

# LOCAL INTEGRITY SYSTEM ASSESSMENT TOOLKIT

**Transparency International is a global movement with one vision: a world in which government, business, civil society and the daily lives of people are free of corruption. Through more than 100 chapters worldwide and an international secretariat in Berlin, we are leading the fight against corruption to turn this vision into reality.**

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Every effort has been made to verify the accuracy of the information contained in this report. All information was believed to be correct as at July 2014. Nevertheless, Transparency International cannot accept responsibility for the consequences of its use for other purposes or in other contexts.

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# ABOUT THE ASSESSMENT

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Transparency International has developed the Local Integrity System (LIS) Assessment Toolkit (the LIS Tool) to:

1. assess the existence and effectiveness of procedures and mechanisms to promote transparency, accountability and integrity in order to fight corruption at the local level
2. develop recommendations on areas for reform to be taken up by local government stakeholders
3. develop a follow-up action plan for strengthening local integrity in collaboration with key local stakeholders.

Since the early 1980s there has been an increasing trend towards the transfer of powers from the central level of government to local governments in the form of decentralisation. As a result, local governments have greater decision-making, implementation and oversight powers. Whether decentralisation results in greater corruption in comparison to centralised governance arrangements is still a matter of debate. However, the reality is that corruption is a problem at all levels of government. Both elected and appointed officials have to deal with separating public duties from private interests. At the local level this is exacerbated by the fact that many officials have vested interests based on family, friendship and business ties that can influence decision-making. In addition, remuneration at the local government level is, in many cases, low in comparison to the national level and the institutions that are designed to hold public officials to account at the local level are not always adequate in terms of their ability to perform their duties and uphold public sector integrity.

A functioning LIS can play an important role in minimising the opportunities for corruption at the local level. A typical LIS incorporates a set of core actors that can be found in most local government configurations, namely: the local council (assembly), a mayor or alderman (executive), the local bureaucracy, local political parties, and in some cases local courts (judiciary) and the police. It also encompasses a set of oversight and accountability functions that need to be performed in order to ensure the LIS is effective. These functions include complaints handling, local government auditing, oversight of local government, investigation and exposure of corruption, awareness-raising and public education, and social accountability.

The LIS Tool assesses the internal governance and capacity of each of the core local government actors and their role in promoting integrity in the system as a whole. It also assesses the capacity to perform, and the effectiveness of, each of the oversight and accountability functions.

The LIS Tool is designed to conduct an in-depth assessment of a small number of local government units in a given country. It is not designed to compare the state of integrity in all (or even the majority of) local government units in a country.

Given the diversity of local governance settings across the world, the LIS Tool places a strong emphasis on flexibility and adaptability to different local governance structures and contexts. In many localities, for example, there is limited separation of powers between the different branches of local government and different levels of autonomy from higher levels of government. As a result, the roles and responsibilities of the core actors, as well as responsibility for performing oversight and accountability functions, may vary considerably from place to place. Therefore, the LIS assessment framework can be adapted to accommodate these local variations.

When used repeatedly, the LIS Tool can monitor and evaluate the progress of the LIS over time. Thus, the LIS Tool is designed to establish a process of continuous improvement at the local level through long-term engagement with key stakeholders.

The LIS Tool is part of a package being developed by Transparency International to help strengthen local government integrity. This package includes the *Anti-Corruption Principles for Local Governance*, *Municipal Transparency Index*, and *Guidance on Implementing Local Governance Solutions*. The LIS Tool also draws heavily on Transparency International's National Integrity Systems (NIS) approach, combining the gathering of valid and reliable evidence on the performance of the local governance framework, actors and anti-corruption institutions with a consultative approach, engaging key stakeholders in the research, advocacy and planning elements of the project.

# ASSESSMENT STEPS

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## Step 1: Project appraisal

The Transparency International national chapter assesses whether the LIS Tool is the most appropriate tool for their purposes, by completing a short checklist. Should the LIS Tool not be the most appropriate tool, the Transparency International Secretariat may be able to recommend alternative approaches to assessing local integrity issues.

## Step 2: Project planning

The national chapter taking part in the project appoints a local project coordinator, selects the local government unit(s) to be assessed and identifies a local civil society organisation partner (where applicable). The chapter and local partner then develop a project plan, recruit a local researcher and set up an LIS advisory group. The researcher takes part in the online LIS training to familiarise him/herself with the LIS research process and outputs, particularly the LIS indicators.

## Step 3: Conducting a stakeholder analysis

The chapter and local partner conduct a stakeholder analysis to identify the most important actors in the LIS, including potential allies and opponents.

## Step 4: Conducting the LIS research

The researcher conducts a situation analysis of the local governance environment in the country in order to be able to contextualise the assessment. He/she then collects data on the local government unit under assessment – using the LIS indicator framework – via desk review, in-depth interviews and other methods.

## Step 5: Drafting the LIS assessment report

The researcher develops the draft LIS report based on the methodology presented in this toolkit in consultation with the advisory group, national chapter and local partner.

## Step 6: Convening the local integrity workshop

The national chapter and local partner convene a consultative workshop to discuss findings, and identify recommendations and solutions for strengthening the LIS. Subsequently, the LIS report is updated with the outcomes of the consultative workshop.

## Step 7: Publishing the LIS report

The national chapter and local partner launch and disseminate the LIS report.

## Step 8: Convening the local action planning workshop

The national chapter conducts a local action planning workshop with key stakeholders to develop a strategy for implementing specific solutions for strengthening the LIS.

## Step 9: Developing practical approaches to strengthening local integrity

The national chapter and local partner develop proposals and secure funding to implement approaches to strengthen local integrity in collaboration with key local stakeholders. For examples of promising approaches, please refer to the Public Sector Integrity Programme.

## STEP 1: PROJECT APPRAISAL

In order to decide if the LIS Tool is the most appropriate tool for your purposes, the following short checklist should be completed.

The LIS Tool may be appropriate if the national chapter/civil society organisation:

- Has some experience of local governance work but wants to gain a more systematic understanding of the integrity issues prevalent at the local level in the country, and how these should be addressed.
- Wants to do an in-depth study of a smaller number of local government units in the country in order to recommend reforms for those specific units, as well as for central government, where applicable.
- Wants to conduct a holistic assessment of the anti-corruption system in this/these local government unit(s), including the capacity, transparency, accountability and integrity of local government actors and the relationships between them.
- Wants to work closely with the local governments themselves, as well as other stakeholders, in order to build relationships and momentum for change.
- Is prepared to invest resources and time in conducting research and advocacy and developing follow-up activities with local and national stakeholders to strengthen local integrity.

The LIS Tool may not be appropriate if the national chapter/civil society organisation:

- Is very experienced in local governance work and already has a good understanding of the local-level integrity issues in the country, and how these should be addressed.
- Wants to do a rapid assessment of all/a large number of local governments in the country in order to compare them/rank them.
- Is interested in assessing only the transparency of local government units.
- Wants to work independently and provide a more critical, external perspective on local integrity issues.

## STEP 2: PROJECT PLANNING

Once the chapter has decided to undertake an LIS assessment, the next step is to begin planning. The project planning phase is comprised of six components:

- A. Defining the purpose of the LIS project
- B. Selecting the unit of analysis (local government/municipality)
- C. Selecting a local partner
- D. Developing a project timeline and budget
- E. Recruiting a researcher
- F. Setting up an advisory group

## A. Defining project purpose

The primary purpose of an LIS project is to strengthen local integrity. Some more specific objectives may include:

*Local government advocacy and reform:* LIS Tool findings point to specific weaknesses in the LIS, and thereby assist in prioritising advocacy, policy reform and other anti-corruption interventions. In order to ensure an effective link between assessment and action, the LIS project should be highly participatory, providing opportunities for local stakeholder input and engagement throughout the entire process.

*Central government advocacy and reform:* LIS findings may also point to reform needs at higher levels of government that have an impact on local government integrity, such as the National Finance Ministry or audit framework. The LIS project should therefore also provide opportunities for national-level stakeholder input and engagement.

*Monitoring and comparing:* The information generated by the LIS Tool provides benchmarks for measuring the impact of local anti-corruption interventions and a basis for comparing among local government institutions within a given locality. Comparison helps generate competition for improvement and provides incentives for positive change. If applied iteratively over time, the LIS Tool can be used to evaluate the progress of the LIS. However, the LIS Tool is *not* designed to compare between different local government units.

*Building coalitions:* Due to its emphasis on wide consultation, the LIS Tool can help a national chapter to identify potential civil society partners at the local level as well as champions in local government for follow-up activities.

## B. Selecting the unit of analysis

A “local government unit” is broadly defined as any administrative unit beneath the level of the central government in a unitary system (or beneath the level of state governments in a federal system). Thus, local government units may include provinces, counties, cities or municipalities. It is important to note that the LIS Tool is best suited to the study of the county, city or municipality levels (sometimes known as local authorities). The tool is not so well suited to the study of provincial-level governments and nor is it appropriate for smaller sub-national divisions such as boroughs or villages.

It is also important to note that, for the purposes of the LIS Tool, a local government unit not only comprises the formal political and administrative actors and functions but also non-state actors including civil society, the media and the private sector.

In many cases, it may already be clear which local government unit(s) is/are to be assessed based on the national chapter’s understanding of the local context and political/advocacy priorities. Nevertheless, there are a number of considerations to bear in mind when making the selection, including:

- *The (perceived) level of corruption:* If a particular local government unit is perceived to have relatively high levels of corruption compared to other parts of the country, or is deemed to pose a significant corruption risk, the LIS Tool can serve as a good starting point to understand why this may be the case.
- *The amount of resources controlled and capacity for reform:* It is advised to conduct the LIS project at a level of local government that has a significant budget and a degree of control over that budget. If the local government budget is very small or there is very little discretion to make resource allocation decisions at the local level, it may not be in the interests of the national chapter to assess that particular unit given that the local government may have little power to implement any recommended reforms and/or the impact of such reforms would be limited.
- *The level of decision-making power:* For the same reasons as above, it is advised to conduct the LIS project at a level of local government for which policy and planning decisions are, to a significant degree, within the control of the unit to be assessed.



- *Political will:* In order to be able to gain access to local government representatives, both for interviews and for conducting follow-up activities, it is desirable that the local government in question (or at least a champion within the local government) has demonstrated political will to work on integrity issues and that the chapter or local partner has good connections to local decision-makers.

The results of this selection process should be recorded and briefly presented in the situational analysis section of the LIS report (see Step 4).

### C. Selecting a local partner

Given that most national chapters are based in the capital city of a country, it is recommended that the chapter partners with a local civil society organisation that has a deep knowledge of the local context and strong local networks. Partnering with a local organisation can help the national chapter identify key local stakeholders, gain access to interviewees, conduct advocacy and implement approaches to strengthening local integrity. In such cases certain activities could be led by the local partner, although the chapter will maintain overall responsibility for coordination and management.

Ideally, the selected local partner should:

- have a solid understanding of, and experience working on, local governance issues
- have an evidence-based approach to advocacy work at the local level
- have good working relations with local government and local civil society actors
- be politically non-partisan
- be free of any (potential) conflict of interest in regard to the LIS project

In cases where the national chapter has decentralised operations (for example, through regional offices), partnering with a local civil society organisation partner may not be necessary.

### D. Developing a project timeline and budget

The main tasks of the national chapter and local partner in implementing the LIS project are as follows:

- plan for and coordinate LIS project implementation
- select the researcher and provide her/him with access to relevant resources, particularly contact information for potential interviewees
- set up the advisory group and convene group meetings
- participate in the study's quality control process
- plan, coordinate and convene a local integrity workshop
- manage publication of the report
- promote and disseminate the report and its main findings in-country
- lead/participate in advocacy activities
- plan and develop approaches for strengthening local integrity

The timetable for the **research phase** of a typical LIS project is around three months.

PHASE	ACTION	APPROXIMATE TIME FRAME
<b>Preparatory phase</b>	Select local government unit(s), identify local partner, recruit researcher and set up LIS advisory group	1-2 months
<b>Research phase</b>	Situational analysis	1 week
	Stakeholder analysis (with advisory group)	1 week (including preparation)
	Core LIS assessment (research, interviews and draft report)	1 month
	Final review of revised LIS report (with advisory group)	1 month
	Local integrity workshop	1 week (including preparation)
	LIS report launch	1 week
<b>Follow-up phase</b>	Action Planning Workshop (with advisory group)	1 week (including preparation)
	Fundraising and planning for follow-up activities to strengthen local integrity	3 months

The budget for an LIS project will vary from country to country, but an indicative budget is provided below.

LIS PROJECT COSTS	UNIT	NO. OF UNITS	COST
<b>Human resources</b>			
Project coordination/administration	per day	15	
Research team	per day	50	
Advocacy and fundraising	per day	35	
<b>Activities</b>			
Workshops and meetings	per project	3	
Local travel	lump sum	1	
Printing	lump sum	1	
Launch	lump sum	1	
<b>Total</b>			

## E. Recruiting an LIS researcher

The national chapter in consultation with the local partner and the Transparency International Secretariat should contract one lead researcher who has overall responsibility for the research component of the LIS project. In addition, it is recommended that one or more research assistants are also recruited in order to ensure that the work is completed within the timeframe.

The process for recruiting the researcher(s) should be open, transparent and competitive, and any potential or real conflicts of interest should be avoided at all costs.

The contract with the researcher(s) should specify the tasks that are specified in this toolkit as well as concrete deadlines. The primary tasks of the researcher(s) are to:

- research, write and deliver the LIS report within the agreed timetable and based on the standards laid out in this toolkit
- revise the draft LIS report based on feedback from the chapter, advisory group and secretariat
- identify and conduct interviews with key individuals and organisations
- participate in the stakeholder analysis and local integrity workshop
- contribute to promotional events surrounding the launch of the LIS report

The lead researcher should have the following qualifications:

- background in political science, public administration, local governance or another related social science
- minimum of 10 years' experience conducting independent research
- proven expertise in political-institutional analysis, with particularly strong knowledge of the country's local governance system
- excellent understanding of the legal framework and actual practice at the local level
- familiarity with transparency, accountability and anti-corruption discourse
- ability to write succinctly and for a non-academic audience
- experience of practical policy reform and evidence-based advocacy in the field of anti-corruption and good governance
- experience of working with/applying quantitative indicators and rating methodologies
- experience of using participatory research techniques

## F. Setting up the LIS advisory group

The advisory group should consist of between 8 and 12 people, who are both internal and external to the local area. There should be a good balance of representatives from civil society, local government and other relevant anti-corruption stakeholder groups. The group should convene at least three times during the project implementation:

1. at the beginning of the project to participate in the stakeholder analysis
2. prior to the local integrity workshop to validate the findings of the LIS report and provide input to the recommendations
3. following the launch to help identify approaches to strengthening local integrity

The key responsibilities of the LIS advisory group are to:

- Advise the national chapter and local partner on the main aspects of the project implementation and assist in identifying interviewees
- Participate in the stakeholder analysis
- Review and comment on the draft LIS report
- Attend the local integrity workshop
- Attend the local action planning workshop

## STEP 3: CONDUCTING A STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS

Once the project planning phase is completed, the next step is to conduct a stakeholder analysis. The aim of the stakeholder analysis is to analyse the influence and interest that various key stakeholders may have in strengthening local integrity, and to use this information to inform your advocacy strategy. This session, convened by the researcher with the support and assistance of the national chapter and local partner, should involve anywhere from 10 to 15 participants (selected from among advisory group members and local stakeholders). The aim of the session is to: (i) identify the most important actors (institutions and individuals) in the selected LIS; and (ii) identify allies and opponents in order to prioritise which actors should be targeted to achieve the objectives of the LIS project.

The national chapter and local partner should first develop a list of priority stakeholders. A simple stakeholder analysis to identify allies and opponents and to prioritise which actors should be targeted to achieve the LIS objectives can be done by: (i) brainstorming a list of stakeholders (the people or groups affected by the LIS project or who can influence the outcome); and (ii) assessing each stakeholder against two basic questions:

1. Is the stakeholder for or against the LIS project, or are they neutral? (Rank them as *Pro*, *Neutral*, or *Anti*)
2. How influential, compared to others, is the stakeholder in regard to the LIS project? (Rank their level of influence as *High*, *Medium* or *Low*)

Placing each of the stakeholders in an analysis grid (as outlined below) provides a quick visual picture of who the priority stakeholders and most important allies and opponents are.

### Sample stakeholder analysis matrix

INFLUENCE	HIGH	NEUTRALISE	CONVINCE OF IMPORTANCE	BUILD ALLIANCES
	MEDIUM			
	LOW	MONITOR		INCREASE INFLUENCE
		ANTI	NEUTRAL	PRO INTEREST

Once positive and negative factors for each (relevant) cell of the framework have been listed, invite participants to brainstorm about strategies and actions that will serve to strengthen, build on and/or take advantage of *positive* factors and address/overcome *negative* ones (see examples in the grid above).

## STEP 4: CONDUCTING THE RESEARCH

The LIS research phase is comprised of four components:

- A. Situational analysis
- B. Adaptation of research framework
- C. Research planning
- D. Data collection and assessment process

### A. Situational analysis

In order to implement the LIS assessment, the researcher should first present a broad picture of the local governance environment in order to be able to contextualise the assessment results.

The situational analysis covers:

- Government structure (tiers, number and size of local governments, relation between the tiers, functions of the various tiers, etc.)
- The history, form and challenges of decentralisation in the country (de-concentration, delegation, devolution)
- Where one exists, the key findings from existing NIS assessments, in particular:
  - Relevant elements of the corruption profile, including causes and types of corruption and whether this differs at different levels (national, regional, etc.), the impact of recent changes such as decentralisation or political upheaval, civil conflict, etc.
  - Particularly strong or weak NIS pillars (institutions) at the national level that may have an impact on integrity and the fight against corruption at local level.

### B. Adaptation of assessment framework

The core of the LIS report is made up of an assessment of two components: (1) a set of *core local government actors*; and (2) A set of *oversight and accountability functions*.

#### (1) Local government actors

The LIS assessment focuses on six “core local government actors” present in most local government set-ups. (Two actors – local courts and local police – are “optional” depending on whether or not they exist at the local level in the given context.) For each of the actors, the assessment covers three dimensions:

- its overall *capacity* to function
- its *role* in contributing to the overall integrity of the local governance system
- its own internal *governance* in terms of integrity, transparency and accountability

## (2) Oversight and accountability functions

In addition to the core local government actors, and because local government set-ups vary considerably from place to place, the assessment also covers six key “oversight and accountability functions”, which may be carried out by local and/or regional/national actors depending on context. For each of these functions, the assessment covers two dimensions:

- the *capacity* for that function to be performed (whether by local actors or at the national level)
- the *effectiveness* of that function (that is, how effectively it is actually performed in practice)

For both “actors” and “functions”, each dimension comprises a number of indicators that are each evaluated both qualitatively as well as quantitatively using a simple traffic light system (Green – Strong; Orange – Average; Red – Weak). Indicators cover elements of both the legal framework (law) and actual implementation on the ground (practice).

The following diagram presents the key actors and functions in a typical LIS as well as the assessment framework:

### LIS assessment framework

#### (1) Core local government actors

ACTOR	CAPACITY	ROLE IN THE LIS	INTERNAL GOVERNANCE		
			TRANSPARENCY	ACCOUNTABILITY	INTEGRITY
Local assembly					
Local executive					
Local bureaucracy					
Local political parties					
Local courts (optional)					
Local police (optional)					

## (2) Oversight and accountability functions

FUNCTION	CAPACITY	EFFECTIVENESS		EXAMPLES OF POSSIBLE ACTORS (TO BE DEFINED FOR EACH LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNIT)
Complaints handling				<i>Ombudsman appellate/administrative courts</i>
Auditing				<i>Supreme audit institution Local audit agencies</i>
Centralised oversight of local government				<i>Anti-corruption agency Ministry of Local Government National legislature</i>
Investigation and exposure of corruption				<i>Anti-corruption agency Media</i>
Awareness-raising and public education				<i>Anti-corruption agency Media Civil society</i>
Social accountability				<i>Civil society Private sector Media</i>



## i. Defining “actors”, assigning “functions” and adapting indicators

It is important to note that, depending on the context, the assessment framework may have to be adapted – in some cases, quite significantly. In particular, certain “actors” or “functions” may have to be added, removed or merged. It is therefore important to clearly define the scope of the assessment at the outset. The following steps should be carried out for each local government unit to be assessed:

- The first step in the process of adapting the assessment framework is to **clearly define what is understood in the local context by the different “actors”** presented in the assessment framework. For example, it may be the case that there is no clear division between the “local assembly” and the “local executive”, in which case the two actors could potentially be merged. Or it may be that “local courts” and/or “local police” do not exist, in which case those actors would be removed altogether. However, before making the decision to remove an actor from the assessment, the research team should first consider whether the role of that actor is performed by another actor (e.g. at the national level). In such cases, the role could still be assessed by incorporating the relevant indicators under the “oversight and accountability functions” (whereby both the effectiveness of – and capacity to perform – that role would be assessed, but the internal governance of the actor would not). In any event, any omission or merging of actors and any reallocation of roles should be clearly noted in the LIS report and the implications for the integrity system analysed.
- The next step is to **identify who (if anyone) performs the different “oversight and accountability functions”** presented in the assessment framework. The LIS indicator framework above provides some examples of the kinds of actor that may typically be responsible for performing each “function”. It is important to note that in any given context more than one actor may perform a specific “function”, in which case each one should be assessed. So, for example, it may be that the national anti-corruption agency partially performs the function of “investigation and exposure of corruption”. However, it may also be that the local media has an important role to play in performing that function and so also needs to be assessed using the same indicators. The actor(s) responsible for each “function” should be noted down in the indicator sheets (see Annex I) and briefly described in the LIS report.
- The third step is to **identify if any additional “actors” and/or “oversight and accountability functions” need to be added** in the particular context. For example, it may be that in certain contexts the private sector or traditional leaders play an important role in the LIS and need to be included as an additional “core local government actor”. In some cases, the additional actor may perform one of the “oversight and accountability functions”, in which case that function can be assessed as one of the roles under the new “actor”. For example, in many Francophone local governance systems, an important additional actor is the “*préfet*”. In theory, this actor could be assessed under the “function” of “centralised oversight of local government”. However, because of the central role and strong influence of the “*préfet*” in many local governance structures, it may warrant additional scrutiny, and thus could be assessed as a “core local government actor” (thus ensuring that the actor’s internal governance is also analysed). Importantly, in this case, the role of the *préfet* would *not* also be assessed under the “oversight and accountability functions” in order to avoid duplication. Ultimately therefore, the decision about whether to include an additional actor under “core local government actors” or under “oversight and accountability functions” will depend on the importance of that actor to the LIS schema and the extent to which it is important to have a deeper insight into its inner workings (internal governance).

Once the scope of the assessment has been clarified, the final step is to **rearrange the indicators accordingly, and in some cases to add or remove indicators**. Indeed, a number of the indicators – especially role indicators – in the LIS assessment framework can be described as “floating indicators”, in the sense that they may fall under different actors depending on the particular local governance set-up (see Annex I for the full set of LIS indicators). So, for example, the indicator on “local elections” may be more appropriately assessed either under “local assembly” or “local executive” depending on whether council elections or mayoral elections are more important in a given context.

Likewise, the indicator on “ensuring transparency in local public procurement” may be more appropriately assessed under the “local executive” or “local bureaucracy” depending on the level of policy influence that the local executive has on local procurement processes. Crucially, the addition of an “actor” or “function” requires the development of new indicators and questions. This has to be done at the beginning of the research process, so that appropriate data collection methods for these additional indicators can be added.

## ii. Adapting the LIS assessment framework for multiple local government units

Where more than one unit is to be assessed, some further considerations should be taken into account in addition to those mentioned above. It is important to note that **each local government unit should be assessed separately, with one scorecard (see below) being developed for each**. However, for some of the law indicators the same information may be applicable across local government units, in which case the data need only be collected once. Likewise for some of the “oversight and accountability functions”, in particular for those which are centralised (and hence external to any one local government unit), the same data may apply across the units assessed. Even where this is the case, however, it is important to bear in mind that practice (or effectiveness in the case of “oversight and accountability functions”) is likely to vary from one locality to the next, and so needs to be assessed for each unit. Therefore, in order to ensure consistency across all the local governments covered by the assessment, the data collection process should be carefully planned before embarking on the research (see *C. Research planning* below).

### SPECIAL NOTE 1: EXAMPLES OF POTENTIAL ADDITIONAL ACTORS/FUNCTIONS

- Traditional authorities (Actor)
- Informal justice institutions (Actor)
- Private sector (Actor)
- Corruption prevention (Function)

However, because these actors and functions are not applicable to all (or even most) contexts, *they are not included in the standard LIS assessment*.

## SPECIAL NOTE 2: TERMINOLOGY

The names given to the different actors and functions in the LIS assessment framework will vary from context to context. The names presented in this toolkit are generic terms that should be adapted where appropriate. For example, the term “local assembly” could be replaced by “local legislature” or “local council”. Likewise, the exact make-up of the “local executive” will vary from place to place and may include the mayor and mayor’s office or senior managers, depending on the local government set-up.

## SPECIAL NOTE 3: THE NORMATIVE NATURE OF CERTAIN LIS INDICATORS

A small number of LIS indicators could be described as taking a normative position, which remains contested in much of the literature on decentralisation and local governance. This is particularly true of some of the role indicators and oversight and accountability functions. So, for example, the function of “centralised oversight of local government” assumes that such oversight is both necessary and desirable, although the extent to which this is indeed the case remains a matter of much debate. Therefore, it is important to note that the analysis should not focus on whether the mandate to perform such roles/function ought to be assigned to a particular actor (from a normative perspective), but instead, assuming that the mandate is assigned: (a) whether there is the capacity to perform the assigned mandate; and (b) whether the assigned mandate is performed effectively. In those cases where such roles/functions might not be mandated, this is noted in the indicator via the annotation: “\*\*assuming that this is within its mandate”

## C. Research planning

Once the key decisions regarding the adaptation of the research framework to the country context have been made and key “actors” and/or “functions” identified and mapped, a brief research implementation plan and timeline should be developed providing details on:

- adaptation of the analytical framework, including the addition or deletion of “actors” and/or “functions” and, where relevant, plans to develop indicators
- list of advisory group members
- brief research timeline for data collection, interviews and draft report. Where multiple local government units are to be assessed simultaneously, a special effort should be made to plan how data will be collected for each and, where relevant, which data sources can be used for multiple units.

## D. Data collection and assessment process

Data need to be collected for each indicator. The data collection process involves a range of different methods, with an emphasis on a **desk review of existing legislation, policy papers and existing analyses of institutional performance of the actors, media reports and key informant interviews, among others**. The kinds of data sources most relevant to each indicator are presented in the indicator sheets (example provided below). Some more specific guidance is as follows:

- **At least 10 interviews should be carried out** (five with stakeholders who are internal to the local government and five who are external), although it is strongly recommended that more are conducted where time and resources allow. Interviews should be used in particular to gather information about the practice of the different “actors” and “functions” (on such matters as whether what is prescribed in law is actually being implemented on the ground). Given the number of indicators to be assessed, it is important to be strategic about the use of interviews. In order to ensure that interviews are kept relatively short (and thus hold the attention and interest of the interviewee) it is important to carefully select those indicator questions which can be answered by each interviewee on a case-by-case basis. Furthermore, as much evidence as possible should be gathered prior to the interview to avoid asking questions that can better be addressed through other sources. Coming prepared with existing evidence also allows the interviewer to better gauge the accuracy of the answers provided by the interviewee and will enable him/her to challenge any statements which appear questionable.
- In some cases **focus groups** could potentially be included as an additional data source. Focus groups could include local government representatives in order to provide answers to a limited number of “customised” questions from the toolkit or to validate some of the initial findings from secondary research and interviews. They could also be used to collect citizen perspectives for certain specific indicators (for example, social accountability).
- Likewise, customised **citizen questionnaires** may be used for specific indicator questions (for example, representation).
- **Field tests or access to information requests**, while somewhat resource intensive, are useful sources for both collecting important data and also for assessing the responsiveness and transparency of the local government.

In total, the LIS is comprised of 55 indicators. Each indicator is presented in an indicator sheet, which contains a set of *assessment questions* that have to be answered based on the information assembled. For each indicator, the findings should be presented in the form of a qualitative assessment for each institution in the “narrative comments” box, based on information which has been collected. The result of the qualitative assessment should also be presented in the form of a traffic light system (Green – Strong; Orange – Average; Red – Weak). Alternatively, two sets of traffic lights can be used for each indicator, one for law and one for practice. This is particularly useful in cases where there is a large discrepancy between what is prescribed in law and what actually happens on the ground.

In order to assign one of the three values, the researcher should read the assessment questions, review the narrative comments answering the assessment questions, read the descriptions for each value (strong, average, weak) and assign a value (colour) that best reflects the qualitative information. Please note that this process might sometimes lead to the realisation that additional information or some clarification of existing data might be required. When this is the case, the researcher should add/change the information and then start again with the score assignment.

Once the narrative comments and quantitative assessment have been completed, the researcher in close consultation with the national chapter and local partner should then devise recommendations based on the evidence provided. It is also recommended that the target of recommendations is noted on the indicator sheet in order to facilitate the advocacy planning. Note that it is not necessary, nor necessarily desirable, to provide a recommendation for each indicator. A sample indicator sheet is presented below.

ACTOR/FUNCTION	LOCAL POLITICAL PARTIES		
<b>Dimension</b>	<b>INTEGRITY</b>		
<b>Indicator number</b>	<b>4.6</b>		
<b>Indicator name:</b>	<b>Nomination and selection of local candidates</b>		
Indicator question(s)	Are there clear, transparent and fair procedures and criteria for the nomination and selection of candidates for local elections? Are these enforced in practice?		
Assessment		There are clear, transparent and fair procedures and criteria for the nomination and selection of candidates for local elections and these are widely enforced	
		Procedures and criteria for the nomination and selection of candidates for local elections and not entirely clear, transparent or fair. Selection and nomination of candidates is somewhat undemocratic and opaque in practice	
		There are no written procedures and criteria for the nomination and selection of candidates for local elections and selection and nomination of candidates is entirely undemocratic and opaque or done on the basis of clientilism	
Source of information	Legislative documents, policies, documents, interviews, observations		
Narrative comments			
Recommendation(s)		Advocacy target(s)	

Once all the indicators have been assessed and values (strong, average, weak) assigned, the final quantitative assessment should be presented in the LIS Scorecard. For each dimension, the values assigned to the relevant indicators are aggregated using a simple method as presented in Annex II.

A sample scorecard is presented below (in this case law and practice are combined, but equally these could be presented separately for each dimension).

## Sample LIS scorecard

### Core local government actors

ACTOR	CAPACITY	ROLE IN THE LIS	INTERNAL GOVERNANCE
Local assembly	Red	Yellow	Green
Local executive	Red	Yellow	Green
Local bureaucracy	Green	Yellow	Yellow
Local political parties	Red	Yellow	Yellow
Local courts	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow
Local police	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow

## Oversight and accountability functions

FUNCTION	CAPACITY	EFFECTIVENESS
Complaints handling	Red	Red
Auditing	Red	Red
Centralised oversight of local government	Yellow	Yellow
Investigation and exposure of corruption	Yellow	Yellow
Awareness-raising and public education	Yellow	Yellow
Social accountability	Green	Yellow



## STEP 5: DRAFTING THE REPORT

The information assembled in Step 3 above is presented in the form of an LIS report, based on the report outline presented below. The report should be around 50 pages long.

- **Executive summary:** Summary of key findings, including visual (traffic light) representation of the assessment, and recommendations.
- **Introduction:** About the LIS Tool (objectives and methodology). Subject of the assessment (which particular local government unit was selected).
- **Situational analysis:** Situational analysis of the local governance structure, justification for the selection of the unit under assessment, and relevant national socio-political dynamics (corruption levels, strengths/weaknesses of national institutions, etc.).
- **LIS assessment:** Presentation of qualitative assessment and traffic light visualisation for each institution/actor.
- **Conclusions and recommendations:** Presentation of the overall assessment of the LIS (including interaction among institutions) as well as a summary of strengths and weaknesses. Recommendations on how the system can be improved should be targeted at different actors (local, national, etc.).

The report should be written using a “scientific journalism style”, which presents valid analysis and arguments about technical matters in language that is accessible to non-experts as well. In particular, all assertions must be substantiated and sources must be cited in footnotes for all facts, figures and quotes. As a general rule, there should be at least one source per indicator.

## STEP 6: CONVENING THE LOCAL INTEGRITY WORKSHOP

Once the draft report has been developed, a local integrity workshop with key local government stakeholders takes place in order to: (a) present and discuss the report findings; and (b) identify recommendations and priority actions for strengthening the integrity of the local governance system.

The workshop aims to use the draft LIS assessment as a platform for discussions among key stakeholders about future priority actions for building local integrity. There are a large number of tools available for such multi-stakeholder assessment workshops, such as visioning/scenario-building, SWOT analysis, stakeholder analysis, brainstorming with cards, force field analysis, search conferences, or appreciative inquiry, and the organisers are encouraged to draw on these.<sup>1</sup>

It is advisable not to spend too much time presenting the LIS assessment findings; instead, the focus should be on developing recommendations. When asking a diverse group to come up with recommendations, often a mere ‘wish-list’ is produced, without much detail and without considering whether the items on it can be achieved or which ones should be prioritised. Carrying out a “prioritisation exercise” can help to deal with these challenges: (1) focus on those recommendations which are attainable; (2) once an initial list has been compiled by participants, ask them to rank them according to priority; (3) given the limited time available at the workshop, do not seek to develop a fully fledged action plan for each recommendation; and (4) rather, make use of the workshop to prioritise and build momentum among stakeholders for key follow-up activities.

Below is a sample agenda for a local integrity workshop, which can be adapted as appropriate.

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<sup>1</sup> See the following useful websites containing further information on these tools: <http://portals.wi.wur.nl/msp/>; [www.mycoted.com/Category:Creativity\\_Techniques](http://www.mycoted.com/Category:Creativity_Techniques); [www.ifad.org/evaluation/guide/annexd/index.htm](http://www.ifad.org/evaluation/guide/annexd/index.htm); [www.viwa.be/content/en/new\\_Manual\\_for\\_Participation.cfm](http://www.viwa.be/content/en/new_Manual_for_Participation.cfm); [www.odi.org.uk/RAPID/](http://www.odi.org.uk/RAPID/)

## Local integrity workshop – sample agenda

9.00 - 10.00	<b>Opening session/Welcome: Introduction of workshop aims, participants, overview of agenda, overview of LIS project, intro to Transparency International, etc.</b>
10.00 -11.00	Presentation of LIS assessment findings and Q&A
11.00 -11.20	Coffee break
11.20 -12.30	Identification of key LIS weaknesses based on assessment findings (ideally in breakout groups, e.g. by actor)
12.30 -13.30	Lunch break
13.30 -14.15	Plenary session to agree on key weaknesses of LIS
14.15 -15.45	Working group sessions to identify priority actions to address weaknesses
15.45 -16.00	Coffee break
16.00 -16.15	Presentation of priority actions by working group representatives
16.15 -17.00	Closing plenary: reactions to set of priority actions; commitment to follow-up activities (local action planning process), information about next steps, evaluation, closure

The key follow-up activities to the workshop are:

- update the LIS report with workshop outcomes
- share the final LIS report and workshop minutes with attendees

## STEP 7: PUBLISHING THE REPORT

The LIS report should then be updated based on the outcomes of the local integrity workshop. Once the discussions and outcomes of the workshop have been added to the draft LIS report, the report needs to be edited, designed and printed.

## STEP 8: CONVENING THE LOCAL ACTION PLANNING WORKSHOP

Based on the priority recommendations of the LIS report and the local integrity workshop, the chapter and local partner then organise a local action planning workshop. Ideally, the workshop should be attended by many of the same participants who attended the local integrity workshop to ensure continuity in the process. Other relevant actors who are key to implementing the agreed recommendations – perhaps from the municipality, national-level institutions, civil society, media, private sector or donor institutions – should be invited.

The objectives of the workshop are to:

1. secure the commitment of key local stakeholders to implementing the key recommendations to address specific weakness identified in the LIS
2. develop a concrete action plan to transform the recommendations into specific follow-up activities (solutions) that are politically and economically feasible

If necessary, the workshop may be broken up into or followed by several workshops with groups of actors relevant to particular courses of action (such as legislative action on the national level, legislative action on the municipal level, work with the media or work with civil society). For example, a separate workshop could be convened to create an action plan for changing legislation on the national level. Along with the chapter and local partner, these could include representatives of a relevant ministry, the municipality or donors. A different workshop could be convened to create an action plan for the changes to municipal legislation.

To boost the chances of responsible actors' commitment to concrete actions, funding opportunities for particular goals and types of actions could be explored before the workshop(s).

The action plan(s) should be clear, concise and realistic. The following should be included:

- measurable goals
- steps necessary to achieve each goal
- clear responsibility
- realistic timeline
- necessary funds and sources of funding (if applicable)
- means of oversight

For example, at an action planning workshop, where changing local legislation is discussed, the following would happen:

- The goal of the legislation to be passed would ideally be agreed.
- The following would be listed as necessary steps: proposal drafting; consultation with civil society, citizens and national authorities; the passing of the legislation; securing capacity for implementation and raising awareness of legislation upon passing.
- Responsibility would be claimed by the mayor or council.
- A timeline with a proposed start and end date would be agreed.
- Regular meetings to measure progress would be planned with the chapter and local partner.

## STEP 9: DEVELOPING PRACTICAL APPROACHES TO STRENGTHENING LOCAL INTEGRITY

Once the national chapter and local partner have secured the commitment of key local stakeholders to implementing the proposed solution(s), the final step is to plan for the implementation of specific projects designed to strengthen the integrity of the local governance system.

The key steps are:

- agree on the project purpose, expected outcomes and key partners
- develop a project proposal and secure funding for the project

The exact project will depend on the local context, the depth of political will and the capacity of the chapter and local partner. However, some promising approaches that have proved successful at the local level include:

## Strengthening integrity of local administrations

This approach consists of convening a multi-stakeholder group that includes local government officials, civil society and specialists to assess, recommend and implement a set of improvements to the local administration to ensure transparency, accountability and integrity. The coalition would work on the basis of a memorandum of understanding between the parties to distribute responsibilities and establish commitment.

This approach has been pursued by TI Slovakia, which carried out in-depth “transparency audits”<sup>2</sup> in five cities. Transparency audits are implemented by TI Slovakia’s senior experts and consist of three phases: (1) analysing the room for corruption based on interviews with key municipality actors, analysis of internal regulations and transparency policies; (2) developing recommendations (including internal regulations) in close cooperation with key municipality actors with a clear implementation timeline; and (3) supporting the municipality throughout implementation. Transparency audits have been funded either by external donors or by municipalities themselves, with their approximate cost being €20,000 per audit. Martin, the first audited municipality, won the 2011 UN Public Service Award for this initiative.

## Community watchdog groups (local committees)

Community watchdog groups – also known as public watchdog groups – are community-based organisations or grassroots associations, the key role of which is civic activism and dissemination of information pertaining to government activities to the public. They help in strengthening local government integrity by raising awareness in the community regarding corruption risks and promoting transparency in local governments. They can also monitor local government issues and policies, correspond with media and government authorities, attend public hearings and speak for or against public policy proposals.

In Bangladesh, around 5,500 citizens are involved in 45 local committees called “committees of concerned citizens”.<sup>3</sup> Since 1996, TI Bangladesh has provided the committees with financial and technical support, often in the form of an area manager and financial manager for each committee. It also supports the committees in networking – all meet at least once a year. Committee members work as volunteers. In communities where committees are active, lower incidence of illicit payments in and higher satisfaction with education and health services have been reported.

## Integrity pledges and anti-corruption pacts

An integrity pledge is a non-binding contract to provide a space for participation and monitoring in local decision-making and service provision. A written but voluntary commitment is signed by stakeholders (including public representatives, officials and other service providers, informal groups of people as service recipients and citizens’ committees) whereby commitments and mechanisms are agreed upon to eliminate all forms of unauthorised payments, ensure and promote the participation of residents in decisions that affect the content and quality of services provided or ensure transparency in public contracts and in implementing work under such contracts. Similarly, anti-corruption pacts are social pledges undertaken by stakeholders in the public and private sectors to establish anti-corruption systems and to strengthen corporate ethics and social responsibility.

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<sup>2</sup> See: [www.transparency.sk/en/ponuka-protikorupcnej-strategie-tis-pre-mesta/](http://www.transparency.sk/en/ponuka-protikorupcnej-strategie-tis-pre-mesta/)

<sup>3</sup> See: [www.ti-bangladesh.org/beta3/index.php/en/about-us/what-we-do/engaging-people/committee-of-concerned-citizens](http://www.ti-bangladesh.org/beta3/index.php/en/about-us/what-we-do/engaging-people/committee-of-concerned-citizens)

TI Bangladesh has used integrity pledges to improve the social accountability of 18 local governments and education institutions,<sup>4</sup> stressing that, in order to achieve impact, integrity pledges are implemented only once a certain level of cooperation, accountability and transparency has been achieved by using other tools (for example, citizen report cards – surveys of citizens' satisfaction with delivered services; open budgeting – providing the general public with understandable information on budgets to improve participation in budgetary procedures; or “face the public” sessions – where municipality representatives are asked to answer citizens' questions and concerns). For an integrity pledge to work, an action plan is collectively developed by stakeholders, regular meetings are held to monitor progress and information boards are set up to disseminate information. Continued involvement from all stakeholders is a key condition of success.

## Expenditure tracking and public service monitoring

Analysing and following the budget process from formulation to execution and auditing allows citizens to detect corruption related to budget allocations and execution. Public expenditure tracking surveys (PETS) have proven useful in detecting corruption at the local level. These surveys track the difference between allocated funds and funds actually spent, providing valuable data on financial flows, outputs and accountability arrangements.

TI Rwanda carried out a PETS<sup>5</sup> in 2012 to find out whether leakages of funds occur between the Ministry of Finance and schools. There were no leakages, but schools were found to receive funds with significant delays, resulting in a serious negative impact on the functioning of schools. A different PETS on diversion of education funds, carried out in Uganda in the 1990s, led to an innovative newspaper campaign and a reduction of leakages from 80% to 20%.<sup>6</sup>

## Local government transparency, integrity and accountability rankings

A local government transparency ranking is a tool used to measure a set of pre-defined indicators in a number of municipalities in a given country or region, and to rank the municipalities accordingly. A ranking may focus solely on transparency issues (that is, the scope of published information) or go deeper and survey the integrity policies or accountability mechanisms in place. Rankings are useful to diagnose shortcomings and advocate for change but have also brought about significant improvement by encouraging ranked municipalities to compete with each other.

Different municipality rankings have been carried out by TI Colombia,<sup>7</sup> TI Portugal,<sup>8</sup> TI Spain,<sup>9</sup> TI Venezuela,<sup>10</sup> TI Bosnia and Hercegovina<sup>11</sup> and TI Slovakia.<sup>12</sup> Some focused on tens but others on hundreds of municipalities. On average, they used around 100 indicators. While some took up to 18 months to complete and used many researchers to collect information, others were carried out by a team of only three people within three to four months. Currently, the Transparency International Secretariat is preparing a Local Government Transparency Index along with chapters in Palestine, Morocco and Lebanon, which will focus solely on transparency issues, should include 30-50 municipalities and cost around €8,000 to implement. This index should be easily replicable in other countries.

For more information on solutions for improving local government transparency, please refer to the toolkit of local government transparency solutions, to be published by summer 2014.

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<sup>4</sup> See: [www.ti-bangladesh.org/files/CCC/Booklet\\_on\\_IP\\_August%2012.pdf](http://www.ti-bangladesh.org/files/CCC/Booklet_on_IP_August%2012.pdf)

<sup>5</sup> See: [www.tirwanda.org/images/stories/public%20expenditure%20tracking%20survey.pdf](http://www.tirwanda.org/images/stories/public%20expenditure%20tracking%20survey.pdf)

<sup>6</sup> Ritva Reinikka and Jakob Svensson, *The Power of Information: Evidence from a Newspaper Campaign to Reduce Capture of Public Funds* (see: <http://people.su.se/~jsven/Information.pdf>).

<sup>7</sup> Transparencia por Colombia, *Índice de Transparencia Municipal* (see: [www.transparenciacolombia.org.co/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=90&Itemid=499](http://www.transparenciacolombia.org.co/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=90&Itemid=499)).

<sup>8</sup> TI Portugal, *Índice de Transparência Municipal* (see: <http://poderlocal.transparencia.pt/>).

<sup>9</sup> TI Spain, *Índice de Transparencia de los Ayuntamientos* (see: [www.transparencia.org.es/ITA%20A%C3%91OS%20ANTERIORES/ITA%20A%C3%91OS%20ANTERIORES.htm](http://www.transparencia.org.es/ITA%20A%C3%91OS%20ANTERIORES/ITA%20A%C3%91OS%20ANTERIORES.htm)).

<sup>10</sup> TI Venezuela, *Indicadores de Transparencia de Alcaldías* (see: <http://transparencia.org.ve/que-hacemos/gobierno-sin-corrupcion/indicadores-de-transparencia-de-alcaldias/>).

<sup>11</sup> TI Bosnia and Hercegovina, *Monitoring and Advocacy for Good Governance in BiH municipalities*

(see: <http://ti-bih.org/en/projekti/monitoring-i-zagovaranje-za-dobro-upravljanje-u-bih-opcinama/>).




<sup>12</sup> TI Slovakia, *Open Local Government* (see: <http://mesta2012.transparency.sk/en/sets/mesta-2012/>).

# ANNEX I: INDICATOR SHEETS




## A. CORE LOCAL GOVERNMENT ACTORS

Note: The indicators below should be adapted to the local context as applicable. In some cases, not all of the indicators will be relevant. In other cases, certain indicators may need to be moved between actors and/or functions (see the *Defining “actors”, assigning “functions” and adapting indicators* section under Step 4 above).

### 1. Local assembly




DIMENSION	CAPACITY		
<b>Indicator number</b>	1.1		
<b>Indicator name:</b>	<b>Adequate resources</b>		
Indicator question(s)	<p><b>To what extent does the local assembly have adequate resources to carry out its duties in practice?</b></p> <p>Does the local assembly have adequate financial, infrastructural and human resources? Are there any provisions for training of local councillors?</p>		
Assessment		The local assembly has an adequate resource base to effectively carry out its duties	
		The local assembly has some resources. However, significant resource gaps lead to a certain degree of ineffectiveness in carrying out its duties	
		The existing financial, human and infrastructural resources of the local assembly are minimal and fully insufficient to effectively carry out its duties	
Source of information	Legislation, documentation, observations, interviews		
Narrative comments			
Recommendation(s)		Advocacy target(s)	




DIMENSION	CAPACITY		
<b>Indicator number</b>	1.2		
<b>Indicator name:</b>	Local elections		
Indicator question(s)	<p><b>To what extent are local elections timely, free, fair and representative?</b></p> <p>Does the local government election law guarantee that people can vote, freely and without fear of interference, for the candidates best representing their interests? Were the last two local government elections timely, free and fair in practice, with candidates representing a range of interests?</p>		
Assessment		Local elections are largely timely, free, fair and representative	
		Local elections are somewhat timely, free, fair and representative	
		Local elections are not timely, free, fair and/or representative	
Source of information	Legislation, documentation, observations, interviews		
Narrative comments			
Recommendation(s)		Advocacy target(s)	

DIMENSION	CAPACITY		
<b>Indicator number</b>	<b>1.3</b>		
<b>Indicator name:</b>	<b>Independence</b>		
Indicator question(s)	<p><b>To what extent is the local assembly independent from the executive?</b></p> <p>Do legal provisions clearly describe the mandates of the local assembly and the relation between the assembly and the executive? Is there a clear division of roles in practice?</p>		
Assessment		The local assembly is fully independent from both the executive and from national interests	
		There is some overlap of roles between the local assembly and the executive	
		There is no clear division of roles between the local assembly and the executive	
Source of information	Legislation, policies, interviews		
Narrative comments			
Recommendation(s)		Advocacy target(s)	



DIMENSION	ROLE		
<b>Indicator number</b>	1.4		
<b>Indicator name:</b>	<b>Oversight of the local executive</b>		
Indicator question(s)	<p><b>To what extent are local councillors able to exercise and enforce their decisions and oversight role?</b></p> <p>Do local councillors have the mandate to oversee the work of the executive? Can they influence and scrutinise the local budget and decisions and activities of the local executive (especially in cases where the executive/mayor has important decision-making powers)? Do local councillors perform this role effectively in practice?</p>		
Assessment			Local councillors have the mandate to oversee the work of the executive and are effective at providing this oversight. They are fully able to enforce their decisions
			Local councillors have the mandate to oversee the work of the executive and are somewhat effective at providing this oversight. They are partially able to enforce their decisions
			Local councillors do not have the mandate to oversee the work of the local executive or they are entirely ineffective at providing oversight of the local executive and are unable to enforce their decisions
Source of information	Policies, interviews, observations		
Narrative comments			
Recommendation(s)		Advocacy target(s)	




DIMENSION	ROLE		
Indicator number	1.5		
Indicator name:	Representation		
Indicator question(s)	<p><b>To what extent do local councillors represent the interests and priorities of their constituency in practice?</b></p> <p>Is there effective and regular engagement between citizens and the elected councillors in an institutionalised manner?</p>		
Assessment		Local councillors are largely considered to represent the interests and priorities of their constituency	
		Local councillors are considered to represent the interests and priorities of their constituency to some extent	
		Local councillors are not considered to represent the interests and priorities of their constituency	
Source of information	Observations, interviews		
Narrative comments			
Recommendation(s)		Advocacy target(s)	

DIMENSION	GOVERNANCE		
<b>Indicator number</b>	1.6		
<b>Indicator name:</b>	Transparency of the local assembly		
Indicator question(s)	<p><b>To what extent can citizens access relevant information on the local assembly and councillors?</b></p> <p>Are there provisions in place to ensure that the public can obtain relevant and timely information on the activities and decision-making processes of the local assembly and its committees (proceedings, voting records, meeting agendas, etc.)? Are these enforced in practice? How much information does the local assembly proactively make public? Are citizens able to attend assembly meetings?</p>		
Assessment		Citizens can easily access a wide range of relevant information on the local assembly and councillors	
		Citizens can access some relevant information on the local assembly and councillors and/or information is difficult to access	
		Citizens cannot easily access relevant information on the local assembly and councillors and/or information is very limited in scope	
Source of information	Legislative documents, policies, interviews		
Narrative comments			
Recommendation(s)		Advocacy target(s)	




DIMENSION	GOVERNANCE		
<b>Indicator number</b>	1.7		
<b>Indicator name:</b>	<b>Accountability of local councillors</b>		
Indicator question(s)	<p><b>To what extent are local councillors answerable for their actions in practice?</b></p> <p>Does the local assembly regularly engage the public in consultation on relevant issues? If so, do councillors take the results of consultations into account? To what extent can citizens complain about the assembly and/or councillors in practice?</p>		
Assessment		Local councillors are fully answerable for their actions in practice	
		Local councillors are partially answerable for their actions in practice	
		Local councillors are not answerable for their actions in practice	
Source of information	Legislative documents, policies, interviews		
Narrative comments			
Recommendation(s)		Advocacy target(s)	

DIMENSION	GOVERNANCE		
<b>Indicator number</b>	<b>1.8</b>		
<b>Indicator name:</b>	<b>Integrity of local councillors</b>		
Indicator question(s)	<p><b>To what extent is the integrity of local councillors ensured?</b></p> <p>Are there comprehensive rules and codes for members of the local assembly (rules on conflict of interest, gifts and hospitality, asset disclosures, whistleblower protection, etc.)? Are these enforced in practice? Are they made public? Have there been recent examples of conflicts of interest in the local assembly? Have the results of investigations been made public?</p>		
Assessment		All of the above rules and codes are in place and effectively enforced and there have been no recent examples of conflicts of interest in the local assembly	
		Only some of the above rules and codes are in place with piecemeal enforcement and/or there has been at least one recent example of conflicts of interest in the local assembly	
		None of the above rules and codes are in place and there have been numerous recent examples of conflicts of interest in the local assembly	
Source of information	Legislative documents, policies, documents, interviews		
Narrative comments			
Recommendation(s)		Advocacy target(s)	




## 2. Local executive




DIMENSION	CAPACITY		
<b>Indicator number</b>	<b>2.1</b>		
<b>Indicator name:</b>	<b>Clear functions</b>		
Indicator question(s)	<p><b>To what extent does the local government have a coherent and realistic set of functions?</b></p> <p>Do legal provisions and/or policies clearly describe the functions to be performed and services to be delivered by the local government? Are these realistic?</p>		
Assessment		The local government has a coherent and realistic set of functions	
		The local government's functions are rather vague, ambiguous or too wide and unrealistic	
		The local government has not articulated its functions	
Source of information	Local Government Act or similar document, policies		
Narrative comments			
Recommendation(s)		Advocacy target(s)	

DIMENSION	CAPACITY		
<b>Indicator number</b>	<b>2.2</b>		
<b>Indicator name:</b>	<b>Predictable resources</b>		
Indicator question(s)	<p><b>To what extent does the local government have access to the resources it requires to carry out its functions and deliver its vision?</b></p> <p>Are there legal provisions and/or policies ensuring that local governments have access to a transparent and predictable amount of resources from a higher level of government (as part/share of the public sector budget)? To what extent do these cover the costs of the mandated functions (both obligatory and discretionary functions)? Does the local government indeed have access to the envelope of the resources as set out in the legal and policy documents (to deliver what is has committed to)?</p>		
Assessment		The local government has access to all the resources it requires to carry out its functions and deliver its strategy effectively	
		The local government has access to some of the resources it requires to carry out its functions and deliver its strategy	
		The local government has access to only a limited portion of the resources it requires to carry out its functions and deliver its strategy	
Source of information	Legislation, policies, interviews		
Narrative comments			
Recommendation(s)		Advocacy target(s)	

DIMENSION	ROLE		
Indicator number	2.3		
Indicator name:	Management of the local bureaucracy		
Indicator question(s)	<p><b>To what extent does the local executive effectively perform its role in terms of providing effective oversight of, and support to, the local bureaucracy?</b></p> <p>Does the executive have the appropriate mechanisms to effectively supervise and manage the work of the local public sector? Do local government managers provide effective supervision over their respective staff? Does the executive provide incentives for local public servants to conduct their activities in a transparent, accountable and inclusive way, for example via transparency awards, financial incentives, monitoring systems/ scorecards, etc.?</p>		
Assessment		The executive is very active and successful in developing a local public sector governed by high levels of transparency, accountability, integrity and inclusiveness	
		The executive is somewhat active, but rather unsuccessful in developing a local public sector governed by high levels of transparency, accountability, integrity and inclusiveness	
		The executive is inactive and unsuccessful in developing a local public sector governed by high levels of transparency, accountability, integrity and inclusiveness	
Source of information	Policies, interviews		
Narrative comments			
Recommendation(s)		Advocacy target(s)	






DIMENSION	ROLE		
Indicator number	2.4		
Indicator name:	Oversight of private providers of public goods		
Indicator question(s)	<p><b>To what extent does the local executive effectively perform its role in terms of holding private service providers of public goods accountable for the service delivery they are contracted for?</b></p> <p>Is there an open and transparent process for contracting local private service providers? Are there formal mechanisms in place to hold private service providers to account for poor performance? Does the local government have sufficient capacity to monitor the performance of private service providers?</p>		
Assessment		The local executive is highly effective in holding private service providers to account	
		The local executive is somewhat effective in holding private service providers to account	
		The local executive is not effective in holding private service providers to account	
Source of information	Policies, interviews		
Narrative comments			
Recommendation(s)		Advocacy target(s)	




DIMENSION	ROLE		
Indicator number	2.5		
Indicator name:	Regulation of local business		
Indicator question(s)	<p><b>To what extent does the local government effectively perform its role in terms of regulating local businesses in an even-handed and effective manner?</b></p> <p>Are local business regulations (for health and safety, environmental protection, etc.) transparent and effectively enforced? Are inspections of local businesses by local government carried out in way considered to be fair and transparent?</p>		
Assessment		Business regulations are effectively enforced and inspections are considered fair and transparent	
		Business regulations are not always consistently enforced and/or there are occasional instances of unfair treatment by local government inspectors of local businesses	
		Business regulations are rarely enforced and/or there are frequent cases of certain businesses being unfairly singled out for inspection	
Source of information	Legislative documents, policies, interviews		
Narrative comments			
Recommendation(s)		Advocacy target(s)	

DIMENSION	GOVERNANCE		
<b>Indicator number</b>	<b>2.6</b>		
<b>Indicator name:</b>	<b>Budget transparency</b>		
Indicator question(s)	<p><b>To what extent does the local government present a clear and accessible budget?</b></p> <p>Is there a legal framework or other provisions that require the Local Government to make a transparent budget that can easily be understood by citizens and councillors? Are there clear guidelines and/or formats on how to present budget data? To what extent is the budget accessible to citizens and councillors and easy to understand in practice?</p>		
Assessment		The local government is required to present transparent annual budgets and these are easily accessible and easy to understand in practice	
		The local government is required to present transparent annual budgets but the budget is difficult to access in practice and/or difficult to understand	
		There is no such requirement and the budget is not accessible or only accessible to councillors	
Source of information	Legislative documents, policies, interviews		
Narrative comments			
Recommendation(s)		Advocacy target(s)	

DIMENSION	GOVERNANCE		
<b>Indicator number</b>	<b>2.7</b>		
<b>Indicator name:</b>	<b>Accountability of the local executive</b>		
Indicator question(s)	<p><b>To what extent is the local executive answerable for its actions?</b></p> <p>Is the local executive required to give reasons for its decisions and actions? Does this happen in practice? Are there systems in place for regular citizen consultation in regard to planning and budgeting? Does this happen in practice? If so, does the local executive take the results of consultations into account? Can citizens complain about the local executive in practice?</p>		
Assessment		The local executive is fully answerable for their actions in practice	
		The local executive is partially answerable for their actions in practice	
		The local executive is not answerable for their actions in practice	
Source of information	Legislative documents, policies, interviews		
Narrative comments			
Recommendation(s)		Advocacy target(s)	

DIMENSION	GOVERNANCE		
<b>Indicator number</b>	<b>2.8</b>		
<b>Indicator name:</b>	<b>Integrity of the local executive</b>		
Indicator question(s)	<p><b>To what extent is the integrity of the local executive ensured?</b></p> <p>Are there comprehensive rules and codes for members of the executive (rules on conflict of interest, gifts and hospitality, asset disclosures, “revolving door” appointments, whistleblower protection, etc.)? Are these enforced in practice? Have there been recent examples of conflicts of interest or the “revolving door” phenomenon?</p>		
Assessment		All of the above rules and codes are in place and effectively enforced and there have been no recent examples of conflicts of interest or the “revolving door” phenomenon	
		Only some of the above rules and codes are in place with piecemeal enforcement and/or there has been at least one recent example of conflicts of interest or the “revolving door” phenomenon	
		None of the above rules and codes are in place and there have been numerous recent examples of conflicts of interest or the “revolving door” phenomenon	
Source of information	Legislative documents, policies, interviews		
Narrative comments			
Recommendation(s)		Advocacy target(s)	

### 3. Local bureaucracy




DIMENSION	CAPACITY		
<b>Indicator number</b>	<b>3.1</b>		
<b>Indicator name:</b>	<b>Adequate resources</b>		
Indicator question(s)	<p><b>To what extent does the local bureaucracy have adequate financial, infrastructural and human resources to effectively carry out its duties?</b></p> <p>Does the local bureaucracy have a sustainable wage bill and offer competitive salaries? To what extent is the local bureaucracy providing the goods and services it has committed to deliver?</p>		
Assessment		The public sector has an adequate financial, infrastructural and human resource base to effectively carry out its duties	
		The local bureaucracy has significant resource gaps leading to a certain degree of ineffectiveness in carrying out its duties	
		The existing financial, human and infrastructural resources of the local bureaucracy are insufficient to effectively carry out its duties	
Source of information	Budget documents, policies, interviews		
Narrative comments			
Recommendation(s)		Advocacy target(s)	

DIMENSION	CAPACITY		
<b>Indicator number</b>	<b>3.2</b>		
<b>Indicator name:</b>	<b>Independence</b>		
Indicator question(s)	<p><b>To what extent is the local bureaucracy free from external interference?</b></p> <p>Are there clear rules and regulations for the recruitment and promotion of local public servants on the basis of merit? To what extent does the local government recruit and promote staff in a transparent way and without nepotism/favouritism in practice? To what extent can administrative staff perform their functions without illegitimate political pressure?</p>		
Assessment		There are clear rules on merit-based recruitment that are effectively applied in practice and local public servants are able to operate free of political pressure	
		While rules on merit-based recruitment exist, they are a few examples of nepotism/favouritism and/or interference from local political actors, although this is not widespread or severe	
		No such rules exist and recruitment on the basis of nepotism/favouritism and/or political interference is widespread	
Source of information	Legislation, policies, interviews		
Narrative comments			
Recommendation(s)		Advocacy target(s)	

DIMENSION	ROLE				
Indicator number	3.3				
Indicator name:	Ensuring transparency and integrity in local public procurement				
Indicator question(s)	<p><b>To what extent is there an effective framework in place to safeguard transparency and integrity in local public procurement procedures?</b></p> <p>Are there sound and objective procurement systems in place (ensuring transparent and timely bidding processes, independent award of contracts, and opportunities to review award decisions)? Are draft procurement plans published in advance? Are procurement processes transparent, timely, merit-based and free from kickbacks in practice? Are there meaningful sanctions for improper conduct by both suppliers and public officials, and review and complaint mechanisms?</p>				
Assessment			Sound local procurement systems (including sanctions) are in place and procurement processes are carried out in an open, timely and fair manner in practice		
					While procurement systems exist at the local level, these contain certain loopholes vulnerable to corruption and bidding processes are not always timely and/or transparent
Source of information	Legislation, policies, interviews				
Narrative comments					
Recommendation(s)		Advocacy target(s)			



DIMENSION	ROLE		
Indicator number	3.4		
Indicator name:	Promoting social accountability and participation		
Indicator question(s)	<p><b>To what extent does the local bureaucracy promote social accountability mechanisms that provide local citizens with the opportunity to interact with and make demands on local governments?</b></p> <p>For example, does the local government promote the use of citizen report cards, social audits, e-governance, citizen juries, etc.? Are school boards, school committees, health management boards, etc. involved in local decision-making processes?</p>		
Assessment		The local bureaucracy is active in promoting social accountability initiatives and the participation of school boards, school committees, health management boards, etc. in decision-making processes	
		The local bureaucracy is somewhat active in promoting social accountability initiatives and the participation of school boards, school committees, health management boards, etc. in decision-making processes, although this is piecemeal in practice	
		The local bureaucracy is completely inactive in promoting social accountability initiatives and the participation of school boards, school committees, health management boards, etc. in decision-making processes	
Source of information	Policies, documentation, observations, interviews		
Narrative comments			
Recommendation(s)		Advocacy target(s)	

DIMENSION	ROLE		
Indicator number	3.5		
Indicator name:	Tax collection		
Indicator question(s)	<p><b>To what extent is local revenue collection fair and transparent?</b></p> <p>Are there clear, transparent and simple frameworks of rules and regulations for revenue collection by the local government in place? To what extent is revenue collection rule-based and free of manipulation, extortion and favouritism in practice?</p>		
Assessment		Local revenue collection methods are uncomplicated, transparent and are enforced uniformly and without discrimination	
		Local revenue collection methods are not entirely clear, overly complicated and/or leave some space for extortion and/or personal benefits in practice	
		Local revenue collection methods are opaque and complicated and there are frequent examples of negotiation, extortion and favouritism in practice	
Source of information	Legislative documents, policies, interviews		
Narrative comments			
Recommendation(s)		Advocacy target(s)	

DIMENSION	ROLE				
<b>Indicator number</b>	<b>3.6</b>				
<b>Indicator name:</b>	<b>Protecting land and property rights</b>				
Indicator question(s)	<p><b>To what extent are land and property rights protected by the local government?</b></p> <p>Are there clear and transparent regulations governing local land records, land development, urban planning and construction permits? Are there clear regulations regarding the compensation of citizens for forced displacement from their land/property? Can citizens contest land-use decisions by the local government in practice?</p>				
Assessment			Local land, property and urban planning regulations are clear and transparent and there is an open and fair mechanism for citizens to contest land-use decisions by the local government that is enforced in practice		
					Local land, property and urban planning regulations exist but do not cover all relevant issues and the ability of citizens to contest decisions by the local government is limited in practice
Source of information	Legislative documents, policies, interviews				
Narrative comments					
Recommendation(s)		Advocacy target(s)			




DIMENSION	GOVERNANCE		
<b>Indicator number</b>	<b>3.7</b>		
<b>Indicator name:</b>	<b>Administrative transparency</b>		
Indicator question(s)	<p><b>To what extent is there transparency in financial, human resource and information management of the local public sector?</b></p> <p>Are details of the assets of senior officials, procurement records, appointments and vacancies made public? Are lists of municipal companies and municipal-owned assets required to be made publicly available (land, buildings, etc.)? Are these provisions effectively implemented in practice?</p>		
Assessment		Comprehensive provisions are in place that allow the public to obtain relevant information on the activities of the public sector and on decisions that concern them and how these decisions were made. This information is readily available in practice	
		Provisions are in place but these do not cover all aspects related to the transparency of the public sector and this information is difficult to access in practice	
		No such legal provisions exist and relevant information on the activities of the public sector is practically impossible to access in practice	
Source of information	Legislative documents, policies, interviews		
Narrative comments			
Recommendation(s)		Advocacy target(s)	

DIMENSION	GOVERNANCE		
<b>Indicator number</b>	<b>3.8</b>		
<b>Indicator name:</b>	<b>Accountability of local public servants</b>		
Indicator question(s)	<p><b>To what extent are local public servants answerable for their actions in practice?</b></p> <p>Are there provisions in place to ensure that local public servants have to report and be answerable for their actions (including complaints mechanisms, audit mechanisms, etc.)? Are these effectively enforced in practice?</p>		
Assessment		There are clear and comprehensive provisions to ensure that local public servants have to report and be answerable for their actions. These are effectively enforced in practice	
		There are some provisions to ensure that local public servants have to report and be answerable for their actions but these are not comprehensive and/or are implemented in a piecemeal way	
		There are no or very limited provisions to ensure that local public servants have to report and be answerable for their actions	
Source of information	Legislative documents, policies, interviews		
Narrative comments			
Recommendation(s)		Advocacy target(s)	




DIMENSION	GOVERNANCE		
<b>Indicator number</b>	<b>3.9</b>		
<b>Indicator name:</b>	<b>Integrity of local public servants</b>		
Indicator question(s)	<p><b>To what extent is the integrity of local public servants ensured?</b></p> <p>Are there comprehensive rules and codes for local public servants (rules on conflict of interest, gifts and hospitality, whistleblower protection, unauthorised use of official property/facilities, employment of family members, etc.)? Are these enforced in practice? How widespread is corruption in the local public sector?</p>		
Assessment		All of the above rules and codes are in place and effectively enforced and levels of corruption are very low in the local public sector	
		Only some of the above rules and codes are in place with piecemeal enforcement and/or levels of corruption are low but not insignificant in the local public sector	
		None of the above rules and codes are in place and/or the levels of corruption are significant in the local public sector	
Source of information	Legislative documents, policies, interviews		
Narrative comments			
Recommendation(s)		Advocacy target(s)	




#### 4. Local political parties

DIMENSION	CAPACITY		
<b>Indicator number</b>	<b>4.1</b>		
<b>Indicator name:</b>	<b>Adequate resources</b>		
Indicator question(s)	<p><b>To what extent do the financial resources available to local political parties allow for effective political competition?</b></p> <p>Is there sustainability and diversity of funding sources (private and public) for local political parties? Do parties have equitable access to the media during campaigns?</p>		
Assessment		All local parties have adequate and sustainable funding and equitable access to the media during campaigns, thus allowing for fair political competition	
		Resources for local political parties and access to the media are largely adequate but somewhat biased towards certain parties, thus compromising political competition	
		Effective political competition is absent due to heavily biased funding and/or access to the media during campaigns	
Source of information	Legislation, documentation, observations, interviews		
Narrative comments			
Recommendation(s)		Advocacy target(s)	

DIMENSION	CAPACITY		
Indicator number	4.2		
Indicator name:	Independence		
Indicator question(s)	<p><b>To what extent are local political parties free from unwarranted external interference in their activities?</b></p> <p>Are there examples of harassment or attempts to prohibit or restrict local political parties, especially minority parties?</p>		
Assessment		Local political parties operate freely and are subject only to reasonable oversight linked to clear and legitimate public interests	
		External actors occasionally interfere with the activities of local political parties	
		External actors regularly and severely interfere in the activities of local political parties	
Source of information	Policies, documents, interviews, observations		
Narrative comments			
Recommendation(s)		Advocacy target(s)	



DIMENSION	ROLE		
Indicator number	4.3		
Indicator name:	Interest aggregation and representation		
Indicator question(s)	<p><b>To what extent do local political parties aggregate and represent a broad range of social interests at the local level?</b></p> <p>Are there specific interest groups who dominate the local political scene? Are there clientelistic relationships between individuals/narrow groups and certain political parties?</p>		
Assessment		In general, political parties are able to aggregate and represent the entire range of relevant social interests in the political sphere	
		While local political parties are effective in aggregating and representing many of the social interests present at the local level, there are significant social groups being excluded from representation. A number of major political parties are based on clientelism and narrow interests	
		In general, political parties are based on clientelism and narrow interests and many relevant social interests do not find a voice in the local political scene	
Source of information	Interviews, observations		
Narrative comments			
Recommendation(s)		Advocacy target(s)	

DIMENSION	GOVERNANCE		
Indicator number	4.4		
Indicator name:	Transparency of local political parties/candidates		
Indicator question(s)	<p><b>To what extent is there transparency in the operations of local political parties?</b></p> <p>Are there regulations in place that require local parties to make their financial information publicly available (e.g. regarding the amount and sources of public subsidies, private financing, etc.)? Can the public obtain relevant financial information from political parties in practice?</p>		
Assessment		There are comprehensive regulations requiring local political parties to make their financial information publicly available and these are effectively enforced in practice	
		While a number of laws/provisions exist, they do not cover all aspects related to the financial information of local political parties and/or accessing this information is usually a difficult, cumbersome and/or lengthy process in practice	
		No such regulations exist and local political parties do not make their financial information publicly available in practice	
Source of information	Legislative documents, policies, interviews, observations		
Narrative comments			
Recommendation(s)		Advocacy target(s)	

DIMENSION	GOVERNANCE		
<b>Indicator number</b>	<b>4.5</b>		
<b>Indicator name:</b>	<b>Accountability of local political parties</b>		
Indicator question(s)	<p><b>To what extent is there effective oversight of local political parties?</b></p> <p>Does an independent agency (such as an electoral management body) oversee and supervise the finances and activities of local political parties? Are there regulations governing the financing of local political parties (for example, limits on individual and corporate donations, independent auditing of campaign finances, etc.) that are enforced in practice?</p>		
Assessment		An independent agency (such as an electoral management body) oversees and supervises the finances and activities of local political parties and there are clear regulations governing the financing of local political parties, which are enforced in practice	
		While an independent agency (such as an electoral management body) is mandated to oversee and supervise the finances and activities of local political parties, this does not happen consistently. There are some regulations governing the financing of local political parties but these are not always enforced in practice	
		There is no independent oversight and supervision of the finances and activities of local political parties and no regulations governing the financing of local political parties/candidates	
Source of information	Legislative documents, policies, interviews		
Narrative comments			
Recommendation(s)		Advocacy target(s)	

DIMENSION	GOVERNANCE		
<b>Indicator number</b>	<b>4.6</b>		
<b>Indicator name:</b>	<b>Nomination and selection of local candidates</b>		
Indicator question(s)	<p><b>To what extent are local candidates selected in a fair and transparent manner?</b></p> <p>Are there clear, transparent and fair procedures and criteria for the nomination and selection of candidates for local elections? Are these enforced in practice?</p>		
Assessment		There are clear, transparent and fair procedures and criteria for the nomination and selection of candidates for local elections and these are widely enforced	
		Procedures and criteria for the nomination and selection of candidates for local elections and not entirely clear, transparent or fair. Selection and nomination of candidates is somewhat undemocratic and opaque in practice	
		There are no written procedures and criteria for the nomination and selection of candidates for local elections and selection and nomination of candidates is entirely undemocratic and opaque or done on the basis of clientilism	
Source of information	Legislative documents, policies, documents, interviews, observations		
Narrative comments			
Recommendation(s)		Advocacy target(s)	

## 5. Local courts (optional)




DIMENSION	CAPACITY		
<b>Indicator number</b>	5.1		
<b>Indicator name:</b>	Adequate resources		
Indicator question(s)	<p><b>To what extent do local courts have adequate financial, infrastructural and human resources to effectively carry out their duties?</b></p> <p>Do local courts provide competitive salaries and incentives for judges to remain in post? Are there significant delays and backlogs in dealing with cases? Do court staff and judges receive training on issues of integrity?</p>		
Assessment		Local courts have adequate levels of resources to operate effectively in practice	
		Local courts have some resources, but significant resource gaps lead to a certain degree of ineffectiveness in carrying out their duties	
		The existing financial, infrastructural and human resources of local courts are minimal and fully insufficient to effectively carry out their duties	
Source of information	Legislation, documentation, observations, interviews		
Narrative comments			
Recommendation(s)		Advocacy target(s)	

DIMENSION	CAPACITY		
Indicator number	5.2		
Indicator name:	Independence		
Indicator question(s)	<p><b>To what extent are local judges free from undue interference?</b></p> <p>Is there a transparent and objective procedure for selecting (based on professional criteria) and removing judges at the local level? Are local judges often transferred to the local area from more attractive posts for political reasons? Are there regulations for allocating cases on an objective basis and protecting local judges from undue influence and are these effective in practice? Are judges subject to intimidation and harassment in practice?</p>		
Assessment		<p>There are transparent and objective selection and removal procedures for local judges and no recent examples of local judges being transferred from more attractive posts for political reasons. There are regulations for allocating cases on an objective basis and protecting local judges from undue influence and these are effective in practice. Judges are not subject to intimidation and harassment in practice</p>	
		<p>Selection and removal procedures for local judges are unclear, leaving room for political manipulation, and/or there is at least one recent example of a local judge being transferred from a more attractive post for political reasons. There are regulations for allocating cases on an objective basis and protecting local judges from undue influence but these contain loopholes and are not entirely effective in practice. Judges are occasionally subject to minor intimidation and harassment in practice</p>	
		<p>There are no explicit selection and removal procedures for local judges and/or numerous recent examples of local judges being transferred from more attractive posts for political reasons. There are no regulations for allocating cases on an objective basis and protecting local judges from undue influence. Judges are frequently subject to intimidation and harassment in practice</p>	
Source of information	Legislation, policies, interviews		
Narrative comments			
Recommendation(s)		Advocacy target(s)	

DIMENSION	ROLE		
<b>Indicator number</b>	<b>5.3</b>		
<b>Indicator name:</b>	<b>Fighting corruption</b>		
Indicator question(s)	<p><b>To what extent are local courts active in fighting corruption?</b></p> <p>Do local courts have the jurisdiction to take on local-level corruption-related cases? Are corruption-related cases brought before local courts and found admissible in practice?</p>		
Assessment		Local courts have full jurisdiction to take on local corruption-related cases and do so in practice	
		Local courts have full jurisdiction to take on corruption-related cases but do not do so in practice	
		Local courts do not have jurisdiction to take on corruption-related cases	
Source of information	Policies, interviews, observations		
Narrative comments			
Recommendation(s)		Advocacy target(s)	

DIMENSION	GOVERNANCE		
<b>Indicator number</b>	5.4		
<b>Indicator name:</b>	Transparency of local courts		
Indicator question(s)	<p><b>To what extent is there transparency in the operations of local courts?</b></p> <p>Are local courts required to provide timely information on appointments and removal of judges, judgements, judicial statistics, court hearings, etc. to the public and do they do so in practice? Are public hearings/proceedings generally required by law and do they take place in practice?</p>		
Assessment			Local courts are required to provide timely information to the public and do so in practice. Public hearings/proceedings are required by law and take place in practice
			Local courts are required to provide information to the public but only provide some of the required information and/or do not provide this information in a timely manner in practice. Public hearings/proceedings are required by law but only occasionally or rarely take place in practice
			Local courts are not required to provide any information to the public and public hearings/proceedings are not required by law
Source of information	Legislative documents, policies, interviews, observations		
Narrative comments			
Recommendation(s)		Advocacy target(s)	






DIMENSION	GOVERNANCE		
<b>Indicator number</b>	5.5		
<b>Indicator name:</b>	<b>Accountability of local courts</b>		
Indicator question(s)	<p><b>To what extent are local courts answerable for their actions in practice?</b></p> <p>Are local judges required to give reasons for their decisions and is there an effective and timely appeals mechanism against judicial decisions at the local level? Are there independent bodies investigating complaints and/or accusations of corruption against local judges and are these effective in practice?</p>		
Assessment		Local judges are required to give reasons for their decisions and there is an effective and timely appeals mechanism against judicial decisions. There is an independent and effective body investigating complaints and/or accusations of corruption against local judges	
		Local judges are required to give reasons for their decisions but not always do so and the appeals mechanism against judicial decisions is largely ineffective in practice. There is a body investigating complaints and/or accusations of corruption against local judges but it is largely ineffective	
		Local judges are not required to give reasons for their decisions and there is no appeals mechanism against judicial decisions at the local level. There is no body investigating complaints and/or accusations of corruption against local judges	
Source of information	Legislative documents, policies, interviews		
Narrative comments			
Recommendation(s)		Advocacy target(s)	

DIMENSION	GOVERNANCE		
<b>Indicator number</b>	5.6		
<b>Indicator name:</b>	Integrity of local judges		
Indicator question(s)	<p>To what extent is the integrity of local judges ensured?</p> <p>Are there comprehensive rules and codes for local judges (rules on conflict of interest, gifts and hospitality, asset disclosures, post-employment restrictions, etc.)? Are these enforced in practice? Have there been recent examples of conflicts of interest in the local courts?</p>		
Assessment		All of the above rules and codes are in place and effectively enforced and there have been no recent examples of conflicts of interest in the local courts	
		Only some of the above rules and codes are in place with piecemeal enforcement and/or there has been at least one recent example of a conflict of interest in the local courts	
		None of the above rules and codes are in place and there have been numerous recent examples of conflict of interest in the local courts	
Source of information	Legislative documents, policies, documents, interviews		
Narrative comments			
Recommendation(s)		Advocacy target(s)	

## 6. Local police (optional)

DIMENSION	CAPACITY		
<b>Indicator number</b>	<b>6.1</b>		
<b>Indicator name:</b>	<b>Adequate resources</b>		
Indicator question(s)	<p><b>To what extent do police at the local level have adequate levels of financial, infrastructural and human resources to operate effectively in practice?</b></p> <p>Are salaries for police at the local level competitive? Do they have adequate equipment?</p>		
Assessment		Police at the local level have an adequate resource base to effectively carry out their duties	
		Police at the local level have some resources. However, significant resource gaps lead to a certain degree of ineffectiveness in carrying out their duties	
		The existing financial, human and infrastructural resources of police at the local level are minimal and fully insufficient to effectively carry out their duties	
Source of information	Policies, documentation, observations, interviews		
Narrative comments			
Recommendation(s)		Advocacy target(s)	

DIMENSION	CAPACITY		
<b>Indicator number</b>	<b>6.2</b>		
<b>Indicator name:</b>	<b>Independence</b>		
Indicator question(s)	<p><b>To what extent are police at the local level free from undue external interference?</b></p> <p>To what extent are police appointments at the local level made on the basis of clear professional criteria? To what extent can police at the local level perform their duties free of political interference?</p>		
Assessment		There are clear rules on merit-based recruitment that are effectively applied in practice and police at the local level are able to operate free of political pressure	
		While rules on merit-based recruitment exist, there are a few examples of nepotism/favouritism and/or interference from local political actors, although this is not widespread or severe	
		No such rules exist and recruitments made on the basis of nepotism/favouritism and/or political interference are widespread	
Source of information	Policies, documents, interviews, observations		
Narrative comments			
Recommendation(s)		Advocacy target(s)	

DIMENSION	ROLE		
<b>Indicator number</b>	<b>6.3</b>		
<b>Indicator name:</b>	<b>Investigation of corruption</b>		
Indicator question(s)	<p><b>To what extent are police at the local level active in investigating corruption?</b></p> <p>To what extent do police at the local level have the powers/remit to detect and investigate corruption cases? If so, are these powers adequate (e.g. search warrants, arrest, access to personal information, etc.)? Do police at the local level investigate corruption cases in practice?</p>		
Assessment		Police at the local level have full powers to detect and investigate corruption cases and do so proactively in practice	
		While police at the local level have some powers to detect and investigate corruption cases, their work is generally reactive, is focused only on a small number of cases and rarely results in charges and successful convictions	
		Police at the local level do not have the power to detect and investigate corruption cases and/or do not do so in practice	
Source of information	Legislation, polices, interviews, observations		
Narrative comments			
Recommendation(s)		Advocacy target(s)	

DIMENSION	GOVERNANCE		
<b>Indicator number</b>	<b>6.4</b>		
<b>Indicator name:</b>	<b>Transparency of police at the local level</b>		
Indicator question(s)	<p><b>To what extent is there transparency in the operations of police at the local level?</b></p> <p>To what extent are there provisions in place to ensure that the public can access the relevant information on the functions and activities of police at the local level (powers, strategies, case files, decisions, assets of senior police officers, etc.)? Is the required information available, comprehensive, up-to-date and easy to access? Can citizens request information in practice? Are requests subject to delays?</p>		
Assessment		Comprehensive provisions are in place allowing the public to obtain information on the organisation and functioning of the police at the local level and these are effectively enforced in practice	
		While a number of laws/provisions exist, they do not cover all aspects related to the transparency of police at the local level and/or provisions are not always enforced	
		There are no provisions allowing the public to obtain relevant information on the organisation and functioning of police at the local level and information is extremely difficult or impossible to access in practice	
Source of information	Legislative documents, policies, interviews, observations		
Narrative comments			
Recommendation(s)		Advocacy target(s)	

DIMENSION	GOVERNANCE		
<b>Indicator number</b>	<b>6.5</b>		
<b>Indicator name:</b>	<b>Accountability of police at the local level</b>		
Indicator question(s)	<p><b>To what extent are police at the local level answerable for their actions in practice?</b></p> <p>Is there an independent complaints mechanism? Is investigation and prosecution of police corruption conducted independently? Do all citizens have equal access to the services of police at the local level in practice?</p>		
Assessment		Existing provisions are effective in ensuring that police at the local level have to report and be answerable for their actions and the services of the police at the local level are equally accessible to all citizens in practice	
		While police at the local level have to report and be answerable for certain actions of theirs, the existing provisions are only partially effective/applied in practice. Access to the service of the police is somewhat dependent on certain factors (e.g. family ties, race, religion, etc.) in practice	
		No provisions are in place or existing provisions are not enforced at all and/or there is widespread discrimination when it comes to accessing the services of the police in practice.	
Source of information	Legislative documents, policies, interviews, observations		
Narrative comments			
Recommendation(s)		Advocacy target(s)	




DIMENSION	INTEGRITY		
<b>Indicator number</b>	<b>6.6</b>		
<b>Indicator name:</b>	<b>Integrity of police at the local level</b>		
Indicator question(s)	<p><b>To what extent is the integrity of police at the local level ensured?</b></p> <p>Are there provisions in place to ensure the integrity of police at the local level (e.g. codes of conduct, rules on conflict of interest and gifts and hospitality, post-employment restrictions, training on issues of integrity, etc.)? Is there effective enforcement of existing rules, proactive inquiries into alleged misbehaviour, and sanctioning of misbehaviour in practice?</p>		
Assessment		There are comprehensive provisions in place and a comprehensive approach to ensuring the integrity of members of the police at the local level	
		While a number of laws/provisions exist, they do not cover all aspects related to integrity, and there is a piecemeal and reactive approach to ensuring the integrity of members of the police at the local level	
		There are no provisions in place and a complete absence of actions aiming to ensure the integrity of members of the law enforcement agencies, such that misbehaviour goes mostly unsanctioned	
Source of information	Legislative documents, policies, documents, interviews, observations		
Narrative comments			
Recommendation(s)		Advocacy target(s)	



## B. OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY FUNCTIONS




### 7. Complaints handling

DIMENSION	CAPACITY		
Indicator number	7.1		
Indicator name:	Access to a complaints mechanism		
Actor(s) responsible:			
Indicator question(s)	<b>To what extent is there an independent procedure (such as through an ombudsman or similar function) to deal with complaints of perceived unjust treatment by the local government?</b>		
Assessment		There is a local independent complaints procedure specifically designed to deal with complaints of perceived unjust treatment by the local government	
		There is an independent complaints procedure at national level that covers, but is not limited to, complaints of perceived unjust treatment by the local government. However, no such procedure exists at the local level	
		There is no independent complaints procedure at either national or local level, or the national-level complaints procedure does not cover complaints of perceived unjust treatment by the local government	
Source of information	Local Government Act or similar document		
Narrative comments			
Recommendation(s)		Advocacy target(s)	




DIMENSION	EFFECTIVENESS		
Indicator number	7.2		
Indicator name:	Investigation of complaints		
Actor(s) responsible:			
Indicator question(s)	<p><b>How effective is the complaints procedure in practice?</b></p> <p>How simple and effective is the procedure of lodging complaints about the local government? To what extent are complaints satisfactorily dealt with in practice?</p>		
Assessment		The complaints procedure is simple and complaints are generally processed swiftly and fairly, while rulings are effectively enforced	
		The complaints procedure is somewhat complicated, complaints are processed with some delays or rulings are not always fair or effectively enforced	
		There is no complaints procedure or complaints are rarely dealt with either swiftly or effectively	
Source of information	Local Government Act or similar document, interviews, documents		
Narrative comments			
Recommendation(s)		Advocacy target(s)	

## 8. Auditing

DIMENSION	CAPACITY		
<b>Indicator number</b>	<b>8.1</b>		
<b>Indicator name:</b>	<b>Provisions for local government audits</b>		
<b>Actor(s) responsible:</b>			
<b>Indicator question(s)</b>	<p><b>To what extent are there regular audits of the local government and comprehensive sanctioning provisions?</b></p> <p>Are there rules in place and funds available for regular audits of the local government, including sanctions? To what extent is the local government audited annually, in a timely manner, by objective and qualified auditors and with the result publicly displayed and/or available to the public?</p>		
<b>Assessment</b>		There are clear rules for local government audits and these are conducted annually by objective and qualified auditors and with the result publicly displayed and/or available for the public	
		There are clear rules for local government audits but in practice audits are not conducted regularly, auditors have low capacity and/or results are not made public	
		There are no provisions for local government audits in place and audits are never, or only rarely, conducted in practice	
<b>Source of information</b>	Local Government Act or similar document , policies		
<b>Narrative comments</b>			
<b>Recommendation(s)</b>		<b>Advocacy target(s)</b>	

DIMENSION	EFFECTIVENESS		
Indicator number	8.2		
Indicator name:	Effectiveness of local government audits		
Actor(s) responsible:			
Indicator question(s)	<p><b>How effective are local government audits?</b></p> <p>To what extent are the outcomes and recommendations of the audits acted upon by the local government? Are sanctions effectively enforced?</p>		
Assessment		The outcomes and recommendations of the audits are always acted upon by the local government and sanctions regularly enforced	
		The outcomes and recommendations of the audits are sometimes acted upon by the local government and sanctions only occasionally enforced	
		The outcomes and recommendations of the audits are rarely/never acted upon by the local government and sanctions rarely/never enforced	
Source of information	Interviews, documents		
Narrative comments			
Recommendation(s)		Advocacy target(s)	




## 9. Oversight of local government

DIMENSION	CAPACITY		
Indicator number	9.1		
Indicator name:	Capacity for oversight of local government		
Actor(s) responsible:			
Indicator question(s)	<p><b>To what extent does the central government have the necessary resources to effectively perform its assigned role in terms of overseeing the operations of the local government?</b></p> <p>Do central government agencies/national parliament have the necessary human and financial resources to perform their assigned role in terms of detecting and addressing irregularities and misbehaviour on the part of local governments? To what extent do they have the capacity to perform their assigned role in terms of advocating to local governments on anti-corruption issues and providing training, advice and technical support?</p>		
Assessment		<p>Central government agencies/national parliament have a strong capacity to perform their assigned role in terms of detecting and addressing misbehaviour, advocating for reforms and providing training, advice and technical support to local governments</p>	
		<p>Central government agencies/national parliament have moderate capacity to perform their assigned role in terms of detecting and addressing misbehaviour, advocating for reforms and providing training, advice and technical support to local governments</p>	
		<p>Central government agencies/national parliament have weak or no capacity to perform their assigned role in terms of detecting and addressing misbehaviour, advocating for reforms and providing training, advice and technical support to local governments</p>	
Source of information	Local Government Act or similar document, policies		
Narrative comments			
Recommendation(s)		Advocacy target(s)	

DIMENSION	EFFECTIVENESS				
Indicator number	9.2				
Indicator name:	Effectiveness of oversight of local government				
Actor(s) responsible:					
Indicator question(s)	<p><b>How effective is central government in performing its assigned role in terms of oversight of the local government?</b></p> <p>To what extent do central government agencies/national parliament actually perform their assigned role in terms of detecting and addressing irregularities and misbehaviour on the part of local governments in practice? To what extent do they actually perform their assigned role in terms of advocating to local governments on anti-corruption issues and providing training, advice and technical support? To what extent have the existence of central government oversight bodies and similar offices improved the integrity of the local government?</p>				
Assessment			Central government agencies/national parliament actively perform their assigned role in terms of detecting and addressing misbehaviour, advocating for reforms and providing training, advice and technical support to local governments, with a positive impact on the integrity of the local government		
					Central government agencies/national parliament sometimes perform their assigned role in terms of detecting and addressing misbehaviour, advocating for reforms and providing training, advice and technical support to local governments, with some impact on the integrity of the local government
Source of information	Interviews, documents				
Narrative comments					
Recommendation(s)		Advocacy target(s)			

## 10. Investigation and exposure of corruption

DIMENSION	CAPACITY		
<b>Indicator number</b>	<b>10.1</b>		
<b>Indicator name:</b>	<b>Capacity for investigation and exposure of corruption</b>		
<b>Actor(s) responsible:</b>			
<b>Indicator question(s)</b>	<p><b>To what extent is there capacity for independent investigation and exposure of corruption at the local level?</b></p> <p>For example, is there an active national/local media that reports on corruption at the local level? Is there a local anti-corruption body? Does the national anti-corruption agency have powers to investigate corruption at the local level?</p>		
<b>Assessment</b>		The national/local media takes a strong interest in corruption issues in the local area. There is also an active local anti-corruption body or a national anti-corruption body with full powers to investigate corruption at the local level	
		The national/local media take some interest in corruption issues in the local area. There is no local anti-corruption body, although the national anti-corruption body has some powers to investigate corruption at the local level	
		There is no media interest in corruption issues in the local area and no anti-corruption body with any powers to investigate corruption at the local level	
<b>Source of information</b>	Interviews, policies, documents, media articles		
<b>Narrative comments</b>			
<b>Recommendation(s)</b>		<b>Advocacy target(s)</b>	

DIMENSION	EFFECTIVENESS		
Indicator number	10.2		
Indicator name:	Effectiveness of investigation and exposure of corruption		
Actor(s) responsible:			
Indicator question(s)	<p><b>To what extent are cases of corruption in the local government actually investigated and exposed in practice?</b></p> <p>Are there any cases of corruption investigations by journalists/anti-corruption bodies? How many investigations were begun and completed in the past year? How many investigations resulted in successful prosecutions?</p>		
Assessment		There is frequent investigation and exposure of corruption in the local government and some successful prosecutions as a result	
		There is some investigation and exposure of corruption in the local government but with limited prosecutions as a result	
		There is no investigation and exposure of corruption in the local government	
Source of information	Interviews, policies, documents, media articles		
Narrative comments			
Recommendation(s)		Advocacy target(s)	






## 11. Anti-corruption awareness-raising and advocacy

DIMENSION	CAPACITY		
<b>Indicator number</b>	11.1		
<b>Indicator name:</b>	Capacity for awareness-raising and advocacy on anti-corruption		
<b>Actor(s) responsible:</b>			
<b>Indicator question(s)</b>	<p><b>To what extent is there capacity for educational activities, public information and advocacy on anti-corruption issues at the local level?</b></p> <p>For example, do anti-corruption bodies, the national/local media and/or local/national civil society engage the public in anti-corruption issues at the local level? Are there specific public education campaigns or training programmes for local officials in this regard? Is there cooperation between different actors on this topic at the local level?</p>		
<b>Assessment</b>		Educational activities, public information and advocacy on anti-corruption issues at the local level are widespread and specific campaigns/programmes have been implemented over the past two years	
		There are some examples of educational activities, public information and advocacy on anti-corruption issues at the local level, although no specific campaigns/programmes have been implemented over the past two years	
		Educational activities, public information and advocacy on anti-corruption issues at the local level are absent	
<b>Source of information</b>	Interviews, policies, documents, media articles		
<b>Narrative comments</b>			
<b>Recommendation(s)</b>		<b>Advocacy target(s)</b>	

DIMENSION	EFFECTIVENESS		
Indicator number	11.2		
Indicator name:	Effectiveness of awareness-raising and advocacy on anti-corruption		
Actor(s) responsible:			
Indicator question(s)	<p><b>To what extent are educational activities, public information and advocacy on anti-corruption issues at the local level successful in combating corruption?</b></p> <p>Is there high-level support for these initiatives? Are there any specific examples of high-profile and successful activities in this regard? Are there any examples of the local government taking positive action following such initiatives?</p>		
Assessment		The national/local media takes a strong interest in corruption issues in the local area. There is also a local anti-corruption body or a national anti-corruption body with full powers to investigate corruption at the local level	
		The national/local media take some interest in corruption issues in the local area. There is no local anti-corruption body, although the national anti-corruption body has some powers to investigate corruption at the local level	
		There is no media interest in corruption issues in the local area and no anti-corruption body with any powers to investigate corruption at the local level	
Source of information	Interviews, policies, documents, media articles		
Narrative comments			
Recommendation(s)		Advocacy target(s)	

## 12. Social accountability

DIMENSION	CAPACITY		
<b>Indicator number</b>	<b>12.1</b>		
<b>Indicator name:</b>	<b>Capacity for social accountability</b>		
<b>Actor(s) responsible:</b>			
<b>Indicator question(s)</b>	<p><b>To what extent are non-governmental actors active in promoting social accountability to hold the local government to account?</b></p> <p>For example, do civil society organisations conduct citizen report cards, community scorecards, social audits, e-governance, citizen juries, participatory budgeting, etc. at the local level?</p>		
<b>Assessment</b>		Non-governmental actors are very active in promoting social accountability initiatives to hold the local government to account	
		Non-governmental actors are somewhat active in promoting social accountability initiatives to hold the local government to account	
		Non-governmental actors are inactive in promoting social accountability initiatives to hold the local government to account	
<b>Source of information</b>	Interviews, policies, documents, media articles		
<b>Narrative comments</b>			
<b>Recommendation(s)</b>		<b>Advocacy target(s)</b>	

DIMENSION	EFFECTIVENESS		
Indicator number	12.2		
Indicator name:	Effectiveness of social accountability		
Actor(s) responsible:			
Indicator question(s)	<p><b>To what extent have social accountability initiatives by non-governmental actors been successful in holding the local government to account?</b></p> <p>Are there any examples of local government management taking decisions/changing their behaviour as a result of such initiatives?</p>		
Assessment		Social accountability initiatives have been largely successful in holding the local government to account, with a number of recent examples of behaviour/policy change as a result	
		Social accountability initiatives have been somewhat successful in holding the local government to account, with at least one recent example of behaviour/policy change as a result	
		Social accountability initiatives are absent or have been unsuccessful in holding the local government to account, with no behaviour/policy change as a result	
Source of information	Interviews, policies, documents, media articles		
Narrative comments			
Recommendation(s)		Advocacy target(s)	


# ANNEX II: AGGREGATING SCORES

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
This annex presents the protocol for arriving at the colour for each of the dimensions (“capacity”, “role” and “governance”) under the LIS research framework. It presents the aggregated results for all possible combinations of green, orange and red for dimensions with two, three and four indicators.




It is important to note that the *order* in which the colours appear does not matter. It is the combination of colours that determines the dimension colour. For example, green+orange+orange is the same as orange+green+orange (with two orange and one green in both cases).

## Dimensions with two indicators

Indicator colours	Dimension colour
	
	
	
	
	
	

## Dimensions with three indicators





Dimensions with four indicators

Indicator colours

Dimension colour

