they often require adjustment and testing against the local context and realities of data collection, to address the governance issues being monitored.<sup>33</sup> These considerations are discussed further under section 3 below.



## 2. ESTABLISHING PARTNERSHIPS AND DECIDING ON INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

Building partnerships and networks across civil society organisations, as well as government institutions, can be critical to the success of monitoring initiatives. Building networks and partnerships can be considered in the initial design phase but the further broadening and deepening of these relationships can also be undertaken once monitoring results become available and interest in the issues grows.

Such partnerships can help guarantee more cost-effective monitoring, by sharing responsibilities for different components of monitoring systems (monitoring, verification, reporting, communication, lobbying advocacy), as evidenced in **Case Study 1**.

In forming such partnerships, those seeking to monitor REDD+ governance should consider the expertise of different civil society organisations in particular issues or in undertaking particular activities across the stages

of the monitoring cycle (for example, data collection, reporting or verification). In the case of advocacy and lobbying, this could also include the level of political clout (networks and reputation) necessary to achieve the uptake of monitoring results – and ultimately achievement of agreed goals.

### Case Study 1. Standardisation and building effective civil society partnerships: SNOIE\* in Cameroon

This monitoring system has been formed through partnerships with a number of national civil society organisations in Cameroon across different stages in the chain of monitoring activities, to maximise impact.

By dividing responsibilities for data collection, observation, verification, reporting, communication, lobbying and advocacy activities, based on the relative expertise of each entity and standardised protocols, this initiative has been successful in developing an effective monitoring system in Cameroon.

**Annex 3** provides more information on Case Study 1, including sources.

\*Standardised External Independent Monitoring System



Monitoring system SNOIE in action.  
© Transparency International Cameroon

In this sense, institutional arrangements can be critical for the design and implementation of successful monitoring initiatives that seek to hold governments accountable. Experiences in establishing Independent Forest Monitoring (IFM) models (see **Case Study 2**) provide important approaches and principles that are

applicable to REDD+. With the implementation of the Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) and the corresponding Voluntary Partnership Agreements, additional frameworks and experiences also exist for monitoring, including independent observation.

## Case Study 2. Institutional arrangements under the IFM (Global Witness)

IFM is a tried and tested way to provide evidence about forest policy implementation, including REDD+, and to identify and publicly report on systemic failures of enforcement agencies. IFM involves establishing a contractual arrangement between a civil society monitoring entity and a relevant state authority (host organisation), based on several key principles. Among these principles are: independence in undertaking monitoring activities, transparency in the recruitment process, unhindered access to information, the establishment of a multi-stakeholder reporting panel and the right to publish.

**Annex 4** provides more information on Case Study 2, including sources.

In such IFM models, the success of third-party monitoring led by civil society depends on negotiations and the agreements reached between the relevant government institutions (for example, forest ministries) and the civil society monitoring organisation. According to Global Witness, these agreements should be formalised and laid out in relevant governing statutes, including in contracts and terms of reference that consider roles, mandates, rights and responsibilities, and delineate exactly what will be monitored, what information is required, how quality will be assured, and what protocols will govern validation and publication of findings. More importantly, these agreements should reflect certain key principles: transparency, accountability, policy / procedural reform, flexibility and independence (in terms of access to information, access to the field, freedom to publish findings), cost-effectiveness, collaboration between institutions, and stakeholder participation and multi-stakeholder reporting.<sup>34</sup>

Furthermore, such institutional arrangements should contain well-defined provisions for dispute resolution in the event of differences between the parties. Grievance and arbitration procedures should be clearly specified, given the possibility that relationships can become

strained under various circumstances and may threaten the success of the initiative. Such arrangements for multi-stakeholder institutions (for example, steering committees) can build trust, reduce opportunities for corruption and allow for effective coordination between institutions and across sectors.

Such agreements, as part of civil society monitoring, can enable greater access to information and to the field, and, more importantly, can at times guarantee the consistent financing and institutional support needed to maintain monitoring systems. This is particularly important given that civil society is often the weakest actor financially.

While such arrangements can be vital, civil society must consider the possible conflict of interests that might arise for them when such activities are embedded in formal domestic or national institutional arrangements for monitoring. The civil society actor must be aware of and careful to maintain their independence, credibility and reputation.



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# 3. SELECTING TOOLS/METHODS FOR COLLECTING INFORMATION ON REDD+ GOVERNANCE

Once you have prioritised and selected your indicators and put in place relevant institutional arrangements, you will move on to collecting the data needed to monitor those indicators. Information can be obtained from primary sources, such as questionnaires, surveys, interviews, focus group discussions, expert panels and direct observation. Secondary data can be collected through document reviews and consultations.

As noted earlier, capturing data on policies, as well as implementation, enforcement and impacts, will require a range of methodologies, from detailed desk-based analysis to field-based monitoring. In **Case Study 3**

below, such a mix-methods approach was used to assess governance in the context of REDD+ and FLEGT Voluntary Partnership Agreements.

## Case Study 3. Monitoring REDD+ and FLEGT governance (Fern)

Fern and its partners in central and west Africa have established national civil society forest governance monitoring systems based on mixed methods to measure progress on FLEGT Voluntary Partnership Agreements and to understand the degree to which key REDD+ safeguards related to participation and benefit sharing are abided by.

**Annex 5** provides more information on Case Study 3, including sources.

It must be noted that the choice of indicators will determine data needs and, consequently, the type of monitoring system and activities that are sought. There are several elements, criteria and trade-offs that need to be considered when choosing appropriate tools/methodologies for collecting information on REDD+ governance indicators.

An assessment of some common data collection methodologies is provided in Table 2. Key criteria and trade-offs are discussed below.

### Context

Choosing which tool and methodology to use will depend on the social context; some local authorities might perceive this exercise negatively and some respondents may be reticent about sharing information publicly on governance issues such as corruption, for fear of retaliation, or in a group setting when participants include traditionally marginalised groups, such as indigenous peoples or women.<sup>35</sup>

### Time

Different time commitments should be expected depending on the monitoring methodologies selected (e.g. desk research in comparison with large-scale surveys). Thus, before making a choice about what methodology to use, time constraints should be closely considered. This might include considering the challenges of achieving timely access to the appropriate data sources, but could also include considering the simple practicalities of how long different monitoring activities take and the frequency with which activities need to be conducted, as well as the reporting urgency.

### Information needs

The choice of research methods may entail trade-offs in the level of detail and specificity and type of information generated. For example, surveys can allow specific questions to be asked, while focus groups and participant observation may only assess general perceptions of governance issues or highlight areas of agreement and disagreement on particular topics. It will therefore be necessary to think about who will ultimately use the data/information generated (the end-user), and what reporting and follow-up actions are required.

### Data robustness

Selecting a mix of data collection methods can generate a more robust (good quality) and comprehensive set of information on governance issues. Adopting standardised monitoring protocols (see **Case Study 1**) can improve data credibility, compatibility and replicability of information, providing a clear baseline for analysis and helping to reduce the subjectivity of interpreting information.

### Capacity and resources

Consider the human and financial resources available, and the level of capacity required to undertake different methodologies, as well as the frequency with which these methodologies need to be implemented. The capacity of the intended participants and audience should be factored in: how much time, knowledge, and skills are required to undertake monitoring. There are clear trade-offs between carrying out participatory and local activities with forest communities, which entail high costs, on the one side, and desk-based research, on the other.

### Cost-effectiveness

Consider cost-effectiveness criteria in the choice of methods and data gathering systems: monitoring costs need to be realistic whilst at the same time ensuring delivery of robust data through locally appropriate methodologies. In this regard, the use of technology should also be considered to increase cost-effectiveness (see **Case Study 4**).



**There are several elements, criteria and trade-offs that need to be considered when choosing appropriate tools/methodologies for collecting information on REDD+ governance indicators.**

## Case Study 4. Improving the cost-effectiveness of REDD+ safeguard monitoring in Democratic Republic of Congo (Moabi)

The system developed by Moabi and partners in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), relied on community observers in each village to collect information using pen and paper forms. The observers were visited bi-monthly by an intermediary focal point, during which the observation forms were presented, checked and discussed, and when necessary joint visits by the focal point and the observer were undertaken to the sites of any reported safeguard infractions, where the focal point would take photographs and record GPS locations for verification.

The observer-collected information was recorded by a focal point using the open-source GeoODK application on a smartphone and transmitted via the internet for processing, and was eventually made publicly available on Moabi's online mapping platform, where additional layers and information from third-parties could be overlaid. They were then shared with the Congolese government authorities, REDD+ project partners, and independent observer organisations in Kinshasa to advocate for action and enforcement of agreements linked to REDD+.

The combination of paper-based methods and digital smartphone technology helped minimise costs. However, this meant a lag period of from several days to weeks in data transferring. This trade-off between cost and speed of data transmission was considered worthwhile, given the reduction in the need for more expensive smartphones to be distributed among remote communities unaccustomed to such devices, and the associated training and maintenance that this would require. This relatively low-cost, low-tech system is both affordable and replicable for future projects dealing with a wide range of land use activities.

**Annex 6** provides more information on Case Study 4, including sources.



## ADOPTING TECHNOLOGY-BASED SOLUTIONS IN MONITORING

Increased access to technology (through reduced costs and increased coverage) and open-source and user-friendly applications have generated a number of REDD+ monitoring experiences with improvements in data accuracy and credibility, albeit with trade-offs (see Toolbox 4 below on digital tools, as well as the evaluation of digital tools in Annex 7).

In many cases deciding whether these technology-based solutions can be useful in a particular context

will depend on the goals, scope and context of the monitoring initiative. For example, where the goal is to enable communities to alert the authorities to illegal activities, mobile data collection can help data to be shared fast enough for a successful, timely response (see **Case Study 9**: Citizen journalists in Indonesia (RuaiSMS)). If a project engages a small number of monitors in frequent monitoring over many years, the benefits are also likely to exceed the costs of supplying each person with a phone and training.

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FIGURE 3. PARK RANGERS USING MOBILE TABLETS IN TANZANIA

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**There are numerous potential benefits to using mobile technology in data collection as part of monitoring.**

## Toolbox 4. Assessing digital tools for REDD+ governance monitoring (Guyana - Global Canopy)



Table 2 on page 18 provides a list of considerations to take into account when deciding whether to use digital technology (for example, smartphones and tablet computers). There are numerous potential benefits to using mobile technology in data collection as part of monitoring, as outlined below, but there are also disadvantages to take into account.

### Advantages

- Small size and storage capacity
- High versatility (wide range of data, including audio, video, camera, GPS and text)
- Can foster participation (e.g. use of pictorial or icon-based data collection apps to enable people to participate who have no previous experience with digital technology)
- Fewer data errors – can reduce the number of data transcription errors; incorporate data auditing features
- Instant data visualisation and immediate analysis
- Reduced time lag between collecting data and analysing and sharing
- Timely transcriptions and data transfers
- Easy data sharing
- Facilitate more efficient two-way communication
- Engage younger people and other phone users








### Disadvantages

- Susceptibility to technical glitches and damage
- Network connectivity required in setting up – and at times in running
- Energy sources, power supply
- Greater reliance on external facilitators
- High up-front and ongoing costs
- Capacity building/training to reach the high level of expertise required to manage digital technology can reduce local autonomy and be a barrier to participation
- Greater initial time investment required

**Annex 7** provides more information on Toolbox 4.

TABLE 2. ASSESSMENT OF DATA COLLECTION METHODS<sup>36,37</sup>

 low  moderate  high

DATA COLLECTION METHOD	Desk review	Interviews	Surveys/questionnaires
DESCRIPTION	Existing records and documents are examined, and the necessary information is extracted. Often forms part of a baseline for undertaking further data collection.	Information is obtained through inquiry and recorded by interviewers. Interviews are conducted in a one-on-one setting and can be structured (set of fixed questions) or semi-structured (guiding questions but adaptable, promotes two-way discussion).	Respondents respond to structured and predetermined questions and sometimes other question forms (such as yes or no responses, multiple-choice, rating scales), or they may ask open-ended questions. They are usually administered via questionnaires that cover a broad range of topics.
COST			
TRAINING NEEDS			
TIME REQUIREMENT	Depends on amount of data needed and access to information	Depends on number/location	Depends on number/location
RESPONSE RATE	Depends on availability of necessary documents		Depends on method of distribution
PROS (+)/CONS (-)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>+ Inexpensive</li> <li>+ Limited logistics</li> <li>+ Can require little training (albeit in cases of topical expertise requirements can be greater – for example, law)</li> <li>– Limited accuracy/consistency</li> <li>– Access to sources can be difficult and time-consuming to obtain</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>+ Able to explain questions or amend them to improve respondents' understanding</li> <li>+ Interviewees may respond more honestly and freely than they would in a group setting</li> <li>+ Depth of opinion</li> <li>+ Low costs</li> <li>– Interviewees may alter their responses to provide the response they think the interviewer is seeking</li> <li>– Interviewee bias</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>+ Large volumes of primate data – statistically representative</li> <li>+ Structured information to ensure consistency</li> <li>– Respondents may alter their responses to provide the response they think the data collector is seeking</li> <li>– Data collectors may be unable to verify that the respondent has understood the question or is knowledgeable about the subject</li> <li>– The costs of conducting surveys with a broad range of participants may be considerable.</li> </ul>



Focus groups	Multi-stakeholder workshops	Content analysis	Field visits/ observation
Stakeholders (one type or different types of actors) are brought together in a group to gather experiences, viewpoints, opinions on an issue, to validate data or to review findings. A facilitator (or moderator) asks predetermined questions to the group, and participants can openly discuss.	A range of stakeholders are brought together to perform different exercises (for example, discussing key questions, reviewing or validating findings). Led by a facilitator, the workshop may include breakout sessions into smaller groups similar to focus groups.	Content analysis is a quantitative tool used to analyse the themes and terms found in chosen documents and media.	Visit to a specific area to determine how actual conditions compare with conditions as described on paper. Watching a process in action to evaluate its existence, effectiveness or efficiency, or observing evidence of what has already happened.
Depends on number and proximity of participants	Depends on number and proximity of participants		
 Depends on number/location	 Depends on number	Depends on amount of data needed	
		Depends on availability	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>+ Participants can directly verify or dispute certain points and thereby increase the likelihood of accurate data being incorporated</li> <li>+ Increased participation</li> <li>+ Quickly and cheaply gather feedback from a larger group</li> <li>+ Broader perspective</li> <li>- Participants may be influenced by others' responses</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>+ Broad participation, viewpoints and discussion of key issues</li> <li>+ Time-efficient</li> <li>+ Allows data collectors to understand where disagreements may lie, and among which stakeholders</li> <li>+ Increased consensus on issues</li> <li>- Stakeholders may disagree or be uncomfortable expressing their opinions, and coming to a consensus can be time-consuming</li> <li>- Expensive, depending on logistics</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>+ Media files and documents may provide data not found elsewhere</li> <li>- Identification of key themes and terms may be subjective</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>+ Allows verification and first-hand data collection</li> <li>+ Can provide more accurate and varied information</li> <li>- Can be time-consuming and costly, depending on whether it is undertaken by an external agent</li> </ul>

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# 4. IMPLEMENTING AND MANAGING MONITORING SYSTEMS

Having looked at some essential steps in the designing of a monitoring system, this section discusses key enabling conditions and considerations for implementing effective REDD+ governance monitoring, which need to be considered before and during the implementation of activities. It presents a number of case studies and experiences, as well as tools and methodologies used for monitoring REDD+ governance.

The participation of different stakeholders in the implementation of data collection tools can result in more credible and useful monitoring systems by ensuring that the information collected is locally relevant and that there is an element of ownership, accessibility and transparency in the processes of information gathering, reporting and verification.

To engender ownership, trust and accountability, monitoring should be developed in partnership with local institutions, and information about REDD+ should be generated by building on existing platforms and

processes. Examples of such an approach include the Village Action Groups in Zambia (see **Case Study 5** below), which assess key safeguards related to access to information about REDD+, and the Accountability Monitoring Committees promoted across different wards in the Mbire District in Zimbabwe (**Case Study 6**), which monitor benefit-sharing agreements.

## Case Study 5. Improving information access and engagement capacity in REDD+ (Zambia)

Transparency International Zambia has established multiple platforms at different levels to compile and share information on REDD+ processes.

At the district level, Community Notice Boards, which are bodies comprised of different stakeholders, have been set up to monitor REDD+ processes and to engage the communities at the local level. These groups –an extended arm of TI Zambia - undertake surveys to understand levels of awareness of REDD+ and to address issues of transparency (for example, access to project documents/information; awareness of the REDD+ project).

At the village level, Transparency International Zambia identified representatives/informants from existing community groups, the Village Action Groups, who can generate information about REDD+ activities (for example, details about the agreements with REDD+ developers; issues raised by communities). Transparency International Zambia gathered this information through the use of a template based on a scorecard system, with key questions relating to governance indicators that were developed with Transparency International Ghana (for example, on access to information; number of meetings held).

**Annex 8** provides more information about Case Study 5, including sources.



Dialogue meeting in Mbenjele community, Chipata. © Transparency International Zambia

## Case Study 6. Participative models for monitoring benefit-sharing (Zimbabwe)

The monitoring system developed by Transparency International Zimbabwe, is administered by trained community volunteers (Accountability Monitoring Committees), who are also involved in public awareness and sensitisation activities to empower forest communities to actively participate in REDD+ related processes, as well as to record REDD+ corruption-related complaints. All recorded issues, including corruption-related complaints, are reported and addressed through multi-stakeholder public hearings that are held each month.

**Annex 9** provides more information about Case Study 6, including sources.



Sensitisation workshop in Mbire District. © Transparency International Zimbabwe



In all cases where a civil society organisation is working with local communities in regard to monitoring activities, it must ensure the free, prior and informed consent of participants is gained (see **Annex 10**).<sup>38</sup>

Furthermore, the participation of (local) government agencies in the implementation of monitoring systems can also help to build trust and foster the integration of information within existing local and/or national monitoring systems. This can also help in receiving and accessing relevant information, and it can support follow-up advocacy, ensuring the uptake and institutionalisation of reports and recommendations on policy reforms and governance improvements based on the monitoring undertaken. The decision to seek the close participation of government entities will ultimately depend on whether this has been identified as a key priority and strategy, and whether there is any conflict of interest (or if such a conflict might be perceived by others) and whether this might damage the parties' reputation and credibility.

## BUILDING CAPACITY ACROSS ACTORS

The effectiveness of monitoring systems will be dictated by the capacity building efforts undertaken to support them. This should, when possible, involve training in data gathering, analysis, synthesis and interpreting information in order to maintain the quality and reliability of data and the credibility of information gathered by civil society organisations.

As such, training on how to use the chosen data collection methods and how to record findings in a format that can be easily understood and processed is essential. Data collectors should be objective and have some relevant expertise and experience in undertaking consultations, interviews and other types of information gathering activities at both government and local level.

**FIGURE 4. MONITORING CAPACITY BUILDING ON REDD+ AMONG INDIGENOUS COMMUNITY MEMBERS IN GUYANA**



© Beth Raine / Global Canopy

Building capacity and know-how at the local level will also be important for improving citizens' understanding of REDD+ processes and safeguards, and for holding government agencies accountable. The Community Activism and Advocacy Handbook developed and put into use in Zimbabwe offers some guidance on this (available upon request).

Key considerations when carrying out capacity building on monitoring are the costs linked to delivering the capacity building (e.g. distance of participants, area of intervention), as well as the existing capacity to undertake monitoring activities. Undertaking capacity assessments prior to and after training will be important, in order to inform the development of a tailored training curriculum on monitoring and advocacy activities.

In sum, adequate capacity building must be incorporated into the process for all key players involved – civil society, local communities and indigenous peoples, as well as relevant government agencies and other institutions on which the effectiveness of the monitoring system depends. At the government level, such capacity building (for example, on data gathering and analysis methodologies, on reporting formats and on monitoring protocols) can help foster the inter-institutional links, coordination and information flows necessary for improving monitoring systems.

### **Case Study 7. Participation in REDD+ Governance in Vietnam (Rural Development and Poverty Reduction Fund)**

This initiative built capacity on REDD+ and forest policy, laws, regulations and procedures, and rights among Truong Xuan and Truong Son communities through different workshops and accessible communication and learning products.

By doing so this monitoring system was able to gather complaints and denunciations as part of a Feedback Grievance Resolution Mechanism linked to REDD+ implementation and safeguards.

This project aimed to foster local awareness of, and greater participation in, REDD+ in the Quang Binh province of Vietnam.

**Annex 11** provides more information on Case Study 7, including sources.

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# 5. REPORTING AND VERIFYING REDD+ GOVERNANCE MONITORING RESULTS

When deciding what format to use to present the monitoring results, it is important to first consider how results can serve different needs and reach different stakeholders. For example, a long and detailed report analysing every technical element of forest governance may have limited impact on a target audience such as a busy government official with limited time to read and digest the report, or local communities. Thus, developing tailored and accessible communication products and using accessible language will be important for achieving the greatest impact.

The decision regarding what types of reporting format to use can also be informed by an assessment of the target audience's knowledge, to understand if they are aware of what REDD+ means, for example, or if they know certain key technical terms or have had previous capacity building on the topic.<sup>40</sup>

Once the decision on the format is made, and prior to publication where the monitoring results are to be made public, there is a need to verify the information in order to ensure the credibility of the system in place. The verification of information collected by civil society organisations requires a technical verification process. In this regard, the use of multi-stakeholder review panels to analyse and elucidate inaccuracies in information/reports is important for generating credibility and for prioritising key issues that require immediate action. Such a model can be drawn from the work undertaken by SNOIE in Cameroon (**Case Study 1**). In sum, if an observation or data recording is verified by multiple sources, it can often be considered more credible.

Linked to this reporting and verification process is the need to ensure access to information and publication of reports and other relevant information in a timely manner in order to build trust and transparency in civil society-led monitoring models. Beyond building trust, ensuring timeliness in following through on monitoring with a verified report is also important in facilitating more immediate responses – as is required in the case of illegal logging activities, for example.

However, when monitoring models rely on external sources, they must also consider key risks and rights associated with the information being shared. Providing anonymity and confidentiality of informants or monitors is important for generating safe working environments and citizen participation. This is particularly relevant in the case of monitors or community members involved in collecting evidence of crimes or tracking and denouncing illegal resource extraction, who can be at a risk of violent reprisals.

One way of generating a safe space for participation is to provide anonymity of monitors in reports and project documentation, and/or to establish protocols for data sharing and management to ensure sensitive information is adequately handled and shared, considering the rights over that information (see **Case Study 8** below).<sup>41</sup>



## Case Study 8. Information sharing considerations: experiences from Guyana (Global Canopy)

In Guyana, local communities use a traffic light system to classify data according to its sensitivity, and the actors it should be shared with. For each traffic light colour (green, amber, red) there is a specific process that needs to be followed for that dataset to be shared and accessed by external actors. The decision-making process is based on the traditional village management structures, which helps ensure local acceptance and ownership of the process.

These guidelines and the agreements on roles make sure that data is used in a very careful and considerate way, taking into account the concerns and decisions of the communities. This also ensures that the project effectively addresses any data-sharing requests that might arise throughout the course of the project and thereafter.

**Annex 12** provides more information on Case Study 8, including sources.

FIGURE 5. CAROLINE ALLICOCK, A COMMUNITY MONITOR, INTERVIEWING FELLOW VILLAGERS IN NORTH RUPUNNI, GUYANA



# 6. FOLLOW-UP AND ADVOCATE

Civil society can often be best placed to act as a bridge between local communities who have grievances and complaints related to REDD+ readiness and implementation activities and decision-makers.<sup>42</sup>

In the case of Zimbabwe, for example (**Case Study 6**), communities, civil society partners and public-private entities are brought together at regular intervals to follow up on the complaints raised.

To build local trust and generate impact, a strong follow-up process is needed once reports are submitted and verified. Updates on the progress made in resolving issues are also required. Such follow-up activities can involve monitoring whether or not issues and recommendations raised in reports have been addressed by the government, or providing the legal support required by citizens to address the issue (e.g. Transparency International's Advocacy and Legal Advice Centres, which provide free and confidential legal advice to witnesses and victims of corruption), or helping communities in developing action plans (see Toolbox 5) to address the issues.



**To build local trust and generate impact, a strong follow-up process is needed once reports are submitted and verified.**

## Toolbox 5. Developing an action plan (Transparency International Zambia)



Based on the monitoring undertaken, the communities were encouraged to develop an action plan, as a road map for implementing community change. The plan describes what the community wants to achieve, what activities are required during a specified time period, and what resources (money, people and materials) are needed to be successful. Communities must think of:

1. What will be done?
2. Who will do it?
3. When will it be done? (timeline)
4. How will it be done?
5. What resources are required?

The advocacy strategies employed to demand greater accountability, transparency and participation must also be broadly visible at the national and international level, in order to generate impact and awareness. Establishing alliances with press or media (see **Case Study 9** on citizen journalists, below) to maximise dissemination, or with legal and anti-corruption institutions to provide legal advice, can be important in establishing effective follow-up support.

## Case Study 9. Citizen journalists in Indonesia (RuaiSMS)

The RuaiSMS initiative links text messages to local media in order to report illegal forest incursions in Borneo, Indonesia. It uses mobile phone text messaging as a way for indigenous and rural communities in remote areas of Borneo to disseminate information to national media and community members. With basic training and mobile phones, members of remote communities can become “citizen journalists”.

Linking local citizen journalists to media services can bring about change for forest communities impacted by forest incursions. It enables communities to share their concerns with a wide audience, including people that can bring about change – for example, by strengthening community land rights or improving public services.

**Annex 13** provides more information on Case Study 9, including sources.

It can be helpful to draw on a concrete case which is considered to be a representative case of the problem in question. This case should be sufficiently high profile and relevant. Using so-called emblematic cases as part of broader government advocacy, citizen awareness and legal support strategies can also be of benefit (see **Case Study 10**).

## Case Study 10. Emblematic cases for public awareness and advocacy (Proética)

As part of its strategy to tackle corruption and support law enforcement mechanisms to prevent impunity in the forestry sector, Proética (the national chapter of Transparency International in Peru) has used emblematic cases<sup>43</sup> to generate public awareness and effective communication, and follow-up and replicability strategies.

An emblematic case is considered to be a representative case of the problem. It is identified through a prioritisation and selection process, in collaboration with relevant experts who assess:

1. the economic, political and institutional impact of the case
2. whether high profile individuals are involved (for example, senior elected or appointed civil servants or business leaders)
3. if there are large sums of money involved
4. if opportunities or strategies for impact are clear and achievable

**Annex 14** provides more information on Case Study 10, including sources.

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# 7. CONCLUSION

**As discussed throughout this document, there are clear opportunities for increased involvement of civil society in informing the development of REDD+ monitoring systems, and in addressing key gaps around transparency and accountability.**

However, enabling civil society organisations to form a permanent component of REDD+ governance monitoring frameworks will require efforts to address key barriers, both internationally and nationally, in terms of:

- the absence of institutional mandates for using civil society-generated data;
- political barriers and will;
- a lack of agreed formats for reporting data or methodologies for monitoring;
- and uncertain and limited funding to support civil society initiatives, as well as unclear funding arrangements for REDD+.<sup>44</sup>

Overcoming these challenges will require the establishment of data-sharing agreements at multiple scales. Such agreements will require the establishment of institutional mandates to allow data assimilation and follow-up by government entities. Standardising aspects of civil society governance monitoring methodologies by establishing basic minimum standards and protocols, and guidelines on best practice, can help improve comparability and replication at scale. Lastly, earmarking funds, generated through REDD+ financial mechanisms to sustain and catalyse civil society monitoring and training, as has been the case for the FLEGT Voluntary Partnership Agreements, can help address financial and capacity barriers.

Irrespective of developments in REDD+ monitoring at national level, existing efforts in assessing governance processes and reforms by civil society organisations will be paramount in order to increase the level of transparency in REDD+ planning and implementation, both for domestic and international stakeholders, and may provide a basis for evidence-led policy reform and for a continued push for higher standards on REDD+.

Balancing civil society demands with the needs and requirements of government institutions will be central for maximising synergies across public–private entities, and as part of long-term improvements in cross-sectoral REDD+ governance.



**Standardising aspects of civil society governance monitoring methodologies by establishing basic minimum standards and protocols, and guidelines on best practice, can help improve comparability and replication at scale.**



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FIGURE 6. A COMMUNITY MONITOR FROM THE CHICO MENDES EXTRACTIVE RESERVE IN ACRE, BRAZIL  
WWW.FORESTCOMPASS.ORG

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# ANNEX

**This guide shows how some fundamental underlying elements are crucial to developing and rolling out effective civil society monitoring. The annex presents toolkits and case studies that strongly reflect each of these crucial elements. As you set about designing your approach, keep these as your guide.**

## Participation

The participation of different stakeholders in the planning, design and implementation of data collection tools can result in more credible and useful monitoring systems. Furthermore, the participation of government agencies (when appropriate) in the implementation of monitoring systems can also help to build trust and foster the integration of information within existing local and/or national monitoring systems. Think carefully about how best to integrate participation into your approach.

## Partnerships

Building effective partnerships across stakeholders can be extremely effective in ensuring strong outcomes from your monitoring. Try to build partnerships with committed government institutions to ensure greater sustainability or with other civil society partnerships to make the best use of limited resources and build on each other's strengths.

## Rights

Working to defend forests and to tackle illegal and corrupt activities can be very dangerous. When monitoring models rely on external sources, they must be sensitive to this risk. Provide anonymity and confidentiality of informants or monitors in order to generate safe working environments and citizen participation.

## Capacity Building

All stakeholders including civil society, local communities and indigenous peoples as well as relevant government agencies and other institutions on which the effectiveness of the system depends will have capacity building needs. Paying attention to this to help foster inter-institutional links, coordination and information flows that are necessary for improving your monitoring system.

## Information

Civil society monitoring adds important complementary information from the perspective of the public interest that allows a real understanding of progress on REDD+ and improvements needed. It is crucial to completing the official picture. However, select information carefully based on a clear understanding of who will use it and what for.

## Cost-effectiveness

Whilst civil society monitoring can fill an important gap, civil society always face challenges in terms of human, financial and other resources. Be aware at all times of your capacity constraints and those of any expected participants and let this guide the design of your approach.

## Replicability

A number of tools already exist that were designed with replicability in mind. Draw on these where it makes sense and avoid re-covering old ground.

## Independence

It is crucial that civil society maintain their independence in any monitoring they undertake. As you seek greater impact and sustainability through institutionalisation of civil society monitoring approaches, always prioritise your independence.







# ANNEX 1. WHAT INFORMATION TO PROVIDE ON REDD+ GOVERNANCE (FAO)

PROFOR developed a diagnostic tool for assessing and monitoring forest governance. It includes a set of 130 indicators and a protocol for scoring the indicators based on multi-stakeholder discussions (see Annex 2 below). The indicators are in the form of multiple-choice questions about aspects of forest governance. Underling the indicators is an overlying framework developed by FAO, comprised of three pillars and 13 basic components and sub-components (see Table 3 below) that should be considered in assessing and monitoring forest governance.

## EXAMPLE OF INDICATOR SCORING:

### Sub-component

Do forest-dependent communities have secure access to the resources that they depend on?

### Rationale

It is a basic human right for forest-dependent communities to have secure and equitable access to forest resources on which they depend for their livelihoods. Their rights should not be arbitrarily changed or taken away.

### Possible responses

- All forest-dependent communities have secure access to necessary forest resources.
- Most forest-dependent communities have secure access to necessary forest resources.
- Some forest-dependent communities have secure access to necessary forest resources.
- No forest-dependent communities have secure access to necessary forest resources.

To score this indicator, the assessment needs to choose one of the possible responses. Note that, despite their format, the PROFOR indicators are not intended as survey or interview questions.

The initial diagnosis can be a starting point from which to set priorities for reform, to target some areas for deeper study, or to track the progress of reform efforts. Experience in Liberia have helped inform

the implementation of REDD+ readiness activities by identifying priorities for support to governance initiatives, providing information relevant to planning and implementing specific activities and a baseline for forest governance trends to be tracked over time.

The tool is flexible, relatively inexpensive to use, and adaptable to many contexts. It has also been tested in Uganda, Burkina Faso, Kenya and Russia.

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**TABLE 3. PILLARS, COMPONENTS AND SUB-COMPONENTS OF PROFOR'S FOREST GOVERNANCE ASSESSMENT TOOL**

COMPONENTS	SUB-COMPONENT INDICATOR EXAMPLES
<b>Pillar 1: policy, legal, institutional and regulatory frameworks</b>	
<b>1.1 Forest-related policies and laws</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Existence and quality of policies, laws, and regulations governing forest use and management</li> <li>• Clarity and coherence of policies, laws, and regulations governing forest use and management</li> <li>• Consistency of forest laws with relevant international commitments and obligations</li> </ul>
<b>1.2 Legal framework to support and protect land tenure, ownership, and use rights</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Extent to which the legal framework recognises and protects forest-related property rights, including rights to carbon</li> <li>• Extent to which the legal framework recognises customary and traditional rights of indigenous peoples, local communities and traditional forest users</li> <li>• Extent to which the legal framework provides effective means of resolving disputes by due process</li> </ul>
<b>1.3 Consistency of broader development policies with forest policies</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Consistency and coordination of national development plans and strategies with forest policies</li> <li>• Extent to which forest laws support and enable sustainable livelihoods of forest-dependent communities</li> <li>• Consistency of land use plans with forest policy goals and priorities</li> <li>• Consistency of forest policies with policies on climate change mitigation and adaptation</li> <li>• Extent to which forest and land use policies ensure gender equity</li> </ul>
<b>1.4 Institutional frameworks</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Extent to which the forest-related mandates of national and subnational governments are clear and mutually supportive</li> <li>• Adequacy, predictability and stability of forest agency budgets and organisational resources</li> <li>• Availability and adequacy of information, technology, tools and organisational resources for the pursuit of agency mandates</li> </ul>
<b>1.5 Financial incentives, economic instruments, and benefit-sharing</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Existence of legal provisions and mechanisms for equitable sharing of forest revenue</li> <li>• Equity in the distribution of access to forest resources, rights, and rents</li> <li>• Existence and adequacy of safeguards against social and environmental harm from forest-related policies and activities</li> </ul>

COMPONENTS	SUB-COMPONENT INDICATOR EXAMPLES
<b>Pillar 2: planning and decision-making processes</b>	
<b>2.1 Stakeholder participation</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Extent to which the legal framework provides opportunities for public participation in forest-related policies and decisions, and opportunities for redress and remedy</li> <li>• Existence and effectiveness of processes that ensure participation by key stakeholders, including sanctions for failure to facilitate stakeholder participation</li> <li>• Transparency of processes and accessibility of guidance on how to participate in forest-related planning, decision-making and implementation at all levels</li> <li>• Extent to which stakeholder processes ensure the participation of women in forest-related decision-making processes</li> <li>• Extent to which government engages with, creates space for, and supports the participation of civil society, indigenous peoples and forest-dependent communities in forest-related processes and decision-making</li> <li>• Capacity of governments at different levels to engage with civil society and other forest stakeholders on forest-related policy-making and implementation</li> <li>• Existence and effectiveness of conflict resolution and grievance mechanisms</li> </ul>
<b>2.2 Transparency and accountability</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Extent to which the legal framework supports public access to information, promotes scientific debate relating to forest policies, and imposes sanctions for failure of agencies to meet obligations to disclose information</li> <li>• Quality, timeliness, comprehensiveness, and accessibility of forest-related information available to stakeholders, including public notice of pending forest agency actions</li> </ul>
<b>2.3 Stakeholder capacity and action</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Presence of strong, independent civil society organisations, including non-governmental monitors and watchdog organisations</li> <li>• Capacity of civil society, indigenous peoples, and small and medium-sized enterprises to participate and engage in forest-related planning, decision-making and implementation</li> <li>• Extent to which governments encourage corporate entities and businesses operating in the forest sector to comply with recommended international codes of conduct and standards and safeguards</li> </ul>

COMPONENTS	SUB-COMPONENT INDICATOR EXAMPLES
<b>Pillar 3: implementation, enforcement and compliance</b>	
<b>3.1 Administration of forest resources</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Adequacy of staff capacity and effectiveness of agencies tasked with forest administration, and quality and effectiveness of information and data management systems</li> <li>Adequacy, effectiveness and transparency of monitoring and evaluation, and accessibility of results</li> </ul>
<b>3.2 Forest law enforcement</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Appropriateness and consistency of application of penalties for breaches of forest laws and regulations</li> <li>Effectiveness of division of jurisdictional authority and responsibility for forest law enforcement</li> <li>Effectiveness of measures and tools to prevent forest crimes</li> <li>Capacity of law enforcement agencies to suppress, detect and prevent forest-related crimes and illegal activities</li> <li>Extent, appropriateness and effectiveness of enforcement agencies' use of tools, instruments and information to enforce laws</li> <li>Capacity and willingness of the judiciary and law enforcement agencies to deal with cases of forest crime effectively</li> <li>Extent to which courts and arbitrators: are accessible, fair, honest and independent; work in a timely manner and are affordable; and deliver enforceable outcomes</li> </ul>
<b>3.3 Administration of land tenure and property rights</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Comprehensiveness and accuracy of documentation and accessibility of information related to forest tenure and rights</li> <li>Existence and effectiveness of implementation of processes and mechanisms for resolving disputes and conflicts over tenure and rights</li> <li>Effectiveness of compensation mechanisms when rights are extinguished</li> <li>Adequacy of measures and mechanisms to ensure the tenure security of forest owners and rights-holders</li> </ul>
<b>3.4 Cooperation and coordination</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Extent, appropriateness and adequacy of coordination and cooperation between national and subnational governments on forest-related activities</li> <li>Extent, appropriateness and adequacy of coordination and cooperation within and among national agencies with forest-related mandates</li> <li>Extent to which other government agencies (land, minerals, agriculture, transportation, communication, environmental protection, finance, etc.) coordinate and cooperate with forest agencies concerning forests</li> </ul>
<b>3.5 Measures to address corruption</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Implementation and effectiveness of forest-related procurement rules in the public sector</li> <li>Existence, adequacy and effectiveness of standards of conduct for civil servants, political appointees and elected officials</li> <li>Existence and effectiveness of channels for reporting corruption and whistleblower protection</li> <li>Extent and effectiveness of follow-up action, including prosecution of all parties involved in cases of corruption</li> </ul>

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# ANNEX 2. APPLICABLE REDD+ GOVERNANCE PROCESS INDICATORS (WRI)

WRI's Governance of Forests Initiative (GFI) framework provides a comprehensive menu of indicators that can be used and adapted to diagnose strengths and weaknesses in forest governance. The framework defines three foundational components of governance (below), based on five principles of good governance (transparency, participation, accountability, coordination and capacity) and key issues of common interest and concern (forest tenure, land use planning, forest management, and forest revenues and incentives).

## FOUNDATIONAL COMPONENTS

- **actors:** people and institutions (e.g. government, civil society, companies, etc) that shape decisions about how forests are managed and used
- **rules:** policies, laws, and regulations that affect forests and the process by which policies and laws are created and changed, and the content of existing policies and laws
- **practices:** how actors develop and apply rules to drive practices at an operational level

The GFI's indicators generally aim to assess quality of process rather than quantifying outputs or outcomes. Each indicator, which is categorised by a theme (e.g. forest management) and subtheme (e.g. forest legal and policy framework), contains three parts:

- **title:** a short phrase that summarises the scope of the indicator (e.g. legal basis for community participation in forest management)
- **diagnostic question:** a question that summarises the qualitative scale of assessment (e.g. to what extent does the legal framework facilitate community participation in forest management?)
- **elements of quality:** three to six qualitative elements that are the focus of data collection and help the user answer the diagnostic question in a more structured manner (e.g. participation requirements – the legal framework requires public and private forest managers to engage local communities in forest management planning and operations; participation platforms – the legal framework establishes permanent structures to facilitate community participation in local forest management activities)

The GFI Guidance Manual includes detailed explanations of each indicator, and worksheets, to support the data collection process. It provides detailed guidance on completing the indicator assessment and a format for recording data and observations for each element of quality (see example on the following page for anti-corruption).

#### 6.4 Anticorruption measures

##### 118. Legal basis for combatting corruption

To what extent does the legal framework seek to prevent and combat corruption?

###### Indicator Guidance:

This indicator should be applied to assess all relevant laws and policies in place to combat corruption. Anticorruption legislation may be standalone, or included as part of public sector codes of conduct or other administrative laws. Researchers should collect and review legal documents as well as any government strategies focused on corruption.

Element of Quality	Guidance
<b>1. Definition of corruption.</b> The legal framework clearly and comprehensively defines corrupt practices as illegal.	Researchers should assess the comprehensiveness of the legal framework by identifying whether rules explicitly define what constitutes corruption under the law. Examples of activities that may be defined as corruption include: bribery, extortion, nepotism, embezzlement, money laundering, using confidential government information for private gain, and misuse of public property.
<b>2. Penalties.</b> The legal framework defines clear penalties for corruption.	Rules should outline clear penalties for corruption activities. Penalties may be differentiated according to the type of corruption action as well as the severity of the crime.
<b>3. Anticorruption institution.</b> The legal framework establishes a government institution tasked with monitoring and investigating corruption.	Researchers should identify whether rules call for establishment of a government anticorruption institution. Such institutions may be explicitly tasked with monitoring corruption, or could be responsible for more general government oversight such as an ethics office. In the absence of a dedicated institution, researchers should identify any offices or units within government agencies that have a mandate to address corruption.
<b>4. Anticorruption strategy.</b> A national strategy exists for combatting corruption.	Researchers should identify whether the government has developed a national anticorruption strategy. Such an effort may be led by an anticorruption institution, finance ministry, or other relevant agency. In the absence of a national strategy, researchers should identify any agency-specific strategies with relevance for the assessment (e.g., forest, land, or extractive sectors) or assess whether actions to address corruption are incorporated into other national strategies (e.g., related to economic development or strengthening governance).

##### 118. Legal basis for combatting corruption

###### Object of assessment:

EOQ	Y/N	Explanation
Definition of corruption		
Penalties		
Anticorruption institutions		
Anticorruption strategy		

Additional notes:

Values	Select
Not applicable/assessed	
Zero to one elements of quality	Low _____
Two elements of quality	Medium _____
Three elements of quality	Medium-High _____
Four elements of quality	High _____

###### Documentation:

###### Researcher name and organization:

**Secondary sources:**  
Record the following: document or source title, author or organization, date published, chapter or page, website (if relevant)

###### Primary sources:

For each of the above conducted, record:  
- Interviewee/participant name(s) and title  
- Institution/company/organization  
- Location and date of interview

The GFI indicators were field-tested by GFI's civil society partners in Brazil, Cameroon and Indonesia.

## Sources

C. Davis, F. Daviet, S. Nakhooda, IMAZON and ICV, *Governance of Forests Initiative Indicator Framework (Version 1)*, (Washington D.C: WRI, 2009). Available at: [www.wri.org/publication/governance-forests-initiative-indicator-framework-version-1](http://www.wri.org/publication/governance-forests-initiative-indicator-framework-version-1)

L. Williams, et al, *The Governance of Forests Initiative (GFI) Guidance Manual: A Guide to Using the GFI Indicator Framework*, (Washington D.C: WRI). Available at: [www.wri.org/sites/default/files/gfi\\_guidance\\_manual.pdf](http://www.wri.org/sites/default/files/gfi_guidance_manual.pdf)



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# ANNEX 3. BUILDING EFFECTIVE CIVIL SOCIETY PARTNERSHIPS

## Project

Standardised External Independent Monitoring System (SNOIE)

## Organisations and country

FODER, PAPEL, SUHE, ASTEVI, CEDLA, Transparency International Cameroon

## Context

The SNOIE system has been set up in the context of the Voluntary Partnership Agreement between Cameroon and the European Union under FLEGT and is also relevant to REDD+. The system monitors forest governance by carrying out independent observations to collect and report information on illegal activities using standardised procedures. The system also includes undertaking joint missions to various sites where concerns have been raised. The system has established and developed standardised methodologies and monitoring approaches (based on ISO 9001:2015).<sup>45</sup> This was carried out as a response to the lack of standardised tools and methodologies, lack of organisation of actors, poor collaboration<sup>46</sup> between observers and competent authorities, and long and expensive external IFM reports, which were not achieving any traction.

## Approach/methodology

A key element of the SNOIE monitoring system is its civil society partnerships and clear role definitions. It emphasises the need for a greater fragmentation of the chain of activities (observation, verification, reporting, communication, lobbying and legal follow-up) among its different partners (PAPEL, SUHE, ASTEVI, CEDLA, Transparency International Cameroon) based on their respective areas of strength. For example, a

community-based real-time deforestation alert system (ForestLink) is integrated with SNOIE as an important source of timely information on illegal activities from the field. FODER acts as the coordinating institution. The lobbying and advocacy activities with authorities and the general public (e.g. MINFOF, NMC and media) are undertaken by TI Cameroon. The SNOIE systems relies on 17 permanent personnel from different civil society organisation members, as well as six non-permanent experts who intervene in the Technical and Ethical Evaluation Committee (see more below), depending on the evaluation requirements.

Despite this division of roles, all members were trained on key monitoring concepts, and on the quality management system principles, as well as on data collection tools (GPS, digital camera, meter, forms) and legal process (for example, distinguishing between illegal / irregular cases, the steps for the documentation of illegal/irregular cases).

The reports generated by field missions are subsequently analysed and validated by a multi-stakeholder Technical and Ethical Evaluation Committee, consisting of experts from public, private and civil society organisations. They validate the reports using standardised procedures and methodologies to ensure the quality of the reports and the credibility of denunciations before their publication. The Committee can provide comments and recommendations on the technical accuracy, relevance and objectivity of the reports submitted, which generates greater credibility. Once the reports are approved they are submitted to relevant forest administration, accompanied with letters of denunciation (public criticism). This can lead to formal or informal meetings with targeted officials to discuss the cases and to take into account the needs and interest of various stakeholders, and leads to control missions being undertaken and sanctions being imposed against the illegal exploiters.

## Strengths, weakness, lessons learnt

This enhanced collaboration between civil society organisation guarantees the effectiveness of the system in generating timely monitoring reports with greater public buy-in. However, challenges remain regarding access to sites where illegal activities are occurring; difficulty in accessing reliable information from forestry companies; and capacity constraints for the expansion of SNOIE system in other areas where illegality exists in terms of covering the financing of joint missions. There is also considerable cost in abiding by the ISO 9001: 2015 quality standard.

## Sources

Foder, Implementation of the standardized Approach to external independent monitoring In Cameroon: Perceptible impacts and results, (Yaoundé, Foder: 2017). Available at: [www.forest4dev.org/images/documents\\_pdf/Implementation\\_of\\_the\\_standardized\\_approach\\_to\\_external\\_independent\\_monitoring\\_in\\_cameroon\\_perceptible\\_impacts\\_and\\_results.pdf](http://www.forest4dev.org/images/documents_pdf/Implementation_of_the_standardized_approach_to_external_independent_monitoring_in_cameroon_perceptible_impacts_and_results.pdf)

[loggingoff.info/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Angeline-MODJO-K\\_SNOIE-in-Cameroon.ppt\\_1052017\\_Accra.pdf](http://loggingoff.info/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Angeline-MODJO-K_SNOIE-in-Cameroon.ppt_1052017_Accra.pdf)

[www.rainforestfoundationuk.org/what-we-do/projects/real-time-monitoring](http://www.rainforestfoundationuk.org/what-we-do/projects/real-time-monitoring)

[www.youtube.com/watch?v=7x0ONDHZ\\_DI](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7x0ONDHZ_DI)

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# ANNEX 4. INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR INDEPENDENT MONITORING OF REDD+

## Project

Independent Forest Monitoring (IFM)

## Organisations and countries

Cameroon and Cambodia, as well as Nicaragua and Honduras, DRC (Global Witness)

## Context

The European Union FLEGT initiative has included independent monitoring as one of the five essential components of the Legality Assurance System of a Voluntary Partnership Agreement participating country, and in some initiatives it has included civil society-led independent monitoring. The IFM model was applied in this context to assess forest law enforcement, which has considerable overlaps with REDD+ policy processes and needs.

## Approach/methodology

IFM includes an independent third party that by agreement with state authorities provides an assessment of legal compliance and observation of and guidance on official forest law enforcement systems. IFM consists of a combination of desk-based assessments and field observations of official law enforcement. These investigations result in the publication of authoritative information on forest operations, which is made widely available to all levels of government, industry and civil society. Reports are compiled according to specified protocols, detailing facts and presenting evidence that can be used subsequently in legal proceedings. Recommendations

for corrective actions at an operational or policy level are also included. Mission reports and periodic summary reports are presented (in some cases) to a peer review group for validation of the conclusions and recommendations before publication and adoption by the appropriate government agencies for action.

A reporting panel composed of representatives from government, donor agencies, the private sector and civil society is established to validate all outputs. This panel further takes ownership of reports and is committed to act upon recommendations. Subsequently, the CSO's role shifts to one of a monitor to observation of follow-up action taken by the enforcement agency, wider forestry authority, or judiciary in response to the report's recommendations, highlighting where these are or are not followed appropriately. At all times it remains the responsibility of the officials, not the monitor, to prosecute offenders and enforce the law.

The design of the individual IFM initiative is critical to its success, which centres largely on the negotiation between the host government institution and the civil society monitoring entity. The institutional arrangements will vary with local circumstances, but certain principles for structuring IFM in terms of monitoring appointment and mandate and reporting panel setup should be employed. Such principles include: 1. independence; 2. an official mandate; 3. terms of reference; 4. a transparent recruitment process; 5. appropriate technical capacity and resources; 6. unhindered access to information; 7. unhindered access to forest locations; 8. a public profile and accessibility; 9. a multi-stakeholder reporting panel; and 10. the right to publish.

All institutional relationships need to be formalised through clear terms of reference, delineating exactly what will be monitored, what information is required, how quality will be assured, and what protocols will govern validation and publication of findings. In addition, sufficient and well-defined provision must be made for dispute resolution in the event of differences between the parties. Grievance and arbitration procedures should be clearly specified in the contract given the chance that relationships can become strained under various circumstances and may threaten the success of the initiative.

### Strengths and weakness

Independent monitoring is a tried and tested means to provide a measure of credibility that countries are implementing the governance reforms they claim to be implementing. In the context of REDD+, it can provide real-time, on-the-ground evidence about REDD+ implementation, and identify and publicly report on systemic failures that undermine the success of REDD+ activities, thus supporting the functioning of implementing and enforcement agencies. Independent monitoring adds credibility and robustness to the overall system by providing independent information to national control structures, international implementing and oversight institutions, and funding providers.

The choice of both monitor and host government institution sets the basis for future success. Both partners need to demonstrate commitment to the process. In addition, the monitor needs to maintain high standards and integrity in order to maintain public credibility. They must also exhibit familiarity with the political and organisational environment in which the monitoring will take place. IFM works with many stakeholders, but contracts will be unworkable if all parties are contractual partners.

A set of training materials for IFM is provided here:

<http://loggingoff.info/document/complete-set-of-training-materials-for-independent-forest-monitoring/>

### Sources

Global Witness, *Guide to Independent Forest Monitoring* (London, UK: Global Witness, 2005). Available at: [www.globalwitness.org/en/reports/guide-independent-forest-monitoring-ifm/](http://www.globalwitness.org/en/reports/guide-independent-forest-monitoring-ifm/)

Brack, D. and C. Leger, *A review of independent monitoring initiatives and lessons to learn*, (Global Witness, 2013).

Global Witness, *Principles for Independent Monitoring of REDD (IM-REDD). Briefing Document* (Global Witness, 2012). Available at: [www.globalwitness.org/en/archive/principles-independent-monitoring-redd-im-redd/](http://www.globalwitness.org/en/archive/principles-independent-monitoring-redd-im-redd/)

Young, D. W (2007). *Independent forest monitoring: seven years*, (Global Witness, 2007). Available at: [www.illegal-logging.info/sites/files/chlogging/uploads/IFM\\_7\\_Years\\_On.pdf](http://www.illegal-logging.info/sites/files/chlogging/uploads/IFM_7_Years_On.pdf)

Further background information is available from [www.globalwitness.org/ifm](http://www.globalwitness.org/ifm)

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# ANNEX 5. SYSTEM FOR MONITORING GOVERNANCE IMPACT INDICATORS FOR REDD+/FLEGT (GHANA)

## Project

Tackling deforestation through linking REDD+ and FLEGT

## Organisations and countries

Implemented by Fern and its partners Civic Response (Ghana), Forêts et Développement Rurale (Cameroon), Azur Développement and 'Forum pour la Gouvernance et les Droits de l'Homme (Republic of Congo) and the Sustainable Development Institute (Liberia).

## Context

This national system for monitoring governance indicators was implemented in the context of the Voluntary Partnership Agreements under the FLEGT framework. It also took into account the overlapping processes related to REDD+ implementation across these countries, including forest code and policy reforms which provide opportunities for greater civil society organisation participation in forest governance monitoring, in particular around generating evidence or information for advocacy, greater accountability, transparency and participation of local communities in forest decision-making. The monitoring work sought to enhance civil society organisation advocacy to improve forest governance, fight deforestation, clarify and strengthen land, tree and forest tenure for local people, and complement the findings of government forest monitoring with the aim of improving companies' respect for forest legislation.

## Approach/methodology

The monitoring methodology draws on indicators linked to participation and benefit-sharing around both FLEGT and REDD+ policy implementation: compliance with Ghana's Voluntary Partnership Agreement; access by communities to information on logging; access by communities to information on REDD+ projects; access by communities to information on large land investments; availability and functionality of decision-making platforms at the community level; quality of community consent in decisions on salvage logging operations; quality of community consent in the decisions on REDD+ projects; and quality of community consent in decisions on large land investments. Information was gathered using both desk and field-based research methodologies. An example of the type of information gathered and methodologies used is given on the following page:



INDICATOR	METHODOLOGY
<p><b>Availability and functionality of decision-making platforms at the community level</b></p>	<p><b>Deskwork:</b> identify the locations where forest management plans are currently being written, including the administrative districts involved and local partners. Set up a database to receive monthly updates on how forest forums are functioning and the issues and contributions they are making. Compile a database of forest forums nationally, pointing the forestry commission and district offices towards locations where they need to be engaged in forest management.</p> <p><b>Fieldwork:</b> Use simple questionnaires and guides on who to talk to enable the local partners to document the process.</p>
<p><b>Quality of community consent in decisions on REDD+ projects</b></p>	<p><b>Deskwork:</b> Scan relevant documents, including the project documents of REDD+ type projects, to identify areas and communities affected (this should include projects involving large-scale land acquisition). Study the current status of work on REDD+ safeguards.</p> <p><b>Fieldwork:</b> Purposefully sample communities and REDD+ or land project implementers to ascertain the information and communication made to them with regard to the specific project, and how they (community) understand the projects' implications, through focus group discussions and interviews.</p>

For further methodological guidance on indicators see: Annex 1 – Monitoring Methodology and Advocacy Plan, developed by Civic Response. 2015. Forest Governance Monitoring system. <http://loggingoff.info/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Final-monitoring-System.pdf>

### Strengths and weaknesses, lessons learnt

One of the strengths of the project was the development of **“future proof” monitoring tools and guides** that can be used to feed into national information systems to support effective pathways for reform and policy improvements. The project’s engagement with civil society organisation platforms and other actors, such as parliamentarians in Africa and the European Union, helped to amplify and strengthen its legitimacy.

### Sources

Fern, *Independent Forest Monitoring: a chance for improved governance in VPA countries: Lessons learned from Cameroon, Ghana, Liberia, and the Republic of the Congo*, (Fern, 2014). Available at: [loggingoff.info/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Independent-forest-monitoring-REDD-FLEGT-ENRTP-project.pdf](http://loggingoff.info/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Independent-forest-monitoring-REDD-FLEGT-ENRTP-project.pdf).

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# ANNEX 6. IMPROVING THE COST-EFFECTIVENESS OF REDD+ SAFEGUARD MONITORING IN DRC (MOABI)

## Project

Independent monitoring of REDD+ safeguard (DRC)

## Organisations and countries

Moabi, Observatoire de la Gouvernance Forestière (OGF), Central African Satellite Forest Observatory (OSFAC), DRC

## Context

This initiative piloted a monitoring system within Mai Ndombe Province, in DRC, where the company Wildlife Works is implementing the Mai Ndombe REDD+ project, also known as the 'ERA' project.

## Approach/methodology

Due to the size of area and number of villages within it a sample of villages was selected for monitoring, according to four criteria: (1) access by road vehicle; (2) have more than 50 inhabitants each; (iii) have past or present REDD+ activities; and (4) are spatially representative of the project zone's ethnic and environmental diversity. The system relied on community observers in each village (every observer received compensation of 4,500 Congolese francs (US\$3/month) to collect information using pen and paper forms on deforestation drivers and degree to which socio-environmental safeguards are abided by in the REDD+ project zone. To allow REDD+ safeguard-related activities to be more easily held accountable, the forms were designed to record quantifiable information on the status of the activities. The forms also provided space for reporting complaints relating to land tenure conflicts, lack of consultation, or benefit-sharing disputes.

Indicators included:

- deforestation drivers (bush fires, charcoal production, artisanal wood and mining activities)
- number of local development committees (comités locaux de développement)
- number of local development plans (plan local de développement)
- number of reports made available to the whole community after the completion of an activity
- provision of a just and equitable redress mechanism
- number of complaints lodged
- number of complaints resolved
- number of activities established
- number of consultations conducted prior to the establishment of the activities
- number of schools constructed
- number of days of activity of the mobile clinic
- number of health centres
- number of demonstration gardens
- number of tree nurseries
- number of livestock lots
- number of permanent employees recruited
- number of villages mapped (to provide data relevant to customary rights, and land and resource rights)

The observers were visited bi-monthly by an intermediary focal point (based in Mai Ndombe's administrative centre, Inongo), during which the observation forms were presented, checked and discussed, and when necessary joint visits were made by the focal point and the observer to the sites of any reported safeguard infractions, where the focal point would take photographs and record GPS locations for verification.

The observer-collected information was recorded by the focal point using the open-source GeoODK application on an android smartphone. The focal point then transmitted the data via the internet to Kinshasa for further validation and discussion with the nationally mandated monitors at OGF. This data was then processed and made publicly available on Moabi's online mapping platform, where additional layers and information from third-parties could be overlaid. This was then shared with Congolese government authorities, REDD+ project partners, and independent observer organisations in the capital, Kinshasa.

### Strengths, weaknesses and enabling conditions

The engagement of community members and traditional leaders allowed local communities to have a greater sense of ownership and involvement in the safeguard monitoring process than they would otherwise have had. Meanwhile, the employment of a locally-based focal point further reduced the need for mandated monitors to make costly missions from Kinshasa.

The combination of paper-based methods (by community members, to collect data) and digital smartphone technology (GeoODK application) by a focal point helped minimise costs. However, this meant this data was not transmitted to Moabi's online platform in real-time (it could have a lag period of from several days to weeks). This trade-off between cost and speed of data transmission was considered worthwhile, given the greater potential for project sustainability afforded by avoiding the need for large numbers of expensive smartphones to be distributed among remote communities unaccustomed to such devices, and the associated training and maintenance that this would require. This relatively low-cost, low-tech system is both affordable and also replicable for future projects dealing with a wide range of land use activities.

The initiative did face difficulties in collecting data from Wildlife Works, which related to the fact that, although OGF and Moabi had official permission to carry out the project, they were operating without an official government mandate to monitor REDD+ safeguards and grievances. Addressing the need for sustainable funding mechanisms for independent monitors is also required.

### Sources

MOABI online mapping platform. Available at: <http://rdc.moabi.org/data/en/#6/-2.877/22.830&layers=>

Forest Compass, *Improving forest governance through independent monitoring – Moabi-DRC pilot project*, available at: <http://forestcompass.org/case-studies/improving-forest-governance-through-independent-monitoring---moabi-drc-pilot-project>

C. Sinai, B. Thuairé, S. Bondo and L. Bottrill, *Monitoring REDD+ Safeguards with Communities in Mai Ndombe District*. Available at: <http://moabi.org/reports/monitoring-redd-safeguards-with-communities-in-mai-ndombe-district-dr>.

B. Thuairé, *Why do we need to develop an Independent Monitoring methodology for REDD+?*, Available at: <http://rdc.moabi.org/independent-monitoring-methodology/en/>

# ANNEX 7. CHOOSING SUITABLE SOFTWARE

There is a huge variety of software that can be used for various tasks in a community-based monitoring system. Some of these programmes have been developed for specific tasks, while others support multiple tasks. Different software can be cloud, mobile or computer based. In many cases, software is compatible and interchangeable, enabling projects to pick and choose the most appropriate.

The comparative table below shows some of the most widely used software programmes in this rapidly evolving space, to help with selecting the right option for a particular project or context.

NAME	INTERNET	PHONE NETWORK	SMART PHONE	LITERACY	LEVEL OF EXPERTISE
<b>C7-LDFN</b>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Medium
<b>CyberTracker</b>	Yes	No	Yes	No	Low
<b>Geo-Wiki</b>	Yes	No	No	Yes	Low
<b>Geographical Open Data Kit</b>	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	High
<b>Global Forest Watch – mobile version</b>	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Medium
<b>Google Earth Engine</b>	Yes	No	No	Yes	High
<b>iNaturalist</b>	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Low
<b>Moabi DRC</b>	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Medium
<b>Open Data Kit</b>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	High
<b>Open Street Map</b>	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Medium
<b>OpenForis</b>	No	No	Yes	Yes	Medium
<b>Sapelli</b>	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Low
<b>Smapp</b>	No	No	Yes	No	High
<b>SMART (Spatial Monitoring and Reporting Tool)</b>	No	No	No	Yes	Medium

The tasks that can be performed by software include:

- creating data collection forms
- checking data collection forms
- hosting data collection forms
- mobile data collection support
- managing and cleaning data
- analysing and visualising data

Currently, the greatest quantity of energy and resources have been spent on developing applications for mobile data collection, with data management, analysis and visualisation still a major challenge. The time and effort needed for data analysis can create bottlenecks for projects, slowing down data-sharing, whether with forest communities or policymakers. This needs to be planned for from the start. Key factors to take into account when choosing software which best suits the needs of a monitoring approach include:

- open source
- cost
- icon or text-based (level of literacy required)
- multi-lingual
- data analysis and visualisation options
- compatibility with other software (GIS, etc.)
- cloud or computer based
- ease of use (e.g. what level of coding is required)
- flexibility – can it serve all the needs of the project?
- support network and continued innovation

See also Toolbox 4 for assessing digital tools for REDD+ governance monitoring.

## Sources

Forest Compass, *Choosing Suitable Software*. Available at: [https://forestcompass.org/how/choosing-suitable-software?order=field\\_dig\\_tech\\_internet&sort=asc](https://forestcompass.org/how/choosing-suitable-software?order=field_dig_tech_internet&sort=asc)



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# ANNEX 8. IMPROVING INFORMATION ACCESS AND ENGAGEMENT CAPACITY WITH REDD+ PROGRAMMES

## Project

REDD+ governance and finance integrity for Africa

## Organisations and countries

Transparency International Zambia

## Context

In Zambia, research conducted in 2016 by Transparency International Zambia indicated that REDD+ governance issues could be linked back to historical issues related to forest concession permits given without consultations and elite capture by village leaders/chiefs. Such historical events have generated overlaps and co-existence of various land tenure regimes. The study further found that the current weaknesses in transparency and participation, the absence of a grievance mechanism, and limited information access have undermined effective REDD+ implementation to date.<sup>47</sup>

## Approach/methodology

Transparency International Zambia has established multiple platforms at different levels to compile and share information on REDD+ processes. At the district level, Community Notice Boards which are bodies comprised of different stakeholders (not to be confused with a display board), have been set up to monitor REDD+ processes and to communicate to the communities at the local level. These groups undertake surveys to understand the level participation in REDD+ consultations with project developers (using Template 1 below) as part of increasing accountability and transparency, and to capture information on key governance issues using Template 2.

At the village level, the initiative identified representatives/informants from existing community structures, the Village Action Groups, to generate information about REDD+ activities (for example, details about the agreements with REDD+ developers, issues raised by communities). This information is gathered through the use of a template (Template 3), using a five-point scorecard system (very good = 5, or very bad = 1), with key questions relating to governance indicators developed with TI Ghana (for example, on access to information, number of meetings held).

Local communities are also provided with information on how they could meaningfully participate in the REDD+ projects in their area through the use of brochures that gave a step-by-step guide on how communities can engage the project developers using free, prior and informed consent.

## Strengths and weaknesses, lessons learnt

The community scorecard is a good tool for gathering information, however it requires a literate person. The use of pictures can help illiterate people – especially at the grassroots level – to be able to give feedback, but this will require more capacity building for the communities both at the district and village level so that they can really understand how to use it.

## TEMPLATE 1. RECORDING MEETINGS WITH PROJECT DEVELOPERS

Question	Answer	Comment
Name of community and district		
Date of meeting		
Main purposes of meeting		
Meeting chaired by?		
Agenda drawn up by?		
How long did the meeting last?		
Did the agenda fit the needs of the meeting?		
Did either notice given for meetings or the time and place prevent anyone from coming? Were there any consequences of this?		
Who took the minutes? (to be recorded once minutes received) Were there any notable items missing from the minutes? Were they recorded accurately?		
Was there sufficient time for each agenda item? (or were any important items squeezed or omitted?)		
Did everyone who needed them have copies of key documents?		
Were there any problems of communication? (audibility, language, jargon etc.)		
Were there any points of contention during the meeting? (list up to three main ones) How were they worded? Who 'won' the arguments?		
Did you feel progress may have been prevented by 'hidden' agendas of group members?		
Did the meeting actually further the purposes of		
the meeting as listed above?		
Can you think of changes that would help to make future meetings more effective?		
Any other issues		

TEMPLATE 2. CAPTURING AND REPORTING CORRUPTION RISKS IN REDD+	
Name of witness or victim:	District:
Mobile number:	Community:
Nature of corruption: <sup>48</sup>	
Name of institution in question:	
Name of individual involved (name/position):	
Period of event (date):	
Location of event:	
Narration of concern:	
Action required:	
General recommendations:	

### TEMPLATE 3. COMMUNITY SCORECARD FOR REDD+ IMPLEMENTATION MONITORING

Indicator	Score					Remarks (explain why you have given a particular score)
	1-Very bad	2-Bad	3-Fair	4-Good	5-Very good	
1. Government/company shares information on REDD+, including budgets (at provincial, district, community levels) (Are there platforms at the district level to share this information?)						
2. Accessibility of the project documents						
3. Communities have access to information on REDD+ funds and activities						
4. Engagement and participation of local stakeholders in the decision-making process. For example, community consultation process regarding REDD+ implementation is guided by free, prior and informed consent principle. (Is the process outlined in the project document?)						
5. Independent grievance/ complaint mechanism is available and easily accessible to all						
6. Access to Information on benefit sharing from government/ company is available to all stakeholders						
7. Violations of forest laws are dealt with fairly and efficiently (enforcement of laws)						

#### Sources

Transparency International, *REDD+ and Corruption Risks for Africa's Forests. Case Studies from Cameroon, Ghana, Zambia and Zimbabwe*, (Berlin: Transparency International, 2016).

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# ANNEX 9. PARTICIPATIVE MODELS FOR MONITORING BENEFIT-SHARING IN ZIMBABWE

## Project

Community monitoring of REDD+ in Zimbabwe

## Organisations and countries

Transparency International Zimbabwe – Zimbabwe

## Context

The Kariba REDD+ Project in Zimbabwe is a public-private partnership project which is being implemented in the Zambezi valley of Zimbabwe, covering Hurungwe, Mbire, Nyaminyami and Binga. Concerns about the potential for corruption have been raised due to poor access to information by forest communities in the REDD+ protected areas. Although the project has already generated more than \$2 million in the sale of carbon credits, there is a lack of transparency and accountability in the allocation and distribution of the funds and other resources. A REDD+ monitoring system was developed as part of an intervention strategy to improve good governance in the REDD project.

## Approach/methodology

The REDD+ monitoring system is designed to measure key governance components in the Kariba REDD+ project: access to information, citizen participation and inclusion in decision-making processes. The system is administered by Accountability Monitoring Committees, which consist of 8 to 10 community volunteer groups currently represented in all 11 wards of the REDD+ site in Mbire District. The Committees are trained in monitoring compliance with governance issues using community scorecards (Template 3, **Annex 8**), which consists of a table that quantifies:

- the number issues provided on REDD+ by Mbire Rural District Council
- the number and type of platforms created for citizen participation in REDD+
- the number of people participating in REDD+ related decision-making processes

The Accountability Monitoring Committees are also involved in public awareness and sensitisation activities to empower forest communities to actively participate in REDD+ related processes. Public awareness is built using the *REDD+ Booklet and the Community Activism and Advocacy Handbook* (hard copy available on request from Transparency International Zimbabwe) to improve citizens' understanding of REDD+ and the associated safeguards and benefits.

Using the community complaints mechanism (see sources below), Accountability Monitoring Committees also record and submit REDD+ corruption-related issues to Transparency International Zimbabwe, which include issues around benefit-sharing of REDD+ revenue, biased distribution of resources generated from REDD+ and undue interference of politicians in REDD+ related decision-making processes. All recorded issues, including corruption-related complaints, are addressed through multi-stakeholder public hearings that are held quarterly between Carbon Green Africa, Mbire Rural District Council and Transparency International Zimbabwe.

## **Achievements, lessons learnt, challenges**

Through the Kariba REDD+ Project, Transparency International Zimbabwe has successfully managed to set the anti-corruption agenda for REDD+ in Zimbabwe. They have also successfully contributed to the progressive engagement of citizens, Carbon Green Africa and Mbire Rural District Council on REDD+, particularly increasing the level of accountability of Carbon Green Africa to citizens.

However, citizens in rural communities are afraid to report corruption issues for fear of victimisation, harassment or deprivation. Transparency International Zimbabwe learnt that empowering citizens and building their capacity to understand their rights and position in REDD+ makes them more willing to demand transparency and accountability in the project.

## **Sources**

Transparency International Zimbabwe community complaints mechanism entails the use of the Transparency International Zimbabwe Advocacy and Legal Advice Centre (more information available here: [http://tizim.org/?page\\_id=47](http://tizim.org/?page_id=47)), together with its Accountability Monitoring Committees (more information available here: [http://tizim.org/?page\\_id=54](http://tizim.org/?page_id=54)).



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# ANNEX 10. ASSESSING FREE, PRIOR INFORMED CONSENT PROCESSES

Free, prior informed consent is a principle protected by international human rights standards (the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, the Convention on Biological Diversity and the International Labour Organisation Convention 169)<sup>49</sup> and considers the following:

- **Free:** refers to consent given voluntarily and absent of coercion or manipulation; a process that is self-directed by the community from whom consent is being sought; free from coercion, bias, conditions, bribery or rewards; all are free to participate regardless of gender, age or standing.
- **Prior:** means consent is sought sufficiently in advance of any authorisation or commencement of activities; it implies that time is provided to understand, access, and analyse information on the proposed activity. The amount of time required will depend on the decision-making processes of the rights-holders.
- **Informed:** refers mainly to the nature of the engagement and type of information that should be provided prior to seeking consent and also as part of the ongoing consent process. Be accessible, clear, consistent, accurate, constant, and transparent. Information should be delivered in an appropriate language and culturally appropriate format (including radio, video, graphics, documentaries, photos, oral presentations). Information should be objective and complete, covering the complete spectrum of both the positive and negative impacts of REDD+ activities.
- **Consent:** refers to the collective decision made by the rights-holders and reached through the customary decision-making processes of the selected peoples or communities. Consent must be sought and granted or withheld according to the unique formal or informal political-administrative dynamic of each community.

At the core of free, prior informed consent is the right of the peoples concerned to choose to engage, negotiate and decide to grant or withhold consent, as well as the acknowledgement that under certain circumstances it must be accepted that the project will not proceed and/or that engagement must be ceased if the affected peoples decide that they do not want to commence or continue with negotiations, or if they decide to withhold their consent to the project.<sup>50</sup>

Consider the forms shown in Figure 7 and Figure 8 (FAO<sup>51</sup>).

FIGURE 7. GUIDING QUESTIONS FOR RESEARCHING LOCAL LAWS ON FREE, PRIOR INFORMED CONSENT

## 5. FRAMEWORK FOR RESEARCHING LOCAL LAWS ON FPIC

These questions are designed to help understanding whether Free, Prior and Informed Consent is included in any National law in the country where you work:

### 1. Has the country expressed support for the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP)?

Check whether your country is listed as supporting UNDRIP. If it is not listed then check the UN website: [www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/](http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/)

### 2. Is there any legislation in the national laws of the country which gives support to FPIC?

- › **IF YES:** What do the provisions say? Look in detail at the legislation to see what is required under law. Who does it apply to? Check to see whether the legislation can apply to all project-affected communities, or whether it is specific to Indigenous Peoples. What procedures does the law require? Compare your country's laws to Article 32 of UNDRIP to see whether each aspect of FPIC is covered. Look closely at what procedures the law sets out.
- › **IF NO:** Is there any legislation in the National laws of the country which support s similar processes to FPIC? Look at whether the country has legislation which sets out similar processes to those of FPIC. These could be found in laws relating to infrastructure development e.g. planning legislation. What processes are required under law? Look in detail at the processes it sets out. What aspects of FPIC are required by law? Examples may include: community consultation procedures, planning requirements, the requirement for environmental and social impact assessment.

### 3. Is there any case law in your country which supports Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC)?

- › **IF YES:** What have the courts decided? Look at cases of project-affected communities claiming their right to Free Prior and Informed Consent in any sector: mining, dam, logging. Look in detail at what the courts decided by reading their judgements.

Can it apply to your case? Look at the circumstances of cases which are similar to yours. Read about what the court said. Could similar reasoning could be applied in your situation.

- › **IF NO:** Are there case studies of similar projects in your country? If there have not been court cases, research whether other communities have been affected by large development projects. What actions did they take? There may be case studies which help you in protecting your rights.

Are there local community groups taking action against proposed development projects in your country? Check whether organisations in your local area have more information on where to find help for FPIC processes. It is important as well to:

### 4. Check what human rights and indigenous peoples rights organizations in the country are saying about the inclusion of FPIC and its implementation

### 5. Check with the UN Country Team what are the precedents of other UN organizations, Companies, and Ministries undertaking FPIC processes in the country.

FIGURE 8. FREE, PRIOR INFORMED CONSENT CHECKLIST

## 6. FAO FREE, PRIOR AND INFORMED CONSENT CHECKLIST USED IN FIELD PROJECTS

	YES	NO	UNKNOWN	n/a
1) Does the project staff have the knowledge and competence to work with indigenous peoples in a culturally appropriate manner?/ Has the project staff been trained on how to interact with Indigenous Peoples?				
2) Has a detailed communication strategy for the dissemination of information been developed taking into account indigenous peoples' own mechanisms, language and locations?				
3) Have the individuals identified as legitimate leaders of the indigenous communities involved been met and consulted?				
4) Have the involved communities had sufficient time to get expert advice on the project? Have sufficient resources been facilitated for them to get expert advice on the project?				
5) Have adequate mechanism and procedures for effective participation in the FPIC process been established?				
6) Has a Participatory mapping analysis with relevant information been carried out?				
7) Have timely consultations (well prior to project design) been carried out?				
8) Have the indigenous communities involved been enabled to participate fully and effectively in project scoping, design, implementation, M&E, mitigation and determination of the need for further review and management of the project?				
9) Has project information (including environmental and social assessment document; environmental social management plan; and evaluation) been disseminated early and through appropriate means?				
10) Has the proper understanding of the information provided to the indigenous communities involved been verified?				
11) Is the consultation process documented?				
12) Has the documentation of the consultation process been disclosed in a timely matter and using appropriate languages, formats and locations?				
13) Has the consent been provided explicitly and recorded and affirmed in the format preferred by the community?				
14) Do the participatory monitoring and evaluation of the project include indicators that indigenous peoples determine to be relevant?				
15) Has the community been engaged in an adequate negotiation process on land and resources agreements, governance arrangements, legal and financial arrangements, employment and contracting opportunities, culturally appropriate benefits sharing, processes and mechanisms for monitoring, grievances and dispute resolutions, among other items?				

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# ANNEX 11. PARTICIPATORY GOVERNANCE OF REDD+, VIETNAM

## Institutions

Rural Development and Poverty Reduction Fund (RDPR)

## Organisations and countries

Quang Ninh District, Quang Binh Province, Vietnam

## Context

For extended periods of time ethnic minorities and indigenous peoples have resided in Truong Xuan and Truong Son communes in Vietnam. They and their livelihoods are attached to the natural forest. As such, it is essential that forestry and REDD+ policies benefit from the participation and monitoring of local people. These affected communities must benefit fully and effectively from these policies, in order to ensure effective protection and development within the forest.

The RDPR project “REDD+ Governance and Finance Integrity” worked with Truong Xuan and Truong Son communes to address this. The different aspects of the work included: 1) raising local awareness of REDD+ and forest policy, laws, regulations and procedures and rights through different workshops and accessible communication and learning products; and 2) building monitoring capacity to address issues such as land rights and benefit sharing. This REDD+ monitoring system aimed to establish feedback and dialogue channels and information exchange to ensure benefits from forest and REDD+ policies for the local communities. It further contributed to broader efforts to enhance transparency and foster greater participation of local populations in gathering complaints and denunciations as part of a feedback grievance resolution mechanism linked to REDD+ implementation and safeguards in the Quang Binh province.

## Approach/methodology

The monitoring method was implemented by community groups made up of local farmers, in collaboration with the Fatherland Front Committee. An initial review of key forestry documents and policies on REDD+ was undertaken, on the basis of which a set of indicators for monitoring and evaluating issues related to the allocation of resources, the transparency of information, and policy implementation progress, quality and effectiveness were developed.

Target communities were supported through training activities to understand forestry policies, to understand REDD+ and to build their capacity for monitoring and making complaints. They were provided with a handbook about monitoring and complaints and were helped to practice to follow-through on solving the results of monitoring, evaluation and complaints. The capacity of communities was maintained after the completion of the project.

Next, the monitoring groups conducted meetings with local people to evaluate and score every criterion, based on the scoreboard. Depending on the level of performance of the criterion, the community indicated a score on a scale from one to five (from bad to good), giving their reasons and recommendations, and provided this to the authorities and relevant stakeholders.

The results of monitoring sessions in the communities were compiled into a report and reported directly to the Commune People's Committee and Commune Fatherland Front Committee. In addition, these groups reported the monitoring results directly at the voters' meetings held by local authorities or at the dialogues organised by the project. With score-based assessments and concrete evidence from the community, reported directly by the communities, the issues and recommendations of communities were more understandable and received greater attention.

## Strengths and weakness, lessons learnt

At voter meetings or dialogues it was experienced that the government responded promptly, clarified the communities' concerns, and addressed the issue with the communities. A number of issues in the communities were identified in monitoring sessions, such as lack of transparency in the selection of participating households, the fact that the funding provided for forest protection was lower than the amount in the contract, the fact that the seedling supply time was incompatible with the needs of the particular crop, and in some cases the fact that people did not even know about support that was made available. The results showed that after these sessions, many issues were significantly improved.

Within the framework of the project, it was possible to demonstrate dialogue and monitoring channels related to forestry policies and related to REDD+ readiness at the local level. Through studies, seminars and dialogues, communities had the opportunity to access provincial and district authorities, such as the Fatherland Front Committee, the People's Council, the Inspectorate and the unit that implements forestry policies and REDD+. This has raised the accountability role of the local authorities.

However, in order to make monitoring activities more effective, it is necessary to institute campaigns to build monitoring mechanisms at the provincial and national levels also. Along with building the monitoring roles of communities, there is also a need to support the enhancement of the capacity of organisations, including non-governmental organisations, in monitoring and policies advocacy.

## Sources

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# ANNEX 12. INFORMATION-SHARING SAFEGUARD CONSIDERATIONS (GUYANA)

## Project

Community Monitoring, Reporting and Verification

## Organisations and countries

North Rupununi District Development Board, Iwokrama and Global Canopy Programme (Guyana)

## Context

This project piloted the use of smartphone technology using an application called Open Data Kit ([www.opendatakit.org](http://www.opendatakit.org)) and cloud-based data storage with indigenous communities as part of a locally-based system for monitoring different aspects of mixed forest/savannah landscapes for REDD+.

## Approach/methodology

Local communities used a traffic light system (green, amber, red) to classify the information collected as part of a data-sharing protocol.

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FIGURE 9: THE DATA CLASSIFICATION TRAFFIC LIGHT SYSTEM

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### Green

Data that can be shared, because it has already received approval through community consultations. Terms and conditions will apply (e.g. copyright, citations).



### Amber

Data that is still not clear or its status is not yet fixed and requires some further consultations to clarify its status and terms under which it can be used.




### Red

Data that is sensitive and that may only be used in limited ways. Requires 2/3 majority vote approval by the community before it can be shared.

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The decision-making process was based on the traditional village management structures, which helped ensure local acceptance and ownership. The diagram below shows the data-sharing processes and roles:





- i. Data sharing or access requests are submitted via an online website portal or through emails to community and facilitator focal points.
- ii. The community and facilitator data focal points examine and log the request and can, depending on the classification, either proceed with sharing the data, or...
- iii. ...pass the request on to the community decision-making body; or...
- iv. ...ask that it is discussed further in community assemblies with each village council.
- v. Once agreements and terms are reached, the datasets are then requested from the appointed data administrators who have access to the system. These individuals provide access details or datasets to the focal points.
- vi. The focal point can then deliver the data and terms of use to the relevant party.

### Strengths and weaknesses, lessons learnt

Given the project's collaborative nature and the sensitivities around data, particularly on wellbeing and natural resources (for example, locations of sacred sites and hunting grounds), the development of a data-sharing protocol was essential to make sure that data is used in the most careful and considerate way, taking into account the concerns and decisions of the communities. This also ensured that the project effectively addressed any data-sharing requests that might arise throughout the course of the project and thereafter. However, given the quantity of data collected this approach could be time-consuming and difficult to implement across all village members, relying as it does on community leaders to decide and agree upon how data is classified, which involves risks of its own.

# ANNEX 13. CITIZEN JOURNALISM IN INDONESIA – RuaiSMS

## Partners and location

RuaiSMS, Indonesia

## Context

In 2010 Indonesia signed a bilateral agreement with Norway, through which it could receive up to US\$1 billion (in phases) to undertake REDD+ activities. So far, this agreement has mainly funded action by Indonesia to prepare for REDD+. The main pressure on Indonesian forests remains the expansion of agricultural land, and especially oil palm, which has created conflict within communities who are dependent on the same land. Many of these remote communities have little direct access to policymakers. REDD+ has the potential to impact communities in Indonesia that live in and depend on forests.

The RuaiSMS initiative is a non-profit citizen journalist news service agency that focuses on reporting issues of relevance to forest communities.

## Approach/methodology

A team of citizen journalists, made up of local community members, collect and submit the data on illegal activities using mobile phone text messaging (SMS). They send their reports to RuaiTV, which collates and edits them. This media organisation works closely with AMAN, a coalition of indigenous peoples in the Indonesian archipelago that promotes indigenous issues.

Topics that frequently feature are deforestation events caused by palm oil expansion, especially if these occur in community lands; farming conflict and land conflict; and issues relating to public service provision.

A typical monitoring event is as follows:

1. A community member identifies a problem and presents it to the village chief.
2. The village chief asks the citizen journalist active in the area to write the alert and send it to RuaiTV.

3. RuaiTV, as the administrator of the SMS alerts, edits the SMS.
4. The alert is then circulated to subscribers, or forwarded to power brokers in the area (such as the chief of police or local politicians).

SMS alerts are restricted to 160 characters, and during the journalistic training citizens learn to report in terms of what, when, where, who, why, and how an event occurred.

## Strengths and weaknesses, lessons learnt

Around 200 citizen journalists have been trained and over 2,000 new stories submitted to the news service, of which 500 have been disseminated after editing.

This initiative is dependent on community members having access to mobile phones, both to receive and transmit information. Community members often have to travel from their village to a local communications hub in order to send and receive messages, due to the remoteness of the areas in which they live. Coverage of mobile phone signals is patchy, meaning that the most remote, marginalised areas are unable to access the service. Furthermore, only 10% of those who did the training have become citizen journalists, regularly submitting information, and these are rarely women. Lastly, the news administration service, RuaiTV, has received threats and offers of bribes to suppress negative media articles, putting them in a challenging position.

## Sources

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<https://forestcompass.org/case-studies/ruaisms-initiative-links-text-messaging-and-local-media-report-forest-incursions-borneo>

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# ANNEX 14. EMBLEMATIC CASES FOR PUBLIC AWARENESS AND ADVOCACY (PROÉTICA)

## Organisation and country

Proética, Peru

## Context

As part of its strategy to tackle corruption and support law enforcement mechanisms to prevent impunity in the forestry sector, Proética has used emblematic cases to generate further public awareness and support for law enforcement.

An emblematic case is by definition considered to be a case that is representative of the problem, in this case the land trafficking in the Amazon in the context of Peru REDD+ implementation processes.

## Approach/methodology

To choose the correct emblematic case(s) one must consider replicable characteristics. In alliance with specialist actors, the following criteria for replicability should be applied in the prioritisation and selection of cases:

1. the economic, political and institutional impact of the case
2. whether high profile individuals are involved (for example, senior elected or appointed civil servants or business leaders)
3. if there are large sums of money involved
4. if opportunities or strategies for impact are clear and achievable

In the data collection phase, the use of visual images, testimonies, interviews and legal documents should be considered when producing reports on the case.

If the work involves working with local actors (indigenous communities, farmers, etc.), it is essential to establish working alliances with grassroots

organisations that will generate a bond of trust among the populations that have been impacted. Local capacity needs to be built on key policy interventions in relation to corruption issues, and alliances should be established with enforcement institutions. A legal strategy should be developed. An up-take strategy to foster action should be developed. Multi-level alliances should be established.

In the reporting stage it is advisable to associate with organisations / institutions with experience working on the subject, such as platforms or serious investigative journalism agencies. In order to correctly choose these cases, the available information, often generated by journalistic sources, but also judicial, should be taken into consideration, as well as discussions with various actors, including the main users of the forest.

## Strengths and weakness, lessons learnt

Emblematic cases are very powerful because the clarity of the messages / speeches, treated appropriately, can generate a current of opinion, communicate a case that is true in many other contexts, and speak to a wider audience. Emblematic cases can be linked to legal support systems, such as Advocacy and Legal Advice Centres, and information platforms such as MAC.

Complex and timely logistics due to remoteness of the community. Time considerations: six months minimum from case identification to reporting (additional time should be factored in for the process of case selection).

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